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PREFACE 
This thesis has been the result of a long standing interest in injury prevention. 
As a doctor in the Army, I have been long concerned about the high levels of injury in 
our soldiers. Much of this was due to errors in the physical training process, with an 
excessive focus on running and subsequent overuse injuries. Published research 
highlighting the impact of running distance on injury lead to changes in the training 
program, and I was instrumental in reducing the run test from 5 kilometres to 2.4 
kilometres. 
Efforts to introduce effective injury prevention programs have been stymied by 
the lack of cost data to bolster the case for "investing" in an effective injury prevention 
system. All government investment decisions are governed by business cases and 
potential cost savings. The absence of any accurate cost data has hampered effective 
argument for change. It is the accountants who rule the policy priority world, not 
clinicians. 
Recent developments have been encouraging. In 2002, the Defence Personnel 
Executive provided funds to establish the Defence Injury Prevention Program. I was 
intimately involved in its implementation, following the excellent work of Doctor 
Rodney Pope who developed the program and argued the case successfully on 
economic grounds. Identifying all the cost components of injury and their quantum is 
essential to maintain the momentum for change and further investment. 
Inappropriate or ineffective treatments are a misuse of scarce funds and can 
adversely impact on an individual's ability to continue serving in the Army or even 
keep a job. Costs matter because they are important to policy makers and accountants 
who govern public policy. This thesis aims to identify the true cost of injury to the 
Army and use this data to influence government policy and investment priorities. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is the first study to have determined a comprehensive estimate of the 
cost of injury to the Australian Army. The approach used was that of a cost of illness 
study, which summarised the economic burden of injury and provides information for 
stakeholders, allowing them to make informed decisions on the allocation of scarce 
healthcare resources. Cost of illness (COi) studies serve a different purpose to that of 
health economic evaluations which are focused on evaluating the cost of an 
intervention rather than estimating the cost of a particular disease. A "top down" 
approach to analysis was adopted utilising high level organisational databases to obtain 
cost data. This thesis adopted the primary perspective of government, but also 
considered costs from a societal and individual perspective. 
Estimating the economic burden of injury in a defined population is dependant 
on the availability of data of sufficient quality and scope, which is often lacking. This 
was the case in this thesis where available datasets contained data of poor quality or 
insufficient detail to provide accurate injury cost data. A number of assumptions were 
required in order to develop estimates of the contribution of injury to different sources 
of cost. There is a clear requirement for Defence to improve it injury surveillance and 
introduce an electronic health record to facilitate this. Efforts must also be made to link 
clinical data with cost data to better inform decision makers about the relative benefits 
achieved from the considerable cost resulting from injury. 
The cost of injury has three components; direct costs; indirect costs; and 
intangible costs. Direct costs considered in this analysis included external medical and 
compensation costs, as well as compensation liabilities calculated by the Australian 
Government Actuary. Indirect costs included productivity losses, with invalid pensions 
also included because they constitute a significant cost to Government not usually 
included in (COi) studies. An additional analysis of the net present value of lost wages 
was conducted on those soldiers who were invalided from the Army. A novel approach, 
termed the Capital Investment Model, was used to estimate the loss of training 
investment as a result of premature separation from the Army due to injury. Intangible 
costs were not included in this study because of the difficulty in placing a monetary 
value on these aspects of injury. 
Direct injury costs in 1996 were estimated to be between $40.75 and $42.36M 
with outstanding compensation liabilities of $270M. Indirect costs were estimated to be 
$10.74M with invalid pension liabilities of $63.82M. Capital losses due to premature 
separation from the Army due to injury were estimated to be $10.1 OM. The total cost of 
injury to the Australian Army (in 1996 dollars) was estimated to be between $61.59M 
and $63.20M, with estimated pension and compensation liabilities of $333.82M. Injury 
causes a significant financial impost. 
This is also the first study to compare the cost and outcomes of a range of spinal 
surgical procedures reflective of general orthopaedic community practice. It adopted a 
"bottom up" approach to analysis, where detailed data was obtained from individual 
records and a patient survey. This allowed for outcome and cost analysis by subgroup. 
A number of findings were consistent with the literature, in particular the dissociation 
between pain score and functional capacity. Increasing complexity of surgical 
intervention increased costs with no improvement in clinical outcome and alarming 
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levels of radiological exposure was found. Radiation exposure could not be compared 
to other studies as they did not report the distribution of radiological investigations. The 
decision to undergo surgery appears to be based on the baseline level of pain and the 
fear of it worsening rather than specific clinical indications. The use of effective non-
operative methods of reducing pain offers the prospect of significantly reducing the 
patient demand for surgery and its attendant cost. 
The greatest injury-related cost savings from a societal perspective are obtained 
from interventions that promote early return to work and minimize lost productivity. 
Preventing an injury prevents the associated cost, so efforts in the area of injury 
prevention are critical in reducing the burden of injury. The significant reduction in 
injury observed from the Defence Injury Prevention Program highlights the benefit of 
effective primary prevention programs. Equally, once an injury occurs, secondary 
prevention efforts seek to achieve maximum restoration of function with minimal 
morbidity and cost. The results of the spinal surgery study have shown that 
improvement in primary outcome measures are not effect by the cost of the chosen 
intervention and efforts to achieve pain relief through non-operative means ,in order to 
prevent surgical intervention, should be a high priority for research, not just in Army 
but in the broader community. 
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Chapter 1. The Importance of Injury 
"the enormous cost of work-related injury and disease is something with which 
Australian industry, and the community in general, has not fully come to terms. It is 
not long ago that the attitude which prevailed was that injury and disease was part and 
parcel of work, largely a matter ofluck, about which little could be done .... Australian 
workplaces of best practice have shown what can be done and the great gains which can 
be made through prevention .... The lack of fervour, evident in some quarters to seize 
this opportunity appears to stem from the fact that many decision-makers in industry 
simply remain unaware of the bottom line impact that successful strategies might have, 
both in economic and human terms." 
Edward A. Emmett, Chief Executive Worksafe Australia (Worksafe Australia 1994). 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate the importance of injury not only from a 
morbidity and mortality perspective, but also from a public health one. As Emmett has 
stated, many view injury as "a matter of luck", and this attitude risks becoming a self 
fulfilling prophesy. Injury has assumed increasing importance as evidenced by it's 
inclusion as one of Australia's top ten health priorities. 
1.2 Definition of Injury 
Injury has been defined as "unintentional or intentional damage to the body 
resulting from acute exposure to thermal, mechanical, electrical or chemical energy or 
from the absence of such essentials as heat or oxygen" (National Committee for Injury 
Prevention and Control 1989). 
The Australian National Injury Surveillance Unit (NISU) uses the following 
definition of injury: "Disruption of the structure or function of the human organism, 
resulting from exposure to excessive or deficient energy" (Harrison 1994 ). 
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Others argue that the definition of injury is more complex than simply the 
transfer of energy (Langley 2004 ). Langley argues that there is no scientific distinction 
between disease and injury, and that injuries should be defined simultaneously by the 
causative event and the resulting pathology. For example, bruising can be due to energy 
exchange or an underlying medical disorder such as sepsis. 
In contrast, "disease" tends to be used for pathologies such as cancer which 
manifest themselves over longer periods following initial exposure to the causative 
event. Injury is commonly understood in the context of a pathological consequence 
arising from a specific precipitating event. 
In such a context, psychological injury, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, 
can be included as there is always a specific precipitating traumatic event, despite the 
lack of any energy transfer. In New Zealand, in 2000/2001, the Accident Compensation 
Corporation compensated 267 people for psychological injury at a total cost $NZ2 659 
000 (Langley 2004 ). 
Tissue damage due to chronic low energy exposures (e.g. carpal tunnel 
syndrome or overuse syndromes of the lower limbs) are often excluded by more 
traditional definitions but as Robertson has pointed out; some have modified the energy 
definition to include such cases (Robertson 1998). 
Langley argues that most injuries are considered to be those pathologies 
included in the "Injury and Poisoning" chapter of the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD 9th revision) and those events coded as Supplementary External Causes 
(E codes). 
Langley considers this range of codes to be anomalous as they are inconsistent 
with the ICD approach to other injuries. For example, ICD does not have a grouping of 
codes for "effects of motor vehicle crashes", instead the actual pathology must be coded. 
Musculoskeletal conditions related to the knee and back fall outside the Injury and 
Poisoning code range, but many would classify these as injuries. The ICD injury and 
poisoning codes also do not include psychological injury. 
The inclusion or exclusion of "medical" injuries can have a dramatic effect on 
estimates of injury incidence. In New Zealand, in 1998, there were 67 428 public 
hospital discharges which had injury (ICD codes 800-999) as the primary diagnosis, 
and 17% of these were in the ICD code range 996-999; complications of surgical and 
medical care, not elsewhere classified (Langley 2002). 
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One study in New Zealand has shown that 26% of all persons discharged from a 
public hospital, and whose record was assigned an E code, did not have a diagnostic 
code within the injury and poisoning range (Pickett 1999). 
Langley argues that because of the definitional variations discussed above, 
estimates of the incidence of injury can vary substantially. Injury is now considered to 
include pathologies that fall outside of the ICD 9 chapter on injury and poisoning and 
this has important implications for determining priorities, as the true extent and cost of 
injuries can be hidden within other categories. 
1.3 Morbidity associated with Injury 
Wheatley (Wheatley 1989) has described the concept of the injury "iceberg" for 
conceptualising injury morbidity. Fatalities represent the tip and minor injuries the large 
submerged mass. Injury researchers alternately describe this as the injury "pyramid", 
where death and serious injury comprise the tip of the pyramid and the large number of 
minor injuries constitutes the base. A lot is known about fatalities, less about hospital 
admissions, and even less about the remainder. 
In 1994, it was estimated that the Australian injury burden consisted of 7 ,489 
deaths, 300,000 hospital admissions, 5.7 million doctor consultations and over 10 
million recent minor injuries (Department of Human Services and Health 1994). 
In Australia in 1991, injury was the 5th leading cause of death, second in years 
of potential life lost before age 65, second in inpatient episodes, third in hospital bed 
days, fourth in doctor visits and the fourth leading cause of recent illness. Injury also 
accounted for 6.5% of deaths and 10% of hospital admissions in Australia during 1991 
(Department of Human Services and Health 1994 ). 
Figure 1.1 shows the injury pyramid estimated from morbidity and mortality 
data obtained for the period 2004/05. The ratio of deaths to hospitalisations to injury 
events was 1 death to 50 hospitalisations to 454 injury events (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare 2006). Injury prevention and control was declared a National 
Health Priority Area in 1997, and is the subject of a national prevention plan (NPHP 
2005). 
Deaths 
7.966 
Hospitalisations 
397,599 
Recent Injury Events 
3,614,400 
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Figure 1.1. The Australian injury pyramid (Adapted from Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare 2006). 
A set of measures, called disability-adjusted life years (DALY s), has been 
developed to summarise the burden of disease and injury at a population level. DALY s 
combine information on the impact of premature death with non-fatal health outcomes. 
Premature death is measured by the years of life lost (YLL) due to disease or injury 
and non-fatal health outcomes are measured by years of 'healthy' life lost (YLD) due 
to disease, disability or injury. To combine these two health measures into a summary 
health measure, the DALY uses time as a common denominator. It is a measure of the 
years of healthy life lost due to illness or injury-one DALY is one lost year of 
'healthy' life (Begg 2007). 
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A recent review by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare found injuries 
were the second highest contributor to the burden of disease and injury among young 
Australians aged 15-24 years. Injury accounted for 36,052 DALYs, or 18% of the total 
burden, after mental disorders, which accounted for 49%. The burden of injury among 
young Australians was higher than for all ages, at a rate of 13 DALY s per 1,000 
population compared with 9 DALY s per 1,000 population for all ages (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare 2008). 
Young males had the highest rate of injury burden of all age groups, with a rate 
of 20 DALY s per 1,000 population, while the rate for young females ( 6 DALY s per 
1,000 population) was the third highest due to the impact of falls among older women 
aged 65 and over. 
Injuries were the leading cause of premature mortality in Australia -accounting 
for 27,683 years oflife lost (YLL) or two-thirds of the total years oflife lost due to 
disease or injury. In terms of healthy years oflife lost (YLD), injuries ranked fourth 
highest after mental disorders, neurological and sense disorders and genitourinary 
diseases, with 8,369 YLD or 5.4% of all YLD. Road traffic accidents, suicide and self-
inflicted injuries accounted for almost two-thirds of the total injury burden for young 
people aged 15-24. The total injury burden for young males was more than three times 
that for young females in 2003 (28,191 compared with 7,861 DALYs) (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare 2008). 
In Australia in 2003, twenty specific disease contributors accounted for about 
60% of the total burden of disease as measured by DALY s. Back pain (1.1 % ) and 
osteoarthritis (1.3%) were the 19th and 16th most common causes on prolonged 
disability (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2006). 
Incidence data are useful in providing information on the rate at which people in 
the community sustain injuries. Incidence data also provides a more complete picture of 
injury occurrence than hospitalisation or death records, as incidence captures the less 
severe injuries that do not require hospitalisation or result in death. 
The ABS 2004-05 National Health Survey (NHS) asked about the most recent 
injury sustained by young people in the 4 weeks preceding the survey for which an 
action was taken, such as receiving medical treatment or reducing usual activities 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006a). An estimated 793,400 young people (23% of 
the population at risk) sustained one or more injuries during this period-accounting 
for around one-fifth of injuries for all ages. Proportions for young males and females 
were similar (24% and 22%, respectively). An estimated 6% of 18-24 year olds 
sustained their most recent injury while under the influence of alcohol or other 
substances, compared with 2% of the population aged 25 years and over. 
The leading causes of the most recent injury for both males and females were 
being cut with a knife, tool or other implement (29%), followed by a low fall of one 
metre or less (19%) and hitting or being hit by something (17%). The most common 
injuries sustained were open wounds (43%), bruising (23%), and dislocations, sprains, 
strains or tom muscles/ligaments (15%). 
It is difficult to determine the severity of these injuries from the NHS data, but 
treatment outcomes can be used as an indicator of severity. An estimated 6% attended 
hospital (including admission and emergency department visits), 19% consulted 
a doctor or other health professional, 10% had days off work or study and 24 % cut 
down on their usual activities due to their most recent injury (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2006a). 
There were 86,032 hospitalisations due to injury-a rate of2,326/100,000. 
Almost three-quarters of these hospitalisations were for young males (61,072 
hospitalisations). The injury hospitalisation rate has increased by 7% since 1996-97, 
with the male rate consistently more than twice the female rate over this period (3,171 
compared with 1,391per100,000 young people in 2005-06) (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare 2008). 
In 2005, there were 1,401 deaths of young people aged 16-25. Injury was the 
underlying cause of two-thirds of these deaths, followed by neoplasm and diseases of 
the nervous system. Injury accounted for 71 % of all deaths among those aged 18-24 
years, 66% of all deaths for 15-17 year olds and 38% of all deaths among 12-14 year 
olds in 2005 (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2008). 
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Young people comprised 12% of all injury deaths in 2005-14% among males 
and 8% among females. The injury death rate in the 12-24 year age group was 26 
1100,000, with the majority of deaths occurring in the 18-24 year age group (80%), 
followed by those aged 15-17 years (17%) and 12-14 years (4%). Injury death rates in 
Australia have halved during the past 50 years, from 1161100,000 males in 1955 to 
551100,000 in 2004, and from 51 to 23 deaths per 100,000 females (Australian Institute 
of Health and Welfare 2006). 
From the foregoing review it can be seen that injury is the leading cause of 
hospitalisation and mortality amongst young adults, in particular young males. This is 
the demographic from which the Army draws its recruits. Some success in reducing the 
impact of these injuries has been achieved with the halving of the population death 
rates from injury, but more targeted efforts in young adults is required. 
1.4 International Injury Experience 
Injuries are an important cause of death in most countries and are usually the 
leading cause of premature mortality in most developed countries (Rockett 1989b ). 
Table 1.1 shows various international comparisons of injury mortality rates. 
The US National Centre for Health Statistics estimated that in the age group 
1-24 years, for every injury death there were 17.4 injury hospitalisations, 356 
emergency department (ED) visits and 700 selfreported visits (Fingerhut 1994 ). In 
Israel, 6% of all short stay hospitalisations were due to injuries with an admission rate 
of8.7/1000(Zadka1994). 
One third of respondents in a US study reported an injury that limited their daily 
activities, but did not seek formal medical attention. Interestingly, some types of injury 
with high rates of medical attention did not result in high rates of medical restriction. 
Skull fractures and lacerations usually received medical attention, yet less than 50% of 
medically attended skull fractures and 30% of lacerations resulted in any restriction of 
activity. On the other hand, 60% of strains/sprains resulted in restriction of activity 
(Overpeck 1994). 
Country Rate 
Australia (combined) 57 /100,000 
United States Male 106 /100,000 
Female 38 /100,000 
New Zealand 62 /100,000 
United Kingdom Male 52 /100,000 
Female 37 /100,000 
Germany Male 88 /100,000 
Female 52 /100,000 
Sweden 44 /100,000 
Norway 46 /100,000 
Table 1.1 International comparison of mortality from injury, by Sex derived from 
WHO mortality tabulations. (Rockett l 989a, Rockett l 989b) 
Corso estimated the incidence and lifetime cost of injuries in the United States 
for injuries that occurred in 2000. In that year, Americans suffered more than 50 
million medically treated injuries, with 150, 000 (0.3%) of these being fatal. This 
equated to injury rates of 200/1000 males and 17011000 females. The total lifetime 
cost of these injuries was estimated to be $406 billion; $80 billion for medical 
treatment and $326 billion for lost productivity (Corso 2006). 
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Corso compared the findings of his study with a similar one in 1985 to 
determine any trends in injury incidence. While the overall incidence of injuries 
declined 15% from 1985 to 2000, the total medical costs of injuries (in real dollars) 
declined roughly 20%. This decrease in cost, although driven mainly by the decrease in 
injury incidence, was also considered to be the result of advances in trauma care, a shift 
toward managed care, and successful injury prevention efforts that minimized the harm 
resulting from injuries (e.g. safety belts, helmets). 
Mulder noted that public health interventions in the Netherlands during the 20th 
century had added 30 years to average life expectancy (Mulder 2002). In the absence of 
disease epidemics, injuries had become more prominent and accounted for 16% of 
deaths worldwide in the 1990s (World Health Organisation 1999). 
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Mulder used an incidence approach to estimate the lifetime costs of all injuries 
that occurred in 1997 (Mulder 2002a, Meerding 2000). The incidence of injuries treated 
in emergency departments in 1997, was determined from the Dutch Injury Surveillance 
System (Dekker 2000). In 1997, 1.1 million injury patients were treated at emergency 
departments and 104,000 patients were admitted to hospital for injury in the 
Netherlands. The total direct medical costs of injury was estimated to be 2.2 billion 
guilders (USD$110M), with an average of2000 Guilders (USD$100) for each injury 
patient who visited the emergency department. 
Home and leisure injuries accounted for over half of all recorded injury 
presentations, followed by sports (17%), and traffic accidents (13%). Home and leisure 
also account for the most costs (59%), followed by traffic accidents (19%) and sports 
(10%). 
Injuries to the lower extremities accounted for nearly 50% of total injury costs 
(1 billion guilders: USD$50M) but only 15% of injury incidence. Superficial injuries 
and wounds were the most common ( 42% ), but accounted for only 15% of costs. 
Home and leisure injuries accounted for lower extremity injury costs (69%), 
particularly for hip (85%) and pelvic fractures (66%). For sports, the upper extremities 
dominated injury costs (15% ), especially luxations and distortions of the wrist, hand 
and fingers (28%), and hand and finger fractures (23%). 
Mulder argues that this approach combines public health data from various 
sources under one common denominator: money. Adding cost data to standard 
epidemiological data provides a greater sense of priority to bureaucrats than more 
abstract concepts such as DAL Ys. Epidemiological and cost data should be combined 
and used to prioritize injuries for prevention. Comparing epidemiological criteria such 
as magnitude and severity with intervention criteria such availability of suitable, 
efficient, and effective interventions, leads to a more transparent discussion on 
prioritisation (Gillespie 2003). 
The total health care costs generated by injuries indicates the relative 
importance of injuries to the health sector as a whole and may be useful in convincing 
politicians to put injuries on their agenda. 
1.5 Sex Differences in Injury Incidence 
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Harrison noted that "Injury is predominately a male condition, whether 
measured in terms of case numbers, population incidence rates, mortality or morbidity" 
(Department of Human Services and Health 1994). 
Age standardized mortality for males in 1990 was 2. 7 times greater than in 
females. Hospital admissions were 1.5 times more frequent and ED visits were 1.8 
times greater. Other non-injury causes of mortality do not show a male excess. 
Hospital, all-age separation rates for injury in 1989-90 were 23/1000 for males and 
15.3/1000 for females. The all persons rate was 19.1/1000 (Department of Human 
Services and Health 1994). 
In 1993, eighty two percent of national Australian Emergency Department 
presentations for injury were male. The main mechanism reported was a 
graze/laceration in 33% and a direct blow in another 33%. Strains accounted for 11 %, 
injuries to the fingers accounted for 24%, eye injuries 15% and the lower back 4%. This 
pattern was very different to the claims pattern reported by W orksafe Australia 
(National Injury Surveillance Unit 1994). 
Differences between male and female injury rates are attributable, in part, to 
differences in exposure to hazards flowing from the continuing gender-segregation of 
many occupations. For example, in the mining industry, the rate of reported injury in 
males during 1991-92 was 41. 7 /million hours worked and 10.5/million hours in 
females, giving a relative risk of 4 in the males. But this is really a reflection of the 
greater number of males engaged in the mining industry, and their increased exposure 
to workplace hazards. 
In 2005-06, injury was the leading cause of hospitalisation for young males 
aged 12-24 years, accounting for 30% of all hospitalisations. For females, injury was 
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the fourth leading cause of hospitalisation among 12-24 year olds, with other causes, 
such as pregnancy, mental and behavioural disorders accounting for a higher number of 
hospitalisations (Berry 2007). 
Australian male workers were responsible for 68% of all compensation claims 
lodged in 2004-05. This represented 70% of injury claims and 64% of disease claims 
(Australian Safety and Compensation Council 2007). Male employees were twice as 
likely as female employees to make a claim (22 /1000 compared with 11/1000). Males 
were 2.1 times more likely to have an injury claim and were 1.6 times more likely to 
have a disease claim. 
Males were responsible for over 75% of injury deaths among young adults in 
Australia in 2005. The injury death rate for young males was 3 times the rate for young 
females (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2008). The data confirms 
Harrison's original observation; injury is primarily a male phenomenon, especially 
amongst young adults. 
1.6 Sports Injuries 
Approximately 1 million sports injuries are reported each year in Australia, and 
it was estimated that in 1992 these injuries resulted in direct and indirect costs totalling 
$1 billion (Egger 1992)(Egger 1991 ). In 1993, 2,500 Victorians were admitted for 
sports related injury, and required 5,725 hospital bed days. (Victorian Inpatient 
Minimum Data set 1992) 
Sports injuries represented 12% of all hospital admissions for unintentional 
injury in Victoria for the age range 10-29 years. (Langlois 1992). Sports related injuries 
in children in the 10-14 year age group were the single highest cause of attendance at 
Emergency Departments (ED) contributing data to the Victorian Injury Surveillance 
System (Victorian Injury Surveillance System 1991). 
In 2005/06, sporting and leisure injuries accounted for 49% of hospitalised 
injuries for young people in Australia (55% for young males and 31 % for females). 
Half of these hospitalisations occurred as a result of playing team ball sports (9,820 
12 
hospitalisations). The proportion was much higher among young males compared with 
young females (54% and 36%, respectively), and was highest among males aged 12-14 
years (37%) and 15-17 years (38%). The most common team ball sports leading to 
injury hospitalisations for 12-24 year olds were Australian Rules football (25%), soccer 
(18%) and unspecified football (17%) (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
2008). 
1.7 Occupational Injury 
"There is universal agreement that work-related injuries constitute a 
considerable cost to individuals, firms and society as a whole. There is also similar 
agreement that the extent of these costs is much greater than the size of worker 
compensation payouts. This is because of the dislocation to family and business life, 
particularly production, which occurs when employees are injured and the 
corresponding increase in the demand for state and privately funded medical and 
rehabilitation services." (Mangan 1993). 
The annual cost of work-related injury and disease in Australia has been 
estimated by the Industry Commission to be A$20 Billion dollars (Industry 
Commission 1995). In the United States, it was estimated that there were at least 10 
million traumatic work injuries per year with an annual cost of more than US$83 billion 
(Satcher 1994 ). 
Occupational injury remains a significant cause of death and morbidity as well 
as a major social and economic cost. In Australia during the l 990's, there were 
approximately 500 deaths a year and 200,000 work-related injuries that required time 
off work longer than 5 days. The cost of these injuries was estimated to be at least A$9 
billion annually (Routley 1993). 
Most data on occupational injury is derived from Worker's compensation data 
(Worksafe Australia 1994). But this data only includes cases that resulted in death, 
permanent disability or temporary disability of at least 5 working days. A large number 
of cases are excluded by this definition. 
During the period 1991-2, 38.8% of accepted workers compensation claims in 
the Northern Territory (NT) involved no loss of time from work, and another 24.9% 
involved less than 5 days oflost time (Work Health Authority 1993). Thus 64% of 
workplace injuries in the NT fell outside the scope of workers compensation data 
reports. 
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Conversely, a New South Wales survey showed that only 47% of those injured 
on the job applied for workers compensation (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1993 ). Of 
those who did not apply, only half said that they had a minor injury or that they did not 
need to apply. This suggests significant under reporting of workplace injury in that 
State. 
Many occupational injuries are also misclassified as "diseases", and this is due 
to the traditional definition of injury as the "result of a single traumatic event where the 
harm or hurt is immediately apparent". Under this definition, hearing loss, activity 
related soft-tissue disorders and vertebral disc dysfunction are classed as diseases, when 
in the majority of cases these conditions are the sequelae of injury or repetitive 
microtrauma. 
Musculoskeletal conditions accounted for 44% of all compensated "disease" in 
South Australia during 1989-90 (Worksafe Australia 1993). Sprains and strains (46.9%) 
were the most common type of injury reported nationwide, with women having a 
greater percentage of sprains than men (56.7% vs. 43.8%). The back comprised 25.l % 
of all injuries, followed by hand/fingers 14.3%, ear 8.1 %, knee 6.5%, shoulder 5% and 
ankle 4.3%. Females had a higher proportion of back injuries than men; 29% vs. 23.8 
%. (Worksafe Australia 1993). 
From an international perspective the burden of occupational disease and injury 
was estimated by the World Health Organisation to be 10.5 DALYs or 3.5 years of 
healthy life lost per 1,000 workers every year at a global level (World Health 
Organisation 2002). But as Eijkemans (Eijkemans 2005) noted, the most important 
limitation in estimating the burden of occupational disease is " the lack of reliable 
data". 
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Eijekemans went on to comment that "under-reporting in existing systems in all 
countries leads to substantial under-counting of occupational injuries and diseases and 
shows an inadequate picture of the true magnitude of the problem ... Even the best 
financed systems produce imperfect data, leaving decision-makers with a large 
underestimate of the problem". 
Biddle (Biddle 1998) estimated that in the US between 9 and 45% of eligible 
workers file for workers compensation benefits. Leigh (Leigh 2004) estimated that in 
the US between $8-23 billion in medical costs was not captured by the workers 
compensation system. He noted that this shifted " responsibilities and costs from the 
workers compensation system to individual workers, their families , private medical 
insurance and taxpayers". 
Concha-Barrientos (Concha-Barrientos 2004) estimated that occupational risk 
factors were responsible for 8.8% of the global burden of mortality and 8.1 % of 
DALYs due to injury. Punnett (Punnett 2005) estimated that 37% of world wide low 
back pain (LBP) was attributable to occupation and was responsible for 818,000 
DAL Ys. He argued that occupational exposures to ergonomic stressors were an 
important source of preventable back pain. 
Among the 15-24 age group, work-related injuries are a significant cause of 
morbidity. This may be due to the types of jobs they undertake, inexperience with the 
tasks required, or risk-taking (Moller 1995). For young people aged 15-17 years, 7% of 
hospitalised injuries occurred while working for an income, and this figure increased to 
19% among 18-24 year olds, with the proportion among males being much higher than 
for females (Flood 2007). 
The NSW Injury Risk Management Research Centre (IRMRC) estimated the 
cost of workplace injury in NSW in 2000-2001 to be $16.9 billion, with an average cost 
of $118,540 per incident (Forbes 2005). In 2004-05, there were 140 655 new workers 
compensation claims raised in Australia, including 214 fatalities. The national claims 
rate was 17 /1000 employees: comprising 12 injury claims /1000 and 4.4 disease claims 
/1000 employees (Australian Safety and Compensation Council 2007). 
The industries with claims rates above the national average were; transport and 
storage (32/1000), manufacturing (32/1000), construction (30/1000), Agriculture, 
forestry and fishing (28/1000) and Mining (27 /1000). The Mining industry had the 
greatest improvement, reducing its incidence rate by 4 7% (from 51 I 1000 in 1996-97 
to 27/1000 in 2003-04). 
Injury-related claims accounted for 74% of all claims, with sprains and strains 
predominating (44%), followed by open wounds (8%) and fractures (8%).Disease-
related claims accounted for 26% of all new claims, with the most common diseases 
being disorders of muscle, tendons and other soft tissues (6%), mental disorders (6%), 
disorders of the spine (5%) deafness (3%) and hernia (3%). 
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Manual-handling accounted for 43% of all new claims, with falls on the same 
level accounting for 13%. The back was the most common location of injury or disease, 
representing 24% of all claims, followed by hands (12%), shoulder (8%) and knee 
(8%). 
The Australian Safety and Compensation Council now groups musculoskeletal 
disease with injuries rather than disease. Table 1.2 shows that this combined grouping 
was responsible for over 85% of all new claims between 1996-97 and 2003-04. Sprains, 
strains and musculoskeletal diseases were by far the single most common cause of 
claim accounting for between 53 and 58% of all new claims during this same period. 
Injury ,Poisoning,MS 
D 
Total 
% 
1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 
143,270 133,740 132,775 133,165 129,385 125,270 123,835 122,865 
164,910 153,240 149,630 149,935 147,800 144,005 142,970 144,025 
86.9% 87.3% 88.7% 88.8% 87.5% 87.0% 86.6% 85.3% 
Table 1.2 The number of new claims for Injury, Poisoning and Musculoskeletal 
Disorders (MSD) by year, from 1996-97 to 2003-04 (Australian Safety and 
Compensation Council 2007). 
Between 1996-97 and 2003-04, total compensated fatalities in Australia 
decreased by 36%, from 398 to 256. The incidence rate nearly halved from 5.4 to 3.1 
compensated fatalities /100 000 employees. 
The Mining industry employed 106 000 people in Australia in 2004-05, 1 % of 
the Australian workforce. It has traditionally been one of the most hazardous of 
industries with high injury and fatality rates. The rate of new claims fell from 51/1000 
to 2711000 between 1996-97 and 2003-04. This represented a 47% decrease in claims, 
almost double the decrease in claims observed across all industries. 
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Total fatalities in mining decreased from 24 (29/100,000) to 8 (9/100,000) 
between 1996-97 and 2003---04. This represents a 69% improvement, well in excess of 
the decrease in the incidence rate of all claims (43%). However, this death rate remains 
nearly three times the national rate (3 .1/100 000 employees). 
These reductions in mining represent the result of determined efforts to reduce 
injury rates and improve safety within that industry. It highlights the benefits of 
effective injury prevention strategies. Work injuries in Australia overall have reduced 
over the last 10 years. The industries with claims rates above the national average are 
those that bear the closest similarity to the Army workforce; transport and storage, 
construction and mining. 
Musculoskeletal skeletal injury and disease are the leading cause of claims, and 
efforts to reduce the incidence and severity of these is likely to reduce both injuries and 
costs significantly. 
1.8 Injury Severity and Outcome 
Overpeck (Overpeck 1994) has stated that "Injury outcomes of most treated 
injuries, including severity and activity restriction, are generally unknown." 
Injury data is usually available in direct proportion to case severity, and in 
inverse proportion to frequency. It is important, however, not to underrate the social 
and economic importance of less severe injuries. 
17 
Injury severity has typically been measured using proxies such as death or 
duration of stay in hospital. Length of stay can be used as an indication of the burden of 
an external cause or health condition on the hospital system. The value of a severity 
indicator is dependent on the accuracy of the data on which it is based and its suitability 
for planning purposes (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2008). 
Length of stay in hospital however, does not take into account transfers between 
hospitals and variations in clinical and administrative practice, which can increase or 
decrease the apparent severity for a given injury cause (Kim 2000, Stephenson 2002). 
Length of stay also does not account for the long-term consequences of injury. For 
example, some spinal cord injuries result in life long disability at an enormous cost to 
the health system, but the average length of stay in hospital may be comparatively short 
compared to other injuries from which full recovery occurs. 
Planning for future needs with respect to rehabilitation and other costs to the 
health system require the development of more sophisticated indicators of severity. 
Definitions and measurement of the severity of an injury are important mechanisms in 
determining the cost of injury (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2008). 
Zadkha (Zadka 1994) noted that one of the major issues with injury was the 
long lasting and permanent disability, which arose from serious injury. McClure 
(McClure 1994) argued that for injury control purposes it is important to divide injury 
into relevant subsets based on the severity of injury. 
A number of methods have been employed to measure the severity of life 
threatening injury (Bakerl 974, Champion I 990). These assessments are made at the 
time of injury, and do not have any relationship to ultimate outcome. Little work has 
been done on non-life threatening injury. 
In the US, most studies have concentrated on the outcomes of more severe 
injuries. Several authors however have commented on the high incidence of non-life 
threatening injuries to extremities that result in long-term disability (Yates1991, Levine 
1987). McKenzie, in a functional study of recovery after trauma, found that only 63% 
of those with minor injury to the extremities had returned to work within the year 
(McKenzie 1988). Bull (Bull 1985), analysed the disabilities suffered by survivors of 
road traffic accidents in the UK. He found 28% of inpatient and 3% of ambulatory 
casualties had some form of permanent disability. 
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Moderate to severe traumatic brain injury often leaves people with intellectual 
impairments and limitations in activities of daily living (Colantonio 2004). As they are 
often discharged from hospital within a relatively short time frame, the extent of this 
morbidity can be hidden. Poor quality of life and poor subjective wellbeing have been 
shown to persist with little change over time up to 15 years after brain injury (Teasdale 
2005). 
In Australia in 2005-06, there were 197,865 bed days for hospitalisations with a 
principal diagnosis of injury with over 70% of these being same-day separations. 
The average length of stay for injuries with an external cause was 2.2 days including 
same-day separations and 5.4 days, excluding same-day separations. Complications of 
medical and surgical care had the longest average length of stay of the leading external 
causes of injury (3.5 days), followed by transport accidents (3.3 days) and intentional 
self-harm (2.3 days). 
Excluding same-day separations, transport accidents had the longest average 
length of stay of the leading external causes of injury (7 .3 days), followed by 
complications of medical and surgical care (6.4 days), intentional self-harm (5.8 days) 
and falls (4.3 days). Assault and accidental poisoning also had high average lengths of 
stay ( 4.1 days each). 
While recovery from most minor injuries is rapid, some injuries often result in 
long term disability. These long term sequelae are less well documented than the 
immediate consequences of injury (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2006). 
An indication of the extent of these problems is provided by the National Health Survey 
(NHS) conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. In 2001, the NHS estimated 
that almost 2.1 million Australians (12% of the total population) had a long-term 
condition caused by an injury (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006a). The 2003 Survey 
of Disability, Ageing and Carers estimated that 25,600 persons were living with 
disabilities due to injury that resulted in profound limitation in the core activities of 
communication, mobility and self-care. Another 39,800 reported severe limitations in 
activity (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004). 
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Severity of injury should not simply be judged by the initial nature of the injury. 
Many seemingly minor injuries resulting in minimal or no days in hospital can have a 
major impact on morbidity, function and quality of life. 
1.9 Predicting Outcomes 
"The ability to identify those injuries which result in major morbidity, is an 
important aid to controlling the burden of injury to the community, and they can be 
subjected to injury prevention strategies." (Alexanderl 992). 
The health consequences of non-life threatening injuries can be significant. In 
one study examining minor "whiplash" injury, 14% of patients were found to have 
continuing symptoms 5 months post injury. (Pennie 1991). In a Swedish study 
(Hildingson 1990), 43% of vehicle accident victims who suffered a soft-tissue injury to 
the cervical spine were found to have residual disability 2 years after their accident. 
Alexander argued that there was a need to improve acute medical care and 
increase rehabilitation support post discharge. The type of injury was found to be the 
only consistently significant predictor of impairment, and not age or location of injury 
in an insurance model (Alexander 1992). 
Mock (Mock 1993) used regression analysis to predict subsequent 
disability in patients at a rural hospital in Ghana. Using injury type, mechanism of 
injury, region, age, sex, referral and inpatient complications, he found that the strongest 
predictors of disability were body part injured and type of injury. 
With advances in medical technology and an increasing number of people 
surviving a serious injury, studies of the burden and cost of injury need to include long-
term morbidity indicators (Sbordone 1995, Murray 1996, Stone 2001). Current 
estimates of the burden of non-fatal injury have largely been derived from the opinions 
of expert panel predictions, but the reliability of these outcomes predictions has been 
questioned (Schluter 2005). 
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Cameron noted that there were few population-based studies of long-term 
outcome of non-fatal injury from which accurate estimates of the burden of injury could 
be derived (Cameron 2006a). The nature of morbidity and disability outcomes from 
injury were also poorly conceptualized and difficult to measure (Kuipers 2004,Singh-
Manoux 2003 ). 
Cameron analysed the Manitoba health admission database and identified all 
persons aged 18-64 years, resident in the province of Manitoba, who were hospitalized 
with an injury between 1 January 1988 and 31 December 1991 (Cameron 2006b). 
Injury severity scores (ISS) > 16 were considered to be a major injury, an ISS of 9-15 a 
moderate injury, and a mild injury was defined as an ISS of 1-8 (McEvoy 2004, Morris 
1990). 
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Figure 1.2 Rate of hospital admissions in the 10 years following an initial injury. 
(From Cameron 2006b) [ A = injury cohort, • = control group] 
Outcome measures selected were number of hospitalizations, cumulative length 
of stay for the 10 years post-injury, physician claims for the 10 years post-injury and 
first admission to a care home during the 10-year follow up period. Males comprised 
63.9% of the sample, with 18-34 year olds representing 54.3% of the 21,032 injured 
people. Over the 10-year follow-up period, 8.0% of the injury cohort died (n = 1677) 
compared with 3.6% of the comparison cohort members (n = 754). 
Figure 1.2 shows that although rates of admission peaked in the first year 
following injury, consistent rate ratios of 2.0 to 2.6 demonstrated that admission rates 
remained higher than the non-injured for many years' post-injury. The injured cohort 
had 1.63 times the number of all-cause post-injury hospital discharges (95% CI, 1.59-
1.68), 3.22 times the number of days' post-injury in hospital for all causes (95% CI, 
2.96-3.50), 1.28 times the post-injury physician claims rate (95% CI, 1.26-1.30) and 
4.37 times the rate of placements in care homes than the comparison cohort (95% CI, 
3.18-6.02). 
Hospital discharge rates were similar for each of the three levels of severity 
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of injury, measured by the ISS . In contrast, LOS rate ratios increased with the severity 
of the injury in the 10 years following injury. Those with minor injury had LOS of2.08 
days/person-year (RR =2.53; 95% CI, 2.34-2.74) compared to 5.07days/person-year in 
those with moderate injuries (RR= 5.52; 95% CI, 4.37-6.99) and 10.49 days/ person-
year in those with an ISS score of> 16 (RR= 11.54; 95% CI, 6.34-21.02). Rates of all-
cause post-injury physician claims increased with increasing severity of the injury, but 
fewer of the post-injury physician claims were found to be attributed to the original 
index injury (between 20.0% and 36.7%). 
The predictors of disability post injury are poorly understood. Age and pre-
existing illness need to be considered, while body part injured and injury type appears 
to be the most consistent predictors. Initial severity of injury has been shown to be a 
reasonable predictor of subsequent health service utilisation. 
1.10 Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation is defined by the WHO as "the physical and behavioural 
processes used to limit handicap and disability in patients who have impairments as the 
result of injury or illness". (World Health Organization 1990) Rehabilitation services 
have the ability to produce significant benefits on two levels; early return to function 
and reduced hospital stay costs. 
The Industry Commission noted that "Overall, .... Rehabilitation has generally 
been proven to be cost-effective, although the returns compared to outlays appear to 
vary widely" (Industry Commission 1993). 
There were clear regional differences in rehabilitation outcomes noted in the 
Industry Commission report. In 1990-91, NSW workers returned to work on average 
9.6 weeks after injury, while in Victoria it was 28 weeks. Nearly four times as many 
Victorians stayed on benefits for 12 months or longer (Industry Commission 1993). 
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Failure to rehabilitate and return injured workers to the workplace was 
identified as the single most important factor in the longer duration of absence in 
Victoria. Both Workcover (NSW) and COMCARE achieved reductions in average 
absences through a program that emphasized workplace rehabilitation. As a result, they 
were able to significantly reduce premiums (Industry Commission 1993 ). 
Wood (Wood 1996) conducted a study investigating the outcomes of 
rehabilitation programs undertaken by 3,211 injured workers. He concluded that 
every dollar spent on rehabilitation yielded a reduction in system costs of $2 .31. 
1.11 The Epidemiology of Injury in the Army 
A major review of injury in the Army was conducted in 1994 (Rudzki 1994). 
This study determined the number, type and causes of injury in the Australian Army 
during the period 1987-91. Data was obtained from databases of Defence Directorate 
of Occupational Health and Safety (DOHS) and the Soldier Career Management 
Agency (SCMA). 
RECREATION & OTHER SERVICES 
COMMUNITY SERVICES 
FINANCE & BUSINESS 
TRANSPORT & STORAGE 
RETAIL TRADE 
CONSTRUCTION 
ELECTRICITY GAS & WATER 
MANUFACTURING 
MINING 
AGRICULTURE 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
INJURIES/ 1000 WORKERS 1986-87 
Figure 1.3 Reported rates of compensable injuries within Australian Industries 1986-
87. 
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Approximately 5000 injuries were reported annually between 1987 and 1991. 
The 1991 reported injury rate of 161/1000 soldiers was twice that of the most 
dangerous civilian occupation of mining (85/1000). Figure 1.3 shows the comparable 
reported compensation claims by Australian Industry for the period 1986-87 (Worksafe 
1991). Reported rates of injury derived from the Defence Occupational Health and 
Safety Database are shown in Figure 1.4. 
1991 
1990 
1989 
1988 
1987 
0 100 200 
INJURIES/1000 SOLDIERS 
Figure 1.4 Reported rates of injury in Army soldiers 1987-1991. 
These figures are not directly comparable, as the Army figures are self-reports 
of any injury considered to be potentially compensable, the majority of which resulted 
in less than 5 days absence from the workplace. The Worksafe data only represents 
lost-time injuries that caused 5 or more day's absence from the workplace. 
In 1994, the mining industry had reduced its claims rate to 64.4 injuries/I 000 
workers (Worksafe Australia 1996). By contrast the Occupational Health & Safety 
(OH&S) database for the Australian Army reported an increased injury rate of 247 
injuries/ 1000 soldiers in 1995/96. Research in US Army trainee populations found 
annual injury rates of between 160-320/100 soldiers (Knapik 1993, Jones 1988, Jones 
1992, Reynolds 1993) 
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Injury accounted for 32% of all admissions to Australian Defence hospitals in 
1991, compared to 18.5 per cent in the general population. This represented an annual 
injury admission rate of 106/1000 soldiers. Knee injuries were responsible for 10% of 
all admissions, with an admission rate of 32.5/1000 (Rudzki 1994 ). 
Lower limb injuries were by far the most frequent injury reported, accounting 
for 39.6% of the five year average for all injuries. Upper limb injuries (19.4%) and 
injuries to the spine (15.2%) were the other major injury sites reported. This pattern of 
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injury contrasts with the civilian workplace where back injury was the most commonly 
reported injury (25%) followed by other injuries (37%) and the hand 14.3%. Lower 
limb injuries only comprised 10.8% of workplace injuries (Workcover Authority 1998). 
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Figure 1.5 Five year average incidence of reported location of injury, Australian 
Army, 1987-91. 
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Figure 1.6 The 5 year average relative morbidity of leg/ knee injuries, Australian 
Army, 1987-91. 
Lower limb injuries comprised a five year average of 40 per cent of all reported 
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injury, but were responsible for 50 per cent of bed days, 48 per cent of sick leave and 
51 per cent of restricted duty. Lower limb causes were responsible for 82% of all 
medical downgradings, to an employment standard requiring permanent restrictions in 
the workplace. The cumulative incidence of non-FE personnel rose from 13 % of 
Army strength in 1987 to 17.1 % in 1992. Figure 1.6 shows that leg/knee injuries had 
the greatest morbidity. These injuries represented a five year average of 21.5 % of all 
reported injury, but were responsible for 35 % of bed days, 34 % of sick leave and 32 % 
of restricted duty. 
Athletic activities (sport/physical training/running/marching) were the cause of 
41 per cent of all reported injuries, and accounted for 37% of bed days, 40% of sick 
leave and 52% of restricted duty. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show the causes of reported injury 
and their relative contribution to morbidity. 
BED SICK RESTRICTED 
CAUSE INJURIES DAYS LEAVE DUTY 
Lift/Bend 4.3% 3.0% 3.6% 5.0% 
Physical Training (PT)/PT Test 12.6% 10.6% 12.3% 15.9% 
Physical Exertion 3.5% 4.0% 4.4% 5.0% 
Run/March 7.1% 7.8% 7.3% 9.1% 
Fall/Slip 14.4% 9.3% I 1.0% 12.0% 
Motor Vehicle Accident 7.8% 17.2% 13.9% 7.2% 
Struck 6.0% 3.8% 7.6% 3.5% 
Sport 21.4% 18.5% 19.9% 27.2% 
Other 22.9% 25.6% 20.1% 15.2% 
Table 1.3 The four year average (%) contribution to morbidity of each cause of injury, 
1988-91 
BED DAYS/ SICK LEAVE/ RESTRICTED DAYS/ 
CAUSE INJURY INJURY INJURY 
Lift/Bend 1.4 1.6 17.0 
Physical Training (PT)/PT Test 1.7 1.9 18.9 
Physical Exertion 2.3 2.5 21.5 
Run/March 2.2 2.0 19.0 
Fall/Slip 1.3 1.5 12.5 
Motor Vehicle Accident 4.4 3.5 13.8 
Struck 1.3 2.5 8.6 
Sport 1.7 1.8 19.0 
Other 2.2 1.7 9.9 
All Causes 2.0 2.0 14.9 
Table 1.4 The four year average associated morbidity per injury cause, 1988-91. 
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Musculoskeletal/injury causes accounted for 46 per cent of Defence Force 
Retirement and Death Benefits (DFRDB) invalidity retirements between 1987 and 
1992. 
From the data presented it can be seen that lower limb injuries predominate in 
the Army, which contrasts with the civilian workplace where back injury is the most 
commonly reported. Athletic activities, primarily physical training, running, marching 
and sport are the leading causes of both injury and morbidity. 
1.12 The Importance of Injury in a Military Setting 
Reducing injuries allows a greater number of soldiers to be available to do their 
job. This becomes an important consideration in the light of workforce shortages and 
the competition for skilled labour. 
Athletic injuries are the leading cause of injuries in the Army and injuries to the 
leg/knee have a disproportionate morbidity. The literature has consistently shown that 
overtraining, and in particular, excessive running distance, is the most significant 
underlying cause of lower limb injuries in athletic populations (van Mechelen 1992). 
A number of intervention studies have been conducted in Australian Army 
recruits to examine the effectiveness of a variety of injury prevention interventions. A 
randomised controlled study was conducted in 1989, which compared the standard 
running program with one that reduced running distance during formal physical training 
and replaced it with backpack marching (Rudzki 1997a). 
This study found the incidence of injury to be 37.6% and 46.6% in the Walk and 
Run groups respectively, but this was not a statistically significant difference. The rate 
of injury was 52.9/100 recruits in the Walk group and 61.7/100 in the Run group. The 
exposure incidence was 12.8 injuries/1000 hrs PT in the Walk group and 14.9/1000 hrs 
in the Run group (Rudzki 1997a). There were significant differences in the number of 
lower limb injuries and knee injuries between the two groups. Table 1.3 summarises 
the results. 
WALK RUN 
Number injured 64 85 2 x = 2.90 p=0.09 
RR=l.24 (0.98 - 1.61) 
Number of injuries 90 111 
Rate of injury 
(/100 recruits) 52.9 61.7 
Rate of injury 
(/1000 hrs PT) 12.8 14.9 
Number of Lower Limb 
2 
injured 43/170 (25.3%) 75/180 (41.7%) x =9.77 p=0.0018 
RR=l.65 (1.21 - 2.25) 
injuries 
(Exel. blisters) 55190 (61.1%) 871109 (79.8%) 
Number of 
Knee injured 15/170 (8.8%) 34/180 (18.8%) 2 x =6.54 p=0.011 
RR= 2.14 (1.21 - 3.79) 
Table 1.5 Number and rate of injuries observed in the Run and Walk groups. (Rudzki 
1997a) 
28 
The run group had a consistently higher incidence of both lower limb and knee 
injuries, the two types of injury which are predominant within the Army population as a 
whole. Foot (18.9%), knee (16.7%), ankle (13.3%) and shoulder (8.9%) were the 
commonest sites of injury in the Walk group. In the Run group, the commonest sites 
were knee (32.l %), ankle (18.3%), foot (11.9%) and shin (7.3%). There were two tibial 
stress fractures in the Run group and none in the Walk group, giving the Run group a 
stress fracture incidence of 1.1 %. 
This reduction in injury was achieved with no detrimental effect on the 
performance of the then Army Physical fitness test which consisted of a 5 km run. 
Table 1.6 shows the 5 km run time performance of the recruits at different stages of the 
12 week training course (Rudzki 1996). 
5 Km Run time 
(mins) 
Week3 
Week6 
Week 11 
Walkers 
21. 78 (21.49-22.06) 
(n=l48) 
22.14 (21.88-22.40) 
(n=146) 
21.85 (21.49-22.22) 
(n=36) 
Runners 
21.83 (21.41-22.26) 
(n=80) 
21.88 (21.58-22.18) 
(n=155) 
22.90 (21.86-23.95) 
(n=32) 
Difference (R-W) 
+0.29 NS 
-0.26 NS 
+ 1.05 * 
t= 2.03 p=0.049 
Table 1.6 Five kilometre run time (mins) for the Run and Walk groups at weeks 1, 6 
and 11 of training. (Rudzki 1996) 
Recorded cause Walk Run 
oflnjury 
2 
Running 5 (5.5%) 28 (25.2%) x =26.58 p=0.0001 
2 
5 Km Run 0 12 (10.8%) x =10.35 p=0.0035 
2 
Marching 27 (30.0%) 7 (6.3%) x =19.85 p=0.0001 
Physical Training (PT) 23 (25.5%) 21 (18.9%) NS 
Obstacle Course 10(11.1%) 16 (14.4%) NS 
Field Training 5 (5.5%) 6 (5.4%) NS 
Trauma/Fall 3 (3.3%) 8 (7.2%) NS 
Other 5 (5.5%) 2 (1.8%) NS 
Not Specified 12 (13.3%) 11 (9.9%) NS 
Total 90 111 
Table 1. 7 The identified causes of injury in the walk and run groups.(Rudzki 1997b) 
Table 1. 7 shows the identified causes of injury during the study. Marching 
(30.0%), physical training (25.5%), and the obstacle course (11.1 %) were the most 
frequent causes of injury in the Walk group. In the Run group, the leading causes were 
Running (36.6%), physical training (19.2%) and the obstacle course (14.6%). 
Table 1.8 shows the cause of knee, other lower limb and back injuries. The 
table shows quire clearly that running was the leading cause of both knee and lower 
limb injuries, consistent with other studies in the literature (van Mechelen 1992). 
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RUN WALK 
Knee Other Back Knee Other Back 
Lower Lower 
Limb Limb 
Physical Training 5 11 2 5 IO 0 
Running 13 12 0 1 4 0 
5 Km Run 4 7 1 0 0 0 
Marching 0 6 1 3 19 5 
Obstacle Course 8 7 0 2 4 0 
Field Training 2 4 0 3 2 0 
Other 3 11 2 1 11 3 
Total 35 58 6 15 50 8 
Table 1.8 The activity causing lower limb and back injuries during training. 
WALK RUN 
Restricted Duty days 356 600 
Not fit Duty days 44 87 
Hospital Bed days 42 82 
Restricted Duty 
(Days/injury) 3.96 5.40 
Not fit Duty 
(Days/in jury) 0.49 0.78 
Hospital Bed days 
(Days/injury) 0.47 0.74 
Table 1.9 Morbidity associated with the Walk and Run groups. (Rudzki 1997a) 
Injury morbidity in the Run group was nearly double that of the Walk group in 
terms of the number of days restriction, hospitalization and not fit for duty. Table 1.9 
shows the absolute and relative morbidity in the two groups. Reduction of running 
distance in the PT programme resulted in significant reductions in both the incidence of 
lower limb injury and the overall severity of injury. 
There were 10 medical discharges in the Walk group and 16 in the Run group. 
Ten (62.5%) of the Run and 2(20%) of the Walk discharges were due to lower limb 
causes. Of these 1(10%) of the Walk and 4 (25%) of the Run injuries were considered 
to be new injuries, and not related to pre-existing conditions. The disproportionate 
morbidity of injury is illustrated by a study which compared the illness and injury 
medical presentation rates for male and female US Army recruits (Jones 1988). 
Gender Injury Rate Illness Rate Injury/Illness 
Ratio 
Sick Call Visits fl 00 Male 22 26.4 0.8 
recruits/month Female 40 37.2 1.1 
Days Limited Duty fl 00 Male 16 3.1 5.1 
Recruits/month Female 77 6.0 21.5 
Table 1.10 The relative incidence and morbidity of illness and injury in a population 
of US Army recruits (from Jonesl988). 
Table 1.10 shows that while the incidence of injury and illness were roughly 
comparable, the morbidity of injury was much greater, especially in female recruits. 
The cost of this disproportionate morbidity was not calculated. 
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British Army data based on medical attendances show a similar picture (British 
Army Medical Directorate 1996). For the period January-July 1996, injury or the 
sequelae of injury were responsible for 3 9.4% of all initial and 48.6% of all review 
presentations to British Army medical facilities. The rate of illness presentations was 
100/1000/ month compared to 65.111000/month for injury. When training units were 
examined, initial illness rates were 249/1000/month and initial injury rates were 
196/1000/month. The picture is somewhat different for review consultations where the 
injury rate was 98/1000/month compared to the illness rate of 8.9/1000/month. Injury 
consultations comprised 91. 7% of all review consultations. 
Using lost workdays as a marker of morbidity, the British Army rate oflost days 
was 219/1000 soldiers/month for injury and 81.9/1000/ month for illness. In training 
units, injury was responsible for 353 days/I 000 soldiers/month while illness accounted 
for only 130 days/ 1000/month. In both groups, injury accounted for 73% of all days lost 
from the workplace. 
32 
The British Army lost on average 26,215 days per month due to injury, 
compared to 9,803 days per month due to illness. Allowing a nominal wage cost of £30 
per day lost, there was an indirect loss of £786,450 per month due to injury or £9.437M 
per year. The equivalent figures for illness were £294,090 per month and £3 .529M per 
year. 
Injury rates in recruit training rose alarmingly in 1995 and there was an urgent 
demand for changes to the physical training program to reduce the attrition due to 
injury. Male medical discharge rates had increased from 57 .6/1000 in 1992-93 to 
81.1/1000 in 1994-95, while female medical discharge rates had increased from 
45.5/1000 to 101/1000 over the same period. 
At the request of the Commander of the recruit training establishment, an 
uncontrolled observational study was conducted to examine the effect of changes to the 
recruit physical training programme on injuries and medical discharge (Rudzki 1999). A 
number of changes were made and it was not possible to control for any one 
intervention. The changes included cessation of road runs, introduction of 400-800 
metre interval training, a reduction in test run distance from 5km to 2.4km, 
standardisation of route marches and the introduction of deep water running as an 
alternate aerobic activity. 
Soldiers who entered 1st Recruit Training Battalion during FY 1995/96 were 
divided into three groups. The platoons which arrived during the 3 month period July-
September 1995 (n=708) represented Group 1 or the pre-change sample. Group 2 [l Oct 
95 - 17 Jan 96 (n=667)], entered training when the 2 physical training programmes were 
in concurrent use. Group 3 [24 Jan 96 - 6 May 96 (n=579)] commenced training when 
the new programme was universal. It was assumed that the 3 month period prior to the 
change was representative of the pre-existing training cycle. 
This analytical approach was adopted because the staff needed to adapt to the 
new physical training regime. Because of the concurrent physical training systems in 
place it was felt that there may have been some "lapses" into old ways. Table 1.11 
shows the incidence of or recorded injury during these three time periods. 
There was a 46.6% reduction in the rate of total injury presentation Cl = 14.31 
p=0.0002) between the pre and post change groups. The annual rate of male medical 
discharges fell 40.8% from 81. l /l 000 in 1994/95 to 4 7 .Oil 000 in 1995/96 Cl= 26.33 
p=0.0001 ). Female rates, however, increased 58.3% from 104/1000 to 164.2/1000 Cl= 
6.09 p=0.014). 
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Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Jul - Oct 95 Oct- Jan 96 Jan 96 - Mar 96 
No of Platoons 16 14 13 
No of Recruits 708 662 577 
No oflnjured 179 112 78 
Injury Rate 253/1000 169/1000 135/1000 
Table 1.11 The crude number and rate of Recruit injuries July 1995 - March 96 
Because of the limitations of the study design, it was not possible to hypothesise 
about causation. The changes to the PT programme were introduced together and there 
were no control groups. The significant reduction in injury rates indicates the need for 
further controlled studies to determine which changes had the greatest impact on injury 
rates. 
Table 1.12 shows the rate of injury for each period by gender. The changed 
physical training programme appeared to have a differential effect; with the reduction in 
male injury rates being much greater than in females. The reduction in male injury rates 
was reflected in the medical discharge rates, with a 40% reduction between 1994/95 
and 1995/96. During this same period however, female medical discharge rates 
increased by 60% (Figure 1.3). 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Jul- Oct 95 Oct-Jan 96 Jan 96 - Mar 96 
No of Males 554 (78%) 578 (86%) 502 (87%) 
No of Females 154 (22%) 89 (14%) 75 (13%) 
Male Injured 125(22.5%) 87 (15%) 61 (12.2%) 
Female Injured 54 (35%) 25 (28%) 17 (22.7%) 
Female Relative Risk 1.55 1.87 1.86 
Table 1.12 The number and Relative Risk of Male and Female injury, July 95 - March 96. 
Part of this increase may have been attributable to a change in the rehabilitation 
holding policy, with a limit of 8 weeks set for recovery. If a condition was deemed to 
require a longer recovery period, then the recruit was discharged. However, this policy 
did not impact the males, and suggests that the changed programme may have had a 
beneficial effect on males, but not females. 
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Figure 1.3 The rate of recruit medical discharge, by sex, 1992/93 to 1994/95. 
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Other potentially confounding factors are time of year and changes in training 
staff. Anecdotally, the best recruits are attracted in the January-March period (Australian 
Summer) and these are school leavers who wish to join the Army as a career. Training 
staff claim that the worst recruits arrive mid-year, when after exhausting all other 
options they choose a military career. Training staff also rotate during the January 
period, so at least one third of staff will have been new during the January period. These 
factors are however constant and regular; the large and statistically significant decrease 
in the annual medical discharge rate suggest that the changed PT programme, rather 
than cyclical events were responsible. 
The relative risk of female recruit medical discharge in 1995/96 was 3.38. This 
risk increased steadily froml992/93 when the discharge rates were comparable. There is 
evidence that suggests different levels of initial fitness may be the cause of this 
differential rate of injury and consequent medical discharge. Pope found that initial 
levels of aerobic fitness (as measured by a 20m shuttle run) were highly predictive of 
subsequent recruit injury (Pope 1999). 
A US Army study found that the risk of injury was the same for males and 
females when stratified by 1 mile run time tertiles. The highest rate of injury occurred 
in the lowest tertile (Jones 1992). The most notable finding was that 50.7% of the 
women were in the lowest tertile compared to 1.2% of the males. This suggested that 
levels of fitness varied significantly between the sexes, and that women of equivalent 
fitness had the same risk as their male counterparts. 
This view was supported by a study of female Officer candidates at West Point 
in 1977. This study found that women who scored highest on the initial fitness tests 
incurred few injuries during the training period. The researchers concluded that the 
female's initial level of fitness affected their susceptibility to injury. The study also 
commented on the preponderance of young adult women with poor fitness levels who 
had never been physically challenged (Tomasi 1977). 
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The reduction in male recruit medical discharges demonstrates the potential cost 
savings that can be achieved with effective injury prevention interventions. The cost of 
acquiring and transporting a recruit to lRTB has been calculated at A$9,000, and if 
discharge occurred after 10 weeks, the net cost was estimated to be A$14,245 
(Australian Army 1996). This figure takes into account salary, housing, food and 
training resources, but not medical, rehabilitation and compensation costs. 
With a male recruit throughput of 2700 in 1995/96, the reduction in medical 
discharge rate represented a saving of 89 recruits, resulting in an estimated cost saving 
of A$ l ,267,805. For the females, the increase in rate was 60.2/1000 in 1995/96. With a 
throughput of 481 recruits this represented an increased loss of 29 recruits or an 
additional cost of A$413,105. 
No of Recruits 
No of Bone Scans 
Rate of Bone Scans 
I 1 00 Recruits 
Jun-Sep 95 
834 
119 
14.4 
Nov-Feb 96 
674 
48 
7.1 
Table 1.13 The number and rate of bone scans pre and post changes to the PT programme. 
Table 1.13 shows that the number of bone scans ordered post intervention fell 
by 50% from 14.4 /100 recruits to 7.1/ 100 recruits. (x2 = 19.33 p=0.0001) This 
reduction represented a saving of 7 .3 scans /100 recruits , which at A$281 per scan 
represented a saving of A$13,770. With a recruit throughput of approximately 3,000 
per year, this equalled a saving of 220 bone scans per year or A$61,539 per year. 
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The study authors questioned the benefits of integrated physical training for men 
and women during Army recruit training. There was likely to be a significant difference 
in initial fitness levels between the genders and this was not taken into account when 
applying a physical training regime which had fixed and not relative demands. 
The system of variable start point and fixed endpoint was a recipe for injury, 
particular given the low levels of initial fitness seen in females (Jones 1992, Pope 
1999). As a result of this research, a screening aerobic fitness test was introduced at all 
Australian Army recruiting centres in October 1997, and a minimum level of acceptable 
aerobic fitness introduced .. The rate of male recruit medical discharge between 1 Oct 
97 and 30 April 98 fell to 22.5/1000 (n=1334) while the female rate fell to 50.4/1000 
(n=218). 
Running is popular with military trainers because it is a simple activity requiring 
little preparation and no equipment. There is the strong belief that running is an 
essential means of acquiring aerobic fitness. Consequently, attempts to reduce the 
frequency and duration of running activities have met with varying degrees of success. 
Based on the Australian Recruit studies outlined above, the distance of the Australian 
Army physical training test was reduced from 5km to 2.4km, with the assumption that 
reducing the test distance will reduce the training distances and result in a concomitant 
reduction in overtraining. 
A US Army Task Force recently evaluated military physical training (PT) injury 
prevention programs, policies, and research. The research group reviewed 286 papers 
on military physical training and recommended interventions based on the strength of 
the supporting evidence (USACHPPM 2008). 
The Task Force considered the essential elements of an injury prevention 
program to be: ( 1) Education of Service members, especially leaders, in injury 
prevention principles and evidence-based strategies, (2) Leadership enforcement of 
injury prevention policies and programs, (3) Unit injury surveillance reporting and (4) 
Investment of greater resources in research and program evaluation of training related 
injury prevention interventions. Table 1.13 summarises the Task Force Findings. 
Recommended interventions (Based on Sufficient Scientific Evidence). 
(1) Prevent overtraining (strongly recommended). 
(2) Perform multiaxial, neuromuscular, proprioceptive, and agility training. 
(3) Wear mouthguards during high-risk activities. 
(4) Wear semi-rigid ankle braces for high-risk activities. 
(5) Consume nutrients to restore energy balance within 1 hour following high-intensity 
activity. 
(6) Wear synthetic blend socks to prevent blisters. 
Interventions not recommended (Due to Evidence of Ineffectiveness or Harm). 
( 1) Wear back braces, harnesses, or support belts 
(2) Take anti-inflammatory medication prior to exercise 
Interventions without sufficient evidence to recommend at this time. 
(1) Stretch muscles before or after exercise 
(2) Reinitiate exercise at lower intensity levels for detrained individuals 
(3) Target specific muscles to strengthen 
(4) Replace running shoes at standard intervals 
(5) Warm up and cool down before and after activity 
( 6) Place shorter Service members in front of formations to set the running pace. 
(7) Manipulate stride length. 
(8) Participate in a standardized, graduated marching program 
(9) Gradually increase load-bearing during marching 
(10) A void hazardous exercises or exercise machines 
( 11) Separate body weight assessment and maximal effort physical fitness tests 
(12) Wear shock-absorbing insoles 
(13) Wear running shoes based on individual foot shape 
(14) Wrap ankle with athletic tape prior to high-risk activity 
(15) Run on improved surfaces that minimize injury risk 
( 16) Improve obstacle course landing surfaces 
(17) Adjust training loads by seasonal variations 
( 18) Encourage smoking cessation programs to prevent musculoskeletal injuries 
(19) Educate Service members on safe lifting 
(20) Apply ice to injuries early to prevent re-injury 
(21) Take oral contraceptives to decrease injury 
(22) Standardize the unit reconditioning program after rehabilitation 
(23) Predict injury risk through use ofan injury risk index 
Interventions without a completed review. 
(I) Provide pre-basic training fitness assessment and fitness programs for the least fit 
(2) Individualize PT versus training as a group or unit. 
(3) Wear knee braces. 
(4) Wear forearm or elbow straps. 
(5) Utilize allied health professionals in a pre-military treatment facility care setting. 
(6) Accommodate for psychosocial issues related to injury. 
Table 1.13 Summary of US Task Force recommendations for injury prevention. 
Of the 31 injury prevention interventions identified in the literature, only 6 (20 
% ) had evidence strong enough to be recommended for widespread implementation. 
Two interventions ( 6 % ) were not recommended due to evidence of ineffectiveness or 
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harm. Twenty-three (74 %) of the interventions reviewed in the scientific literature 
could not be recommended because of lack of evidence, poor quality evidence, 
conflicting evidence, or evidence of harm. A further 6 interventions had not received a 
complete review. Physical training is necessary to condition soldiers for their 
occupational tasks. The authors noted "In classic military tradition, however, efforts to 
exceed the standards have contributed to the injury epidemic present today." 
The biggest presumed impact on the prevention of overtraining in the military 
population is a reduction in running distance. The authors state "Military and civilian 
research indicates that high running volume significantly increases the risk for lower 
extremity injury. During initial military training, about 25 percent of men and about 50 
percent of women incur one or more PT-related injuries. About 80 percent of these 
injuries are in the lower extremities and are of the overuse type-a condition brought 
about by PT volume overload (generally excessive running relative to initial fitness 
level and running capability of the individual)." 
The USACHPPM review cited 3 US studies which examined the effect of 
reducing running distance on injury. The first study examined US Marine Corps 
recruits during a 12 week course. Table 1.15 summarises the results. Three groups of 
recruits each undertook different amounts of organized running. The group with the 
greatest ( 40 % ) reduction in running distance had a 54% reduction in stress fracture 
incidence no significant change in physical fitness test run time. In this study, reducing 
running mileage reduced stress fracture incidence with no effect on aerobic fitness. 
No of Marines Total run distance over 12 Stress fracture Final 3-mile run times 
(n) weeks (miles) incidence (%) (min:sec) 
1136 (High) 55 miles 3.7% 20.20 
1117 (Medium) 41 miles 2.7% 20.44 
1097 (Low) 33 miles 1.7% 20.53 
22-mile reduction 54% reduction NS 
Table 1.15 Mileage, Stress Fracture Incidence, and Average Final 3-Mile Run Times 
Among Three Groups of Male U.S. Marine Corps Recruits. (USACHPPM 2008) 
In 1995, it was estimated that the reduction in running mileage saved $4.5 
million in medical care costs and nearly 15,000 training days annually by preventing 
stress fractures (USACHPPM 2008). 
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A 1994 study examined US Army soldiers during a 12 week recruit course, and 
divided the recruits into a low mileage group (56 miles) and a high mileage group 
The low mileage group had a 24 % reduction in injuries and maintained 
their aerobic fitness. It is important to note that while they decreased their running 
mileage, they increased the miles marched (the high mileage run group marched 68 
miles; the low mileage run group marched 117 miles). The results are summarised in 
Table 1.16. 
Running Mileage Injury Incidence Final 2-Mile Run Time 
(min:sec) 
(High) 130 miles 54% 13:45 
(Low) 56 miles 41% 13:28 
74 mile reduction 24% reduction NS 
Table 1.16 Mileage, Injury Incidence, and Average Final 2-Mile Run Times Among 
Two Groups of Male and Female U.S. Army Recruits. (USACHPPM 2008) 
The third study compared male Naval recruits ran either 12 - 18 miles 
or 26 - 44 miles during formal physical training .. The lower mileage group had lower 
injury rates and 1.5-mile run time improvements that were the same as the higher 
mileage divisions. In other words, a reduction of 20 miles of running during US Navy 
recruit training reduced injuries by 20 percent, again without negatively affecting 
physical fitness. The results are summarised in table 1.17. 
Running Mileage Injury Incidence Average Improvement in 
1.5-Mile Run 
High (26-44) 22.4% 1:02 
Low (12-18) 16.4% 1:00 
Average 20-mile reduction 27% reduction NS 
Table 1.17 Mileage, injury incidence, and average improvement in 1.5-Mile run times 
among two groups of male U.S. Navy recruits. 
In summary, it is clear that overuse injuries of the lower limb are the signature 
injuries of military populations. The evidences supports the view that excessive running 
distances during physical training is the main cause and that reductions in running 
distance will reduce injuries without an adverse impact on aerobic fitness. 
1.13 Injury Data Collection 
Surveillance is defined by the World Health Organization as the ongoing 
systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of health data necessary for 
designing, implementing and evaluating public health prevention programs (World 
Health Organization 2001). 
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Injury surveillance has been hampered by a lack of readily available information 
on injury cause or mechanism. Hospital discharge records frequently do not have 
complete International Classification of Disease (ICD) E (external cause) code data. 
Without the ability to identify patterns and types of injuries in the population, 
epidemiological studies of injury risk cannot be conducted. Since risk factors and 
patterns for fatal and non-fatal injury frequently differ, both mortality and morbidity 
data are essential. One problem with most systems is that there is no one unique 
identifier, which serves to link all records (Dischinger 1994). 
ICD 10 coding has moved to an alpha numeric-coding of external injury events. 
L'Hours (L'Hours 1994) noted that "The traditional ICD approach to the classification 
of external causes, while perhaps relevant to mortality uses was, in many respects, 
considered inadequate for the needs of injury prevention programmers and policies." 
Many significant categories of injury cannot be distinguished easily in the 
Australian mortality and morbidity data; occupational and sports injuries for example. 
These defects reflect the past national reliance on ICD 9. The aim of injury data 
collection is to identify problems and prompt causal hypotheses. Target setting for 
injury reduction goals is hamstrung by the lack of adequate baseline data. In New 
Zealand, the Injury Prevention Unit has established a hospital based database with the 
aim of documenting resource utilization, determining incidence of injury and 
undertaking analytical epidemiological studies. 
The New Zealand surveillance system identified that 20% of admissions were 
re-admissions for ongoing rehabilitation and management. Langley (Langley 1994) 
noted that while New Zealand had almost universal E code usage, they had several 
shortcomings, and were not critical from an injury prevention perspective. The use of 
free text narratives was felt to provide greater benefit. 
Sherman (Sherman 1994) noted, "A surveillance system that is not used is 
useless. In the risk assessment/ risk management model, surveillance data can and 
should be used at many points including hazard identification, risk estimation, option 
development and monitoring evaluation". 
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Population based data is necessary to perform risk factor assessment according 
to either population or exposure characteristics in order to target interventions 
appropriately. Tursz (Tursz 1985) noted the methodological difficulties of only 
collecting data from public hospitals. Limiting data collection to public hospitals alone 
would have produced an injury rate of 51/1000 subjects instead of the rate of 83/1000 
observed. This difference was due to the high percentage of sports injuries seen in 
private clinics. In another study, 22% of all injuries presented to the offices of private 
physicians (Spyckerelle 1984). 
1.14 The Public Health approach to Injury Prevention 
Pointer argues that a public health approach to injury prevention provides a 
framework in which national priorities for injury prevention can be developed. (Pointer 
2003) This public health approach is characterised by 4 steps; surveillance, risk factor 
identification, intervention evaluation and implementation (National Center for Injury 
Prevention and Control 1998). 
Australian surveillance systems have a number oflimitations. The databases 
containing basic morbidity and mortality data do not link with external injury factors 
from hospital separations data and the lag-time between injuries occurring and data 
becoming available is too long. Most identified risk factors for injury are not subject to 
routine data collection or are collected by other agencies in different systems in 
different policy areas (Pointer 2003). Surveillance systems underpin injury prevention 
and intervention. Surveillance data is fundamental to priority setting, but is dependent 
on reliable and valid data collection and dissemination. 
Current surveillance systems are also not well placed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of specific interventions. Pointer argues that there is a pressing need to 
identify injury specific indicators of success and delineating the type and level of 
evidence required to establish the success or failure of an intervention. Cost will 
always be a factor in any health intervention. Identifying proven and effective 
interventions should become a priority 
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The public health approach involves the selection of population-based priorities, 
because within each population group there are different injury profiles. Examining 
population based groups allows for the targeting of different injuries e.g. hip fractures 
in the elderly, and lower limb overuse injuries in military populations. The population-
based approach allows for a range of targeted strategies to be introduced for particular 
injury areas. 
One of the five priority populations identified by the National Injury 
Surveillance Unit (NISU) was young adults aged 15 to 24. This group accounts for a 
disproportionately large number of injuries in both males and females, accounting for 
16% of all hospitalisations and 14% of all deaths from injury in Australia. Young 
adults are over-represented in a number of injury areas including transport, violence, 
and pharmaceutical poisoning and self-harm (Kreisfeld 1996, Moller 1995) 
Key factors that influence the observed injury patterns in young adults include 
risk taking behaviour, alcohol and workplace injury. Prevention strategies targeting 
young adults have the potential to reduce the high injury burden seen in for age group 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2008). 
One of the important aspects of monitoring and maintaining successes in injury 
reduction is the development of surveillance systems that provide accurate and valid 
data. Without such data it is nearly impossible to measure the impact of interventions. 
Coupled with the difficulties in surveillance is the difficulty in measuring 
severity. Injury in young adults can have an enormous impact on the individual, their 
family and society (via health care costs). Pointer argues that developing a predictive 
model for the health and financial needs of injured patients is an important goal which 
requires more valid and reliable indicators of severity (Pointer 2003 ). 
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1.15 The Defence Injury Prevention Program 
The Defence Injury Prevention Program (DIPP) is an attempt to apply the public 
health model of injury prevention to an Army Population. The key elements ofDIPP 
are outlined below. 
Surveillance. Traditional workers compensation datasets are too broad in 
nature and do not assist in the identification of specific and unique areas of military 
risk, such as physical training, obstacle courses and field training. The DIPP system 
required all recruits who presented to the medical centre with an injury to complete a 
simple injury report form, which was based on that developed for sports injury 
surveillance by Finch (Finch 1999). 
Diagnostic details were added by treating medical staff and injured recruits 
added details on circumstances of the injury incident such as venue, activity, action, 
and mechanism of injury. Data was entered into an injury surveillance database, with 
medical imaging and orthopedic specialist reports used to update diagnostic. Injury 
surveillance reports detailing the type, frequency and causes of injury were produced 
quarterly. Developing a military specific surveillance tool was essential to gain face 
validity with the senior military management. 
Risk factor identification. The DIPP delivered a 2 day training program for local staff 
of a military unit to enable them to analyse and interpret the injury surveillance reports. 
The principles ofrisk assessment and management were also taught. 
Intervention evaluation. The DIPP training also included injury counter-measure 
development for many of the most commonly identified risk factors. The risk factor 
analysis and proposed countermeasures were then presented to the organisation's 
quarterly Occupational Health and Safety committee meeting for review and 
endorsement by senior leadership/management. 
Implementation. Once scrutinised and approved, the proposed counter measures were 
implemented. The effectiveness of the intervention was assessed by continued 
monitoring of the injury surveillance database. 
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The DIPP program is founded on the key principles of (1) Education of key staff 
and leaders, in injury prevention principles and evidence-based strategies, (2) 
Leadership enforcement of injury prevention policies and programs and (3) Unit injury 
surveillance reporting. 
Population Injury Rate Reductions in 
Time Period (Incidence) Injury Rates 
(Injuries per 100 Achieved 
per month) 
Staff - Australian 1Jan2003 8.2 15% reduction 
Federation Guard to 2001-2003 
(Canberra) 31Mar2003 
Officer Cadets - Australian 1Jan2003 11.3 32% reduction 
Defence Force Academy to 2002-2003 
(Canberra) 31Mar2003 
Recruits - 1st Recruit 1Jan2003 27.3 71 % reduction 
Training Unit (Royal to 2001-2003 
Australian Air Force, 31Mar2003 
Edinburgh) 
Recruits - Army Recruit 1 Jan 2003 22.3 70% reduction 
Training Centre (Kapooka) to 1995-1999 
30 Jun 2003 & further 13% 
reduction 2001-
2003 
Officer Cadets - Royal 1Jan2003 15.8 13% reduction 
Military College (Canberra) to 2002-2003 
31Mar2003 
Table 1.18 DIPP Injury Surveillance System Injury Statistics Jan-Jul 2003. 
The key aim ofDIPP was to provide leaders with accurate and reliable 
information on the type, nature and cause of injury, in conjunction with well-thought 
out injury prevention interventions. There is an old Army dictum "Do not come to me 
with problems, just solutions". Table 1.18 summarises the effectiveness of the DIPP in 
regional organisations where it has been implemented. Reductions in injury incidence 
of between 13-70% demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach. 
Pope described the use of DIPP in identifying and eliminating ACL ligament 
ruptures at the Army Recruit Training Centre. (Pope 2002a, Pope 2002b ). In June 1998, 
six unexpected anterior cruciate ligament ruptures within the preceding 12 months were 
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detected by routine injury surveillance in a cohort of Australian Army recruits. 
Only one ACL rupture was able to be identified in previous years, therefore an 
incidence of 6 cases was of concern to the supervising staff (Pope 1992a). Australian 
Army recruits who sustained an ACL rupture were medically discharged from the 
Army, because their rehabilitation timeframe of 12 months exceeded the recovery limit 
of 3 months for retention in the Army. So every ACL rupture was a career terminating 
Ill Jury. 
Review of the individual injury reports and clinical case histories indicated that 
all six injuries occurred on an outdoor obstacle course. Five of the six ACL ruptures 
occurred while landing after jumping a horizontal distance of 2 m over an open pit. 
The sixth occurred on landing from a 1.8 metre high log wall. The pit jump activity 
was observed by the health staff, who noted that the recruits landed on newly installed 
rubber matting, and it became apparent that recruits rapidly decelerated when their feet 
hit the matting. The rubber matting had been laid on both the takeoff and landing areas 
of the wall and the open pit. 
The supervising staff commented that the matting had been laid at the end of 
June 1997. The prevailing view was that ankle sprains occurred as a result of ground 
wear at the landing site and that the new rubber matting would provide a level surface, 
prevent slipping, and provide for shock absorption. The time at which the rubber 
matting was laid coincided with the time at which the series of ACL ruptures began to 
occur. No other changes had been made to the obstacle course at this time. 
A review of the medical literature was conducted to ascertain the likely mech-
anisms of ACL rupture. Combined valgus and external rotary forces applied to the 
lower leg relative to the thigh was the most commonly described mechanism (Jarvinen 
1994, McConkey 1986). 
The rubber matting had a friction rating of 0.68 to 0. 72, which was 
considerably higher than the minimum recommended friction rating of 0.40 for 
pedestrian surfaces. This suggests when the recruits landed on the matting their lower 
legs "stuck" Pope concluded that this could put the knee at risk if there was any 
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external rotation of the knee on landing. 
The commanding officer was notified of the findings and a recommendation 
was made that the rubber matting be removed from the landing area of the open pit 
only and be replaced by raked, 20-mm river pebbles. The river pebbles allowed the 
foot to decelerate more slowly after landing and prevent the foot from being rigidly 
fixed in one position in the presence of rotational forces in the transverse plane. 
Raking of the pebble surface ensured an even landing surface to minimize the risk of 
ankle sprain. 
The commanding officer accepted this initial recommendation, and required 
that subsequent injury surveillance confirm that the cause had been correctly identified, 
by evaluating of the effect of removing the rubber matting on the incidence of ACL 
ruptures. 
The initial recommendation did not involve the removal of the rubber matting 
from the takeoff and landing areas of the 1.8 m wall, because only one ACL rupture 
had occurred at the wall at that time. In the subsequent 9 months of injury surveillance, 
two additional ACL ruptures occurred at the 1.8 m wall, but none occurred at the 2m 
open pit. As a consequence it was recommended that the remaining rubber matting be 
removed. No further ACL ruptures were observed in the 12 months following removal 
of the remaining rubber matting. The difference in the incidence of ACL rupture pre 
and post removal of the rubber matting was statistically significant ct = 5.91 p = 
0.015). 
Combined with the temporal relationships between removal of the matting and 
the observed reduction in the incidence of injury, this provided highly suggestive 
evidence of a causal relationship. Compensation payments made to each of the eight 
individuals with ACL rupture ranged from zero to A$66, 719 and averaged A$26,3 l 7. 
Direct medical costs paid by the Army averaged A$3,310. The costs of training was 
calculated at A$2,000 per week and the cost ofrecruiting each recruit was AU$9,000. 
Because of a typical a 5-week delay between rupture and departure, and given 
that injuries occurred, on average, 3 weeks into the training program (range, 2-5 
weeks), the estimated averag~ training cost associated with each injured recruit was 
AU$ l 6.000. The total estimated average personnel cost was A$25,000 per recruit with 
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an ACL rupture. The total estimated average cost for each case of ACL rupture was 
A$54,627; This cost is borne entirely by the Army and is likely to be conservative 
because it includes only compensation payments made within the first 2-3 years post 
injury. Recruits remain eligible for reasonable medical and associated costs related to 
their injuries for the term of their lives. This means that the total cost to the ADF of 
each of these injuries is likely to continue to increase steadily as time passes. Based on 
the costing outlined above, preventing 6 ACL ruptures in the 12 months following 
removal of the rubber matting provided a cumulative saving of AS328,000 per annum. 
These results highlight the high cost of injury to the military and draw attention 
to the benefits to be gained from efficient injury surveillance and preventive processes. 
One of the key aims in identifying the scope and severity of injury is to develop the 
impetus to establish prevention programs. In many ways this is little different from 
anti-smoking or anti-obesity campaigns. 
But as Emmett noted at the beginning of this chapter the area of injury 
prevention is hamstrung by views that "injury and disease was part and parcel of work, 
largely a matter ofluck, about which little could be done". Work on this thesis began 
in 1996 and has been a long and slow process. While the epidemiological evidence in 
support of injury prevention has been clear, the organisational I bureaucratic support 
has not been present. This thesis sought to examine and quantify costs as a means of 
providing organisational impetus for the development of an effective injury prevention 
system. 
Despite receiving strategic defence endorsement and funding, the original 
project plan was not implemented because a civilian employment freeze was imposed 
on the department. It had been intended that regional data entry clerks be employed in 
regional areas to assist medical staff in the laborious task of data entry. 
Attempts to outsource data entry were hampered by the significant cost of this 
service compared to the employment of APS level 2 data entry staff. Only in the 
Townsville region was a local data entry staff member employed, and their employment 
ceased on 30 June 2006. 
The effect of the DIPP can be illustrated by the results achieved within the 3rd 
Brigade based at Lavarack Barracks in Townsville. The Defence Injury Prevention 
Program was implemented with full support of the Commander, and most importantly 
it had a full time data entry clerk and a full time injury prevention advisor. The injury 
prevention advisor's job was to ensure that all local units reviewed their quarterly 
injury reports and assisted in the analysis of injury trends and injury counter 
measurement development. 
The DIPP was instituted in the Australian Army 3rd Brigade in March 2004. 
Injury surveillance data including the location, activity, time of day, type of injury and 
morbidity were collected. Data from 2005 was compared to 2004 data for the same 
month to assess the effectiveness of the program. 
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Figure 1. 7 Rates of injury /100 soldiers/month recorded by the Defence Injury 
Prevention Program at the 3rd Brigade Townsville. 
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In 2004, monthly injury rates ranged from 2.91100 to 10.6 1100 /month, with 
injury incidence peaking in the winter sports season (July-September). In 2005, this 
injury peak was abolished with injury rates falling from a high of 10.6/100 in August 
2004 to 6.11100 in August 2005. July and September saw smaller but significant 
reductions. 
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With a military population of approximately 3,000, the reductions in injury rate 
of 2. 7 /100/month, 4.4/100/month and 1.5/100/month equate to injury reductions of 81, 
132, and 45. This means that the program prevented 258 injuries during the peak 
winter season. Other factors may have been at play, but his demonstrates the 
effectiveness of prevention programs backed up by effective surveillance systems. 
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Figure 1.8 The percentage of injuries rated as mild per month, 2004 and 2005. 
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Figure 1.9 The nature of injuries sustained April 2004 - March 2005. 
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In addition to the reduction in incidence, there was also a reduction in the 
severity of the injuries reported in 2005. In May 2004, 11 % of injuries were recorded as 
mild (requiring no further care); while in May 2005 32% of injuries were recorded as 
being mild. Smaller reductions in severity were seen in other months. Figure 1.9 shows 
that the majority of injuries were new (77%), with 18% being recurrent injuries, 3.7% 
being exacerbations of old injuries and 1.3% described as chronic injuries. 
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Figure 1.10 Bodily location ofreported injuries April 2004 - March 2005. 
Figure 1.10 shows the bodily location of the reported injuries. Ankle injuries 
were the most common (15%), followed by knee (14.2%), back (11 %), shoulder (9.4%) 
and foot (9.3%). Lower limb injuries comprised 50.2% of all reported injuries. 
Figure 1.11 shows that sport was the leading cause of injury being responsible 
for 24% of all injuries followed by physical training not supervised by a qualified 
physical training instructor (PTI) ( 17%) and military skills training (9% ). Figure 1.12 
shows that running was the leading activity which resulted in injury responsible for 
22% of all injuries followed by walking (10.4%) and jumping (8.2%). 
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Figure 1.11 Causes ofrecorded injury April 2004 -March 2005. 
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Figure 1.12 Activity during which injury occurred April 2004- March 2005. 
The demonstrated reduction in both the incidence and severity of injuries had a 
positive effect on the local commanders. Commanders were also willing to engage in 
injury prevention activities because they considered that they had ownership and 
influence over the process. These results indicate that the DIPP is an effective means of 
reducing both the incidence and severity of injuries in a Military setting. 
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1.16 Conclusion 
Injury is a leading cause of death and premature mortality, especially in young 
adults. Injury is predominately a male event, especially in the workplace, motor vehicle 
and sporting field. Work injuries have been estimated to cost Australia $20 billion 
dollars annually, while sports injuries have been estimated to cost over $1 billion per 
year. Back pain is the leading type of occupational injury accounting for 25% of all 
work-related injuries. 
Injury is a major problem for western armies. In Australia, the reported rate of 
injury in soldiers is four times higher than the mining injury, although the reporting 
criteria are different. In contrast to industry, lower limb injuries predominate in the 
Army, mainly due to the heavy emphasis placed on physical training. 
The US Army has demonstrated that injury rates in female soldiers are twice 
that of males, with days of restriction five times greater. The British Army has shown 
that while the incidence of illness was greater than of injury, injury resulted in two and 
a halftimes greater morbidity (days lost). 
Systematic data on injury outcome is surprisingly scarce and it is of note that 
severity of initial injury is not automatically related to residual disability. The best way 
of improving injury incidence and outcome is through a comprehensive system of 
injury surveillance. There is a clear imperative to improve the surveillance, prevention 
and management of injury. 
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Chapter 2. Costs of injury and economic evaluation of interventions. 
"One way to assess the importance of a health problem to a society is to calculate its 
costs". (Langley 1989) 
2.1 Introduction 
Economics has been defined as the study of the consequences of resource 
scarcity. (Jacobs 1980) The major consequence of resource scarcity is the necessity to 
choose between competing alternatives. The aim of this thesis is to identify the cost to 
government of injuries in the Army. This section seeks to review the various costing 
approaches used in the literature with the aim of influencing public policy makers. 
Levin (Levin 1985) defines a cost as "a sacrifice equal to the value of something 
that is given up by using resources in a given way .... the cost to us is what we must give 
up by using the ingredients in this way rather than in their best alternative use". Using 
resources for one purpose denies them to another. The alternative use of these resources 
is termed the opportunity cost. 
In health care, choices are often made based on values or moral sentiment rather 
than economic rationality. Markets are assessed in terms of the principles of perfect 
competition; a large number of suppliers and purchasers, no single controlling price, 
free entry and exit of suppliers, free substitution of products and services and perfect 
information accessible to all suppliers and purchasers. 
Unfortunately these principles have little applicability to health-care markets, 
where free exit and entry of suppliers and purchasers rarely exists, despite the best 
efforts of government to create such a market. 
2.2 Determining and defining Costs 
"Costs arise in one community sector but are financed partly or entirely by other 
sectors. This fragmentation of community expenditure on accidents constitutes a 
dilemma, ... since the scope of the economic consequences of this health problem is 
hidden. Only when the total cost is known can we become aware of the extent of the 
problem." (Lindqvist 1996). 
Health Costs have traditionally been divided into three categories; 
(1) Direct costs. These are costs that reflect resource use or direct 
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monetised payments within the health sector for patients and families. They 
include all costs attributable to service provision, e.g. detection, treatment and 
care. They also include non-health components such as travel and time spent by 
family members caring for patients. 
(2) Indirect Costs. These are the costs associated with lost production and 
usually focus on the lost production attributable to sickness or premature death. 
These are losses or foregone transactions and can include costs that impact 
outside of the healthcare system, and 
(3) Intangible costs. These are changes in the quality of life for patients and 
families. The burden of illness diminishes the quality of life resulting in reduced 
emotional well-being and the inability to relate to and support others. By their 
nature they are difficult to identify and measure. 
In traditional economic terms, costs can be determined in a variety of ways 
including: 
(a) Market prices - when markets are perfectly competitive, the equilibrium 
price established by the market will represent the value of that good. This is a 
simple method and a set of prices will be readily available to determine the cost 
of inputs, and 
(b) Shadow prices - Where the market does not meet the criteria for perfect 
competition, the market price may not reflect the true cost. The scarcity of talent 
may generate a higher cost for qualified people, as demand for that talent 
increases. It is therefore necessary to estimate the value of an ingredient as if 
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there were a market. This estimated value is called the shadow price. Each case 
has a time component, and a specific time period must be used in all costs 
estimated. The annual cost is the most common. 
The theoretically correct price to use in the costing of a service is the 
opportunity cost of the resources that are involved. In practice, market forces are taken 
as a reflection of these. When cost savings are considered, the extent of change required 
and the period of time the savings are to be counted, should be specified. 
When dealing with capital, the commonly accepted method of determining the 
cost of ownership is to calculate the depreciation and the interest on the remaining 
(undepreciated) value. Depreciation of an item is the amount that is consumed in a year. 
This is calculated by determining the economic life of the item and then dividing this 
into the replacement cost. For example, if a defibrillator has an expected life of 10 
years, then one tenth would be consumed each year, yielding a depreciation rate of 10% 
per annum. 
In the commercial sector, depreciation is not the only cost involved. The 
undepreciated portion of the defibrillator represents an investment in resources that 
could have been used in another way. If invested in an interest bearing account it would 
have produced a return consistent with the prevailing rate of interest. The annual cost is 
therefore the value of the undepreciated portion times the prevailing interest rate plus 
the annual cost of depreciation. 
Annualisation factors have been calculated for given rates of interest. For 
example, for a given building with a 20-year life span, with a prevailing interest rate of 
10%, the Annualisation factor is 0.1175. Multiply the factor by the replacement cost 
and you arrive at the annual cost. 
2.3 Cost of Illness Studies 
Cost of Illness (COi) studies were among the first economic studies to appear 
in the literature, with the first study appearing in the literature in 1920, and increasing 
in popularity during the 1950s and 1960s (Jefferson 1996). Jefferson describes the aim 
of COI studies as "descriptive: to itemise, value and sum the costs of a particular 
problem with the aim of giving an idea of its economic burden". 
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In the public health context a problem is usually defined in terms of its 
incidence, prevalence, mortality and morbidity. COI studies are not complete economic 
evaluations, but they aim "to inform choices in resource allocation by estimating 
resource consequences of health problems in relation to each other" (Jefferson 1996). 
the 
Jefferson notes that COI studies have a number of common elements including 
(1) recognition 
(2) identification 
(3) listing 
( 4) measurement, and 
(5) valuation of costs generated by an illness. 
The first stage of COI methodology is to identify all cases of illness, usually 
based on national statistics if available or extrapolating from a smaller sample. This 
step suffers from the limitations of the data upon which it is based. The second stage 
involves identifying the costs generated by all cases of the illness. This is traditionally 
along the lines of direct, indirect and intangible costs. 
Two alternate strategies are used to determine cost: the incidence and 
prevalence methods. The incidence method estimates costs from their onset until their 
disappearance for whatever reason (usually death or cure). The prevalence method 
estimates costs of all cases in a short period, irrespective of the stage they are at. 
The incidence method is more precise but has greater information needs, is 
costly, and is used mainly in those diseases that are of short duration and with a 
:fluctuation in incidence, traditionally infectious diseases. The prevalence approach 
relies on more assumptions, but is the only practicable way to cost chronic diseases 
such as rheumatoid arthritis. 
COI studies focus on defining the value of resources consumed by an illness. 
But some argue that direct costs such as hospital days are fixed costs, consumed 
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irrespective of the nature of the illness. The use of "avoidable costs" is applied to 
overcome this concern. A voidable costs are those generated by the illness and would be 
avoided if the illness did not occur. 
A voidable costs are usually gross estimates and Jefferson notes that they are 
inadequate, particular when attempting to value indirect and intangible costs. COI 
studies are interested in values, but a number of historical studies failed to focus on the 
methods of deriving those values, relying on average costs which led to unreliable or 
over-inflated cost estimates (Jefferson 1996). 
Currie has questioned the value of COI studies; she notes that the rationale for 
these studies is to provide data for priority setting, through the expression of the cost of 
injury in dollar terms to illustrate the importance of the problem and therefore its high 
priority for resources (Currie 2000). Some authors argue that high cost injuries should 
be made a priority for treatment and prevention programs (Bonnie 1999, Moore 1997). 
Sheill argues that COI studies "are not helpful in the context of setting priorities 
for resource allocation and research priorities". She goes on to state that "cost of 
injury studies add little to what is already known." In the context of motor vehicle 
accidents she notes that routinely collected hospital and mortality data provide "direct 
and meaningful information about the size of the problem" (Sheill 1987). 
An alternative method of estimating costs is the "willingness to pay" (WTP) 
approach. This estimates the burden of a disease by measuring what society would be 
prepared to pay in order to avoid that disease or problem. Jefferson considers this 
approach appealing because "both opportunities and values are simultaneously 
considered", but the practical application of WTP is full of difficulties relating to the 
questions asked and the interpretation of the answers given. 
While the usual viewpoint for COI studies is a societal one, estimates of WTP 
are purely individual. As Jefferson noted "It is unlikely that individuals have enough 
information to weigh up the value to them of avoiding the disease, and they certainly do 
not have the information to assess the same value to society." 
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2.4 Cost Components for Injury in the Army 
In classic 'cost of illness' studies "the economic burden is assessed in terms of 
all costs that occur within the health system and outside." (Sheill 1987). The total cost 
of illness or injury represents the benefit of eliminating the illness or injury. This thesis 
will adopt a government viewpoint to identifying costs. Within the Australian Army 
context these costs can be broken down into a number of discrete components. These 
include: 
( 1) Direct Costs 
(i) Medical payments for professional services 
(ii) Compensation Costs 
(2) Indirect Costs 
(i) Military Invalid Pension Costs 
(ii) Lost Work Days - (Restricted duty & Sick Leave) 
(iii) Loss of future earnings 
(iv) Lost Capital Investment in Training due to premature separation 
(3 ). Intangible Costs 
(i) Loss of skilled manpower and operational readiness 
(ii) Pain and suffering 
(iii) Loss of career opportunity 
(iv) The impact of vacancies on remaining soldiers 
Of these costs, only some are borne by the Army, the remainder are borne by the 
Government and the individual (society). Pensions and benefit payments are not usually 
classed as indirect costs, because they are not considered to represent a loss of 
production. They are usually classed as transfer payments because they represent a 
transfer of purchasing power from one group to another. They are included as indirect 
costs in this thesis because they are not health related costs, but still represent a real 
cost to Government that can be avoided by reducing the incidence of injury. This 
approach uses a direct government cost to place a value on an indirect cost. 
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2.5 Direct Costs 
Direct health costs are the costs of providing medical services and the patients' 
out-of-pocket expenses. Direct costs account for approximately 30% of the total 
lifetime cost of injury (Rice 1989), but for some groups this may be much lower. 
Hospital and medical costs are thought to represent only a small proportion of 
the total cost of injury. Estimates from the Bureau of Transport and Communications 
Economics (Bureau of Transport and Communication Economics 1992) suggest that 
hospital, medical and rehabilitation costs account for only 2.4% of the total cost of road 
accidents. Lost earnings, family and community losses, pain and suffering and property 
damage accounted for the majority of total injury cost. 
The authors noted that the estimation of hospitalisation costs was problematic. 
Most studies use an average per day cost, but the average cost may not reflect the costs 
of a particular treatment of interest. Average hospital costs are a poor guide to resource 
savings if hospital stays are shortened, because resource use is typically higher during 
the early part of a patients hospital stay, thus preventing the assessment of marginal 
cost savings. 
Many studies use billing costs provided by institutions, but some specialist 
centres may charge higher fees for reasons other than resource use by particular patients 
(Bureau of Transport and Communication Economics 1992). Billing costs do not allow 
for the distinction between professional fees and the costs ofreagents, supplies or the 
capital cost of equipment. Another factor is the issue of price differences for the same 
resource in different locations. There is a strong case for presenting costs not only in 
their financial amounts, but also in terms of the physical amount of input used e.g. 
number of tests, number of days, number of nurse visits etc. 
One estimate of the total direct cost attributable to road accidents in Australia 
put the figure at $239 million (Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics 
1994). Langley estimated the total direct cost of motor vehicle accidents in New 
Zealand to be NZ$425 million in 1983, or NZ$133 per person (Langley 1989). This 
included Emergency Room care, bed days and Accident Corporation costs. 
61 
The direct cost of injury in Australia is difficult to calculate because the data is 
either poor or incomplete. Watson (Watson 1995) estimated that in 1991192, the total 
cost of unintentional injury in Australia was $1.323 billion. This comprised coronial 
costs of$ l 1.6M, hospital inpatient costs of $910.9M, emergency department visit costs 
of $216.5M, and GP attendance costs of$184.1M. 
McClure (McClure 1994) estimated that the cost of attendance for injury and 
radiology at a selected sample of Australian emergency rooms (ER) was $ l .5M in 
1992. When GP costs were added, the figure came to $2.5M for a sample population of 
296,000. General practice care was found to be much cheaper than ER care. 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) estimated the total outlay for direct 
hospital and medical treatment of all non-intentional injury to be $1. 79 billion in 1995 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 1995). Worksafe Australia published two estimates of 
the cost of Workers compensation in Australia in 1991-92. The first estimate based on 
national accounts data was $4.6 billion, while the second estimate based on the ABS 
Major Labour Costs survey data was $3.8 billion (Worksafe Australia 1994). 
2.6 Indirect Costs 
Heinrich documented the first systematic study of injury costs (Heinrich 1931) 
where he classified costs as direct and indirect. He concluded that indirect costs were 
about four times greater than direct costs, with the ratio being higher in hazardous 
occupations such as construction. 
Heinrich coined the term "iceberg theory", to describe the propensity for 
indirect costs to be far larger than direct costs, but largely hidden. Since the 1970's, the 
US Bureau of Labour Statistics has worked on a ratio of7:1 between indirect costs and 
direct costs. In an Australian study (Mangan 1993), the ratio of compensation costs to 
total costs was found to be between 6.3:1and6.9:1, which was close to the ratio of7:1 
used by the US National Safety Council. 
Hammer (Hammer 1984) noted that even though Heinrich stated that his 4:1 
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ratio did not hold true for all injuries and industries, many safety investigators adhered 
to it as a "magic ratio". Grimaldi (Grimaldi 1984) has argued that the Heinrich ratio for 
indirect costs should be abandoned because of methodological flaws. Heinrich included 
direct medical and wage costs but not the overhead insurance premium costs. This cost 
is the difference between the premium paid and the costs incurred, and is between 30-
50% of premium costs. Including these costs reduces the ratio to as low as 2:1. 
Grimaldi described costs as either insured or uninsured, reflecting the US work 
environment. Uninsured costs were broken down into three major categories: 
( 1) costs due to lost labour time, 
(2) costs due to wages being paid to the injured while absent and 
(3) costs due to incidental property damage. 
His study of 2000 accidents (Grimaldi 1984) showed no correlation between 
direct and indirect costs. He also argued for the change from indirect to uninsured costs 
as an important psychological move, focusing management on the reality that indirect 
costs are real rather than intangible. 
Laufer (Laufer 1987) argued that current approaches to indirect costs failed to 
provide sufficient incentive to managers to change their attitudes and behaviour. He 
favoured a division into controllable and uncontrollable costs. By identifying costs, 
which could be reduced through management intervention, he believed that behaviour 
would be influenced. 
Laufer argued that workers compensation insurance should be determined by a 
company's injury record, but he noted that current systems did not closely link safety 
performance with financial reward. The long lag time between a company's safety 
record and its workers compensation premium "obscures the relationship between 
performance and reward and makes it a poor incentive" (Laufer 1987). 
To counter the perceived deficiencies of existing approaches, Robinson 
(Robinson 1979) proposed the use of accident cost accounting as a means of improving 
workplace safety. This approach involved the development of a matrix of fixed 
accident costs classified by type of injury and body part injured. Laufer (Laufer 1987) 
argued that such an approach is a great incentive to management because of the 
"instant, clear and accurate linkage between performance (i.e. safety level) and result 
(i.e. accident cost)". 
However, this link is only relative and not absolute, as noted by the US 
Department of Labour (National Committee for Injury Prevention and Control 1989) 
" frequency is a much more valuable indicator of safety performance than severity, 
since blind chance usually plays a greater part in determining the seriousness of an 
injury than it does in determining how frequently accidental injuries occur". 
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Laufer argued that a much better system of recording cost data would be a much 
more potent motivator of behaviour. He noted that in the Israeli construction industry, 
there was no incentive for direct cost data collection because the insurance premium for 
workplace injury was a constant 2. 7% of labour costs, with safety records having 
negligible influence. Lost day data was used as an indicator of accident severity instead. 
Laufer believed that one of the reasons managers were unaware of high cost data was 
that because of the great variance in accident costs, they were perceived as exceptional 
events and unrelated to management actions. He also argued "In order to change 
entrenched ideas regarding the magnitude of costs, it is necessary to restrict oneself to 
the use of proven conservative values i.e. the lower limits of costs." 
Lindgren (Lindgren 1981) estimated the total cost of illness in Sweden. Of the 
total cost components, health care costs accounted for 30%, morbidity for 52% and 
premature death for 17%. The four most common categories of illness were circulatory, 
musculoskeletal, psychiatric and accidents/injuries, which together accounted for over 
50% of total costs. 
Yelin (Yelin 1979) looked at the costs of chronic illness in a cohort of 
Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA) patients. He found that RA patients spent 3 times the 
national average on medical and social services, and lost on average 61 % of their 
expected earnings. 
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2. 7 The Human Capital Approach to estimating Indirect Costs 
The Human Capital model states that when an individual devotes time and 
money to studying or acquiring skills, he is acquiring "human capital"(Addisonl 984). 
This "human capital" resides within an individual and cannot be purchased except in 
the form of another human with the same requisite skills or training. Such training is 
considered as work, which was not being undertaken for present benefit, but for future 
monetary and non-pecuniary gains. (Addison 1984). Individuals can therefore increase 
their potential future income by investing in training in the present. 
The Human Capital model states that during schooling, all potential earnings 
power or capacity is directed to the production of human capital. This investment can 
continue through life with continuing education, and allows for increased earnings in 
later life. The logic implies that training investments will continue to be made until the 
marginal cost (tuition plus foregone earnings) exceeds the present value of expected 
returns. Eventually investment will not offset depreciation, and the stock of human 
capital and consequently earnings capacity, will shrink. 
The concept of depreciation is important, for it helps to explain an observed 
decrease in earnings profile in later life. Those who undertake no post-school training 
will experience a horizontal wage path that may even deteriorate as human capital 
depreciates over time. Johnson (Johnson 1974) estimated that human capital 
depreciated at a rate of 1-3 % per annum, with an indication of a higher rate of 
depreciation in the higher schooling groups. 
The period over which educational investment costs can be amortised reduces 
as a person approaches retirement; therefore it is reasonable to expect such investments 
to decline over the life cycle. At the end of a working life, the only time an investment 
would be considered would be if it were free. Central to this is the link between 
education and production. Earnings are the return on investment in human capital. 
Based on likely earnings outcomes, individuals are supposed to choose how much to 
invest and which occupation to choose. Investment is chosen so as to maximise future 
earnings net of training costs e.g. the choice to study high earning professions such as 
medicine, law, and business. The decision to commence training is primarily one of 
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investment. The factors that affect the decision are the magnitude of the investment, its 
rate of return and its relationship to the age earnings profile. 
Investment in education is dependant on the supply and demand for skills in the 
workplace. The greater the demand, the more likely additional training will increase the 
value of earnings. The greater the supply, the more likely there will be a depressive 
effect on earnings. Therefore skills in short supply such as pilots and doctors are worth 
the investment because they are likely to generate increased earnings. 
Personnel account for approximately three-quarters of most organisational costs, 
especially in the area of education. The services of most personnel are purchased in the 
marketplace and although there is a general market for personnel, skills in short supply 
may be difficult to acquire. 
Human capital theory is predicated on an individual making investment 
decisions for their own benefit. Within the Army context, it is the organization which 
determines the level of investment in training for organisational purposes, and there are 
little, if any, foregone earnings. Hence the individual internal rate ofreturn is high, with 
an increase in earnings related to the increase in skills acquired at little or no cost. 
Investments in on-the-job training are also important. In the British model of 
apprenticeship, the training provided led to the expectation that the trainee would tend 
to bear part of the cost of training in the form of reduced wages. 
Addison (Addison 1984) argues that the social costs and returns for education 
should also be considered because they differ from those of the individual. Social costs 
are generally higher than private costs, because there is usually a subsidy element in 
education, and what is free to an individual is not without cost to society. Within the 
Army context, certain military skills are deemed essential for national security, and 
therefore the cost of this training is heavily subsidised by society, through the 
government budget process. 
Some economists have argued that in the US, increases in per capita income are 
directly attributable to quality improvements in labour due to education. This "advance 
of knowledge" is considered to represent 50% of the increase in National income and 
represent a rate ofreturn of25% from a social perspective (Becker 1975). Educated 
individuals embody higher productivity. Despite their higher cost, companies usually 
seek to retain them, rather than maximising profit by undercutting its competitors by 
employing less well educated and hence cheaper labour. 
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Addison (Addison 1984) studied post-school investment in training and added 
two additional variables to a regression equation; years of experience and weeks 
worked per year. The results showed that people with the same level of schooling could 
earn widely differing amounts. When schooling alone was considered, the percentage of 
the total variance explained by the regression ( R1 ) was only 6.7%. But when years of 
experience were added to the equation R1 rose to 30%. This means that schooling only 
accounted for 6. 7% of the variation in wage difference while experience accounted for 
30%. The value of experience in organizations has been difficult to quantify and 
consequently most methodologies focus on the costs of training. 
2.8 General and specific training. 
General training increases the marginal product of an employee, by the same 
amount as it would in other firms. Specific training raises the productivity of an 
employee only in the firm providing the training. Most training falls somewhere in 
between these two extremes. 
Specific training is an investment by the firm and not the individual. The firm 
pays all the costs and receives all the returns. But if the worker were to quit at the end 
of the training, the firm's investment would be wasted. The willingness of firms to pay 
for specific training will closely depend on the likelihood of turnover. The optimal 
strategy for the employer is to share some of the costs of specific training with the 
employees. 
It is common to observe a close relationship between specific training and wage 
rates. (Addison 1984) The employer is likely to raise the wage rate of the trained 
employee so as to reduce the probability of quitting. This raises the implication that the 
quit rate will be higher in industries which require mainly general rather than specific 
training. Professional workers who tend to have more general training appear to have 
higher quit rates than other industries. (Addison 1984) 
2.9 Loss of lifetime earnings as a result of Injury or Illness. 
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The loss of wages expressed as the net present value (NPV) oflost future 
earnings potential, is the oldest and most common method of estimating the cost of an 
individuals absence from the workforce for a permanent or prolonged period (Alter 
1985). Estimates obtained are sensitive to the values of the discount and productivity 
rates chosen. There are a number of methods for deriving an appropriate discount rate. 
These include the rate of growth of Gross National Product and the average pre-tax, 
inflation adjusted rate of return on private investment. 
The most common method is to use the long-term Commonwealth Bond rate as 
a guaranteed rate of return. During the period the data in this study was collected, the 
10 year bond yield ranged from 6.99 per cent in July 1997 to 5.31 per cent in June 1998 
(Australian Office of Financial Management 1997). The 5 year bond rate in June 2005 
was 5.25% (Australian Office of Financial Management 2006). 
In calculations ofNPV, it is assumed that 60% of those with permanent injury 
would be only partially impaired, and therefore not suffer the full loss of a fatality. 
(Miller 1987) It is also assumed that each permanent partial impairment experienced 
30% of the loss of a total impairment or fatality (National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration 1983). 
Using these assumptions Mangan (Mangan 1993) derived the following 
cost estimates for industrial illness and injury in Queensland (QLD) for the period 
1986-87. Temporary wage losses were obtained by multiplying the number of 
temporary disabilities by the average number of days lost by the estimated average daily 
earnings. This analysis indicated that temporary injuries resulted in wage losses of 
approximately $100M. For the same period the Compensation Board paid out $90M, 
indicating that compensation payouts were achieving a high coverage of the actual 
wage losses involved. 
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Accidents Diseases Ratio 
Males $11 l.50M $87.23M 1.3: 1 
Females $14.75M $1.76M 8.4: 1 
Total $126.25M $88.99M 1.4: 1 
Table 2.2 Present value of wage loss from fatal and permanent industrial injuries and 
diseases in QLD 1986-87. 
Social security costs will be impacted if there is under-compensation for those 
suffering fatal or permanent impairment. In 1987-88, $54M was paid out in lump sums 
for fatalities and permanent impairment. Mangan's estimate of the NPV of the lost 
future earnings was $215M. If the victim or their surviving dependants want to 
maintain a similar standard of living, they will need to seek additional income 
elsewhere. This shortfall will inevitably be subsidized by the social security system, 
which in the worst case would be $161 M. This cost was not included as part of the cost 
of industrial accidents, because they represent transfer payments rather than new costs. 
One main criticism of the human capital approach is that it only counts 
earnings, and excludes intangibles such as pain and suffering and places a low value on 
low income earners and children (Max 1990). 
2.10 Burden of disease studies 
The World Health Organisation has estimated the global burden of fatal and 
non- fatal occupational injury to be 10.5 million disability-adjusted life years or DALY s 
(World Health Organization 2002). Eijkemans argues that these findings require an 
"integrated, coordinated and strategic response" and "collaborative development of 
national policies by the major stakeholders: health and labour ministries, employer and 
worker representatives, occupational health professionals and the public health 
community." 
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Burden of disease studies seek to influence policy makers by attempting to 
quantify previously intangible costs. These costs relate to an individual's pain, suffering 
and lifestyle degradation. It has been stated that "the true value of the lives and the 
physical and mental capabilities which are destroyed in motor vehicle accidents can 
never be adequately measured because the pain, suffering and frustration felt by the 
individual accident victim cannot be expressed in monetary terms" (National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration 1983 ). 
The DALY is a qualitative measure which seeks to capture the consequence of 
disability in a quantifiable manner. Closely aligned is the quality adjusted life year or 
QAL Y. A QAL Y takes into account both quantity and the quality of life generated by 
healthcare interventions. It is the product of life expectancy and a measure of the 
quality of the remaining life years (Phillips 1998). The quantity of life is expressed in 
terms of survival or life expectancy and has few problems of comparison; people are 
either alive or not. 
Quality of life considerations however, cover a wide range of areas, not just 
health status. Even restricting the focus to a person's health related quality oflife will 
result in a number of dimensions relating to both physical and mental capacity. A 
number of approaches have been used to generate these quality of life valuations, 
referred to as health utilities. 
The utilities that are produced represent the valuations attached to each health 
state on a continuum between 0 and 1, where 0 is equivalent to being dead and 1 
represents the best possible health state, although some health states are regarded as 
being worse than death and have negative valuations. There are many methods of 
eliciting utility weights and it is important to compare analyses that have used the same 
utility-weightings otherwise the comparisons will be invalid. 
The EuroQol group, a consortium of European researchers, developed the EQ-
5D instrument to determine health utilities. (EuroQol group 1990, Essink-Bot 1993, 
Brooks 1996). The EQ-5D has five functional dimensions; mobility, pain/discomfort, 
self-care, anxiety/depression and usual activities. Each of the five dimensions used has 
three levels; no problem, some problems and major problems, providing a total of 243 
possible health states, to which unconscious and dead are added to make 245. For each 
of the possible 245 health states utility scores were constructed from responses to a 
random sample of3,000 people in the UK (Dolan 1996). 
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The EQ-5D utilised a time trade-off method, developed by Torrance (Torrance 
1972). For chronic conditions and individual is offered two choices; 
a. condition state i for time t (life expectancy) followed by death, or 
b. healthy for time x, (less than t) followed by death 
Time x is varied until the individual is indifferent between the two alternatives, 
at which point a preference score is determined (Drummond 1997). 
QALYs provide a common basis for the assessment of benefits gained from 
various interventions in terms of health-related quality of life and survival. When 
combined with the costs of providing interventions, a cost-utility ratio can be generated 
which indicates the additional costs required to generate a year of perfect health (one 
QALY). 
Comparisons can then be made between interventions to assess their relative 
worth from an economic perspective, and a cost -utility analysis is the result. A cost-
utility analysis the incremental cost of a program is compared to the incremental health 
improvement as measured in QALY's gained. The results are usually expressed in 
terms of cost per QAL Y gained. Priorities can be established based on those 
interventions that are relatively inexpensive (low cost per QAL Y) and those that are 
relatively expensive (high cost per QAL Y) (Drummond 1997). 
The use of QAL Y s in resource allocation decisions allows for choices between 
patient groups competing for medical care to be made explicit and health bureaucracies 
are given an insight into the potential benefits from investing in new technologies or 
therapies. QAL Y s and cost utility analysis provide additional information and is 
another piece in the complex decision making process of health service resource 
allocation (Drummond 1997). Another qualitative measure of injury cost is the 
Potential Years of Life Lost (PYLL). This measure places greater emphasis on the 
assessment of disability and permanent impairment. 
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Hussey (Hussey 1988) however, argues against the use of cost-utility analysis. 
"By this means we are, it is claimed, provided with a fair and rational means of making 
health care choices; we can maximise technical efficiency by producing the best 
possible outcome from any given input. It is also claimed that these calculations enable 
us to choose our priorities or goals by seeing which produces the most QAL Y s per 
pound spent." 
Hussey questions whether quality of life can be measured at all, and takes issue 
with the Rosser index "which purports to give an index of disability and distress to 
three decimal places ...... Questions arise not just about what should be measured and 
whether measurement is possible, but who should do the measuring. An estimate about 
post-operative quality of life made by a surgeon and that made by a patient might be 
wildly different." 
Robine (Robine 1998) argues that the QAL Y is excessively complex, because it 
simultaneously raises issues of demography, epidemiology, health measures, 
economics, philosophy and psychology. To aggregate these measures, equivalence's 
between various health states have to be drawn up, and this is fraught with difficulty. 
Robine also disputes the assertion that indicators of burden of disease can 
simultaneously enable measurement of a population's health status, quantification of ill 
health, definition of priorities, assessment of the effectiveness of interventions and the 
allocation of resources. 
Bonneux (Bonneux 1998) showed that the elimination of fatal diseases would 
increase health costs because of the medical expenses that would be incurred during the 
added life years. He argues that this demonstrates that health status and burden of 
disease cannot be expressed in a single figure. 
Andrews (Andrews 1998) on the other hand, argued that qualitative measures 
of disability had greater importance in developed countries where medical advances 
and affluence have reduced premature mortality to very low levels. Rankings of health 
problems produced by DALY s differed markedly from mortality statistics, with mental 
disorders accounting for only 0.4% of years lost due to premature death, but represented 
26% of premature disability. Andrews also noted that non-fatal conditions comprised a 
much greater share of the total burden of disease in developed countries and therefore 
deserved higher priority in national goal setting. 
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Most burden of disease studies aim to provide information that will shape 
priorities in public policy, but Holterman (Holterman 1981) argues that these studies 
appear to have had little impact on UK health policy. He states that "studies of burden 
of disease and policy priorities can be useful in decision making, provided that they 
tackle problems that policy makers are aware of, but that they are having less effect on 
what gets put on the policy agenda". 
2.11 Presentation of injury cost data 
Balas (Balas 1998) critically reviewed the literature dealing with clinical 
interventions in reducing injuries. He reported poor methodology in most of the studies 
examined and noted that appropriately categorising all costs represented the first step in 
improving quality and comparability of cost information. His assessment was made 
difficult because of the diverse and conflicting interpretations of cost found in the 
published studies. 
Barber (Barber 1998) performed a similar review of 45 papers and found that 
the cost of competing treatments were usually estimated using information about the 
quantities of resources used. The economic data was either unit cost data or from direct 
charges for health care. Barber argued that "For cost data, the crucial information is the 
arithmetic mean ..... This is because policy makers, purchasers and providers need to 
know the total cost of implementing the treatment. This total cost is estimated as the 
arithmetic mean cost in the trial, multiplied by the number of patients to be 
treated ... The fact that the distribution of costs is often highly skewed does not imply 
that the use of the arithmetic mean is inappropriate." 
In his review sample, Barber found only 44% of papers reported one or more 
measures which described the spread of cost data. Standard deviations were only 
reported in 20% of the papers. Barber argued that all cost data should be supported by 
a measure of precision (standard error or confidence interval) of the difference in mean 
costs between groups. The t test allows for an inference to be drawn between two 
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different mean costs of treatment. This method however assumes normality, which may 
not be present in highly skewed distributions of cost data. 
Any conclusion that could be extrapolated to future public policy needs to be 
justified in terms of the confidence interval and P value for the mean cost difference. 
Without any information about the precision of the mean cost difference observed, 
Barber argues that you cannot justify any conclusion. Because of the skewness of some 
data, the standard deviation alone is often not ideal. It is useful to present the inter 
quartile range, i.e. the range containing the central 50% of the cost data, or a 95% 
reference interval, which excludes the 2.5% of the cost data at each extreme. 
Barber considered the use of non-parametric tests and log transformation of data 
to be inappropriate, because they do not allow proper comparison of the difference in 
mean costs. Because of these limitations, only 36% of the papers studied drew 
conclusions that Barber believed were justified. He commented "Reporting 
inappropriate conclusions for either clinical or economic outcomes is potentially 
misleading and unethical". 
2.12 Other Methodologies 
Guria (Guria 1990) found that disability is a common outcome of road accident 
trauma. In the worst cases the victim has no productive future, and the costs of medical 
care may continue indefinitely. He noted that there was no systematic way of costing 
disability for inclusion in economic evaluations of accident prevention measures. He 
noted that there were difficulties in obtaining a measure of the spectrum of disabilities 
and in measuring the resultant economic cost. 
He noted that the social cost of disability included the opportunity costs of 
resources required e.g. emergency services, hospitals and other medical treatment. It 
also includes the individual's loss of productivity and legal costs imposed. The loss of 
productivity comprises temporary incapacitation and long-term disability. The costs 
attributable to pain and suffering and loss of quality of life were the most difficult to 
estimate in monetary terms. 
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Arthur (Arthur 1981) argued that a "willingness to pay" methodology may be 
appropriate in estimating these costs. Using this technique, estimates are developed to 
approximate the value a person places on their own life, rather than expected annual 
earnings. Some argue that this approach is the best way to value human life (Schelling 
1968). It is claimed that the NPV of earnings calculated using the human capital 
approach estimate the lower range of costs as estimated by willingness-to-pay 
(Linneroth 1979). 
The "social consumption equivalents" approach is also put forward as preferable 
to the human capital approach (Miller 1987). This approach includes transfer payments 
that are affected by changes in injury rates, especially fatalities. The value of a life 
saved is defined as the enjoyment value of the extra additional years and the value of 
additional labour input, minus the additional consumption of resources. This method is 
really only appropriate for fatalities. 
The friction method attempts to estimate the actual production loss in a 
workplace. (Koopmanscap 1995). The assumption underlying this methodology is that 
all workers who become the victim of premature death or disability will be replaced in 
the economic process after a so-called 'friction period'. This approach confines the cost 
of lost production to this friction period (usually put at 3 months). In most cases, this is 
considerably less than the loss from death or disability to time of retirement. 
In the Netherlands, both the human capital and friction methods indicated that 
8% of indirect health costs were due to injury. (van Beeck 1996) Using the human 
capital approach, traffic accidents were the greatest cause of indirect costs, while the 
friction method indicated that occupational accidents were the most costly. Van Beeck 
(van Beeck 1996) found that the human capital approach tended to over-estimate the 
loss of economic production as a consequence of disease or injury at a specific age until 
retirement. He considered that the human capital estimate was one of potential 
production loss, rather than the actual production loss. 
The friction method explicitly takes into account the economic processes, which 
reduce losses compared to the Human Capital model, which tends to estimate the 
potential upper limit. With this method, indirect costs will be lower in countries with 
high unemployment and higher in those with low unemployment. While seeing merit in 
other approaches Miller (Miller 1987) argued, "the only approach that has been 
sufficiently developed at this time for use in a cost framework is the human capital 
approach." 
2.13 Costs of Employee Turnover 
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Abbott (Abbott 1997) examined the organisational costs of managerial staff 
exiting a large professional services organization because of family pressures. She 
estimated that the total direct and indirect costs associated with the separation, training 
and replacement of new employees approximated to A$75,000 per employee. 
Cascio (Cascio 1991) has argued that there are three key costs associated with 
staff turnover: separation, replacement and training costs. He argued that it was also 
important to measure the dollar value of the performance difference between departing 
employees and their replacements. 
Competitive advantage in an enterprise depends upon the calibre of its 
employees, and it is essential for organizations to become the employer of choice in an 
environment where personnel are increasingly more selective in their choice of work 
environment. Failure to retain key staff results in a loss of competitive advantage and 
perhaps brings the survival of the organization into question. (Cox and Blake 1991) 
Costs associated with recruiting, training and replacing employees are a major 
expense for most organizations. It has been estimated that the cost of turnover per 
person may range from between 93 and 200 percent of an exiting employees salary 
(Johnson 1995), depending on their skill and responsibility level. In the Australian 
hospitality industry, where turnover ranges from 40-60%, it has been calculated that the 
turnover of a supervisor would cost a 5-star hotel approximately $13,000 (Deery 1996). 
Organizations seek commitment from their employees; this commitment is 
revealed in their attitudes, acceptance and belief in organisational goals and a 
willingness to exert effort on behalf of their organization and a desire to remain a 
member of the organization (Porter 1974). 
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Separation costs include lost productivity. Senior executives surveyed by Abbot 
believed that productivity dropped to 50% of previous levels as outstanding performers 
prepare to exit the organization. Abbot noted that this was a "subjective" assessment, as 
limited factual data was available. It was estimated that it took a new employee 
between 6 and 12 months to reach a level of productivity comparable to an exiting 
employee. Employees new to the industry or from smaller firms appeared to take longer 
to assimilate as they were not familiar with the quality controls, administrative 
processes and systems within the business. 
Abbott costed the replacement of a business manager with 7-10 years 
experience. She noted that this individual would have had extensive training in the 
organization's way of doing business and in technical training. Although a lateral 
replacement may have the technical skills, understanding and acceptance of the culture 
can take between 3 months and 3 years. Senior executives noted that some experienced 
recruits never fully integrate into the culture and leave after 3-5 years, particularly if 
their previous employment was not in competition. 
Abbott noted the requirement for considerable training of new recruits, as this 
would mainly be in the first year. These training costs equated to an average of 3 7% of 
total turnover costs. Replacement Costs included the cost of selecting a new candidate, 
entry procedures, and productivity of the new employee. Replacement costs and lost 
productivity accounted for 47% of turnover costs. Abbott argued for a standardised 
methodology for estimating turnover costs as this would allow different firms to 
benchmark against each other. The difficulties arise from a lack of hard data on the lost 
productivity associated with turnover, as data for her study was derived from subjective 
interviews. 
Voluntary turnover is in many cases a healthy and functional part of any 
organizations development as new employees enter who are better suited to the 
organizations' needs and those in conflict move on. However Cascio (Cascio 1991) 
noted that the loss of valued employees can directly affect bottom line profits. In some 
cases, employees cannot be replaced with individuals of similar skills due to a lack of 
applicants. To retain competitive advantage, employers are reliant on a committed and 
productive workforce (Pfeffer 1977). 
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2.16 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed a number of methodologies currently utilised to 
estimate the resultant costs arising from injury or illness. Cost of illness studies assess 
costs based on their viewpoint. Most COI studies have adopted a societal viewpoint, 
but this thesis will assess costs from a governmental viewpoint. This choice was shaped 
by the economic realities of the government resource allocation processes. Investment 
decisions are usually determined by potential savings, either in the form of productivity 
gains or direct cost reductions. 
Other Armies have conducted cost analyses looking only at days of lost 
production due to work absence (British Army Medical Directorate 1996). This 
approach excludes other significant costs such as compensation payments, direct 
medical costs and invalid pensions. 
While QAL Y s and DALY s are useful and commonly used tools, there are 
conflicting views regarding their influence on policy makers or the budgetary process. 
(Robine 1998) They have little applicability within the military context because the 
population is generally young and quality of life concerns usually only become a 
significant issue once the member has transitioned to civilian life. In these 
circumstances, any health related outcomes become an issue for society and not the 
Defence organisation 
The human capital model relies in investment by the individual in their own 
education or training, whereas the Army is that rare employer who pays for all job 
related training, while providing a salary. As such, a "pure" human capital approach to 
estimating indirect costs would not be applicable, as the individual bears no investment 
costs. As outlined in Chapter 5, an approach that focuses mainly on known training 
costs will be utilised. 
As noted by Balas (Balas 1998) correctly categorising all costs represents the 
first step in improving the quality and comparability of cost information. Diverse and 
conflicting interpretations of cost make it difficult to compare between published 
studies. 
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Barber (Barber 1998) argues for more rigour in the presentation of cost data, with the 
use of arithmetic means, standard deviations and measures of precision (standard error 
or confidence interval). He strongly advocates the use of simple statistical analysis to 
determine any significance between two different mean costs of treatment. This 
approach is followed in the data presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
The following chapters will seek to categorise the available data on the costs 
associated with injury in general and surgically treated injuries of the spine in 
particular. These areas were chosen because cost data was available. As will be 
detailed in subsequent chapters, the depth of analysis is governed by the quality of the 
available data. 
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Chapter Three. Direct Costs of Injury for the Australian Army 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will estimate the direct cost of injury to the Army, through a review 
of medical and compensation costs. The limitations of the datasets utilised and 
suggested improvements will be discussed. In order to fully understand the direct 
medical payments system, a brief review of the previous Army financial management 
system follows. 
3.2 Army Financial Arrangements. 
Army funding is derived from the Defence Vote or appropriation within the 
Federal government budget. Within the Department of Defence there were 13 
programs; Army, Navy, Air Force, Defence Estate, Personnel Executive, Training and 
Education, Corporate Services, Acquisition and Logistics, Budget and Management, 
Strategy and Intelligence and Science and Technology. 
Direct funding allocations were made to each program, which was responsible 
for its own financial management. Funds were accounted for using a cash based 
expenditure system, but accrual accounting is progressively being introduced. In 1996, 
Health funding was provided directly to the Army. Following the Defence Reform 
Program in 1997, health funding for all three Services was centralized to the Defence 
Personnel Executive. 
Free medical and dental care is a condition of service for all members of the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF), and funds were allocated to the Defence Health 
Services to pay for the provision of medical services to Defence personnel. These funds 
were allocated to what is termed Account Group 39 (AG39) - Medical and Dental 
Services. Funds from AG39 were used to pay for all medical treatment costs that 
resulted from injury or illness in serving members. 
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Health regions were created in different states and each region was allocated a 
set amount of funding for the purchase of health services and paid providers directly on 
the presentation of invoices. In this way, the regional health agencies acted as fund 
holders and made decisions regarding the appropriate expenditure of funds and sought 
value-for-money services. 
Some other direct costs were incurred internally; for example, pharmaceuticals, 
wages for uniformed staff and facilities (hospital and medical centre running costs). 
These costs were met through different appropriations in the Defence budget, and were 
managed through the allocation of funds to a central management organisation. Salaries 
for uniformed members were fixed costs that were met irrespective of the workload or 
clinical demand. They were not considered in this analysis because it was not possible 
to attribute a proportion of this cost to injury, as the employment of uniformed 
members of the Defence Force in effect constitutes an insurance policy, for use in time 
of war or natural disaster. 
There has also been a deliberate strategy of replacing uniformed personnel 
involved in direct patient care, as it was considered that uniformed manpower was a 
more expensive option than civilianisation of the health workforce. Policy guidance on 
expenditure was provided via the medium of Health Policy Directives issued from the 
Office of the Surgeon General Australian Defence Force. 
3.3 External Medical Costs - Account Group 39 (AG 39) 
Where services are not provided internally, Army (Defence) must purchase them 
in the marketplace. These services included fee-for -service specialist providers 
(surgeons, physicians, and optometrists), sessional services and contract services 
(General Practitioners, nurses and physiotherapists working full-time in Service 
facilities). Public and private hospital services were also used. 
Each medical facility was given a budget to manage over a 12-month period. 
These funds were used to pay invoices received from service providers under normal 
terms of trade i.e. bills paid within 30 days ofreceipt. All invoices were subjected to a 
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verification and proving system which was in accordance with the Audit Act in order to 
minimise the possibility of fraud and double billing. 
ACCOUNT CODE NUMBERS AND CATEGORY DESCRIPTIONS 
20800 MED FEES -GP 20831 FEE SERV MED - ANEST 20862 FEE PROF-PODIATRIST 
20801 MED SESS FEES-SPECST 20832 FEE MED-GEN SURGEON 20863 FEE PROF-PSYCHOLOGST 
20802 MED SESS FEES - OTH 20833 FEE MED-OPHTHALMGST 20867 PUBLIC HOSP-MEDICAL 
20803 DENT FEES-GP 20834 FEE SERV MED - ORTHO 20868 PUBLIC HOSPTL-DENTAL 
20804 DENT FEES-ORAL SURO 20835 FEE MED-PSYCHIATRIST 20869 PRIVATE HOSP-MEDICAL 
20805 DENT FEES-OTH SPECST 20836 FEE SERV MED - GENER 20870 PRIVATE HOSP-DENT AL 
20806 DENT FEES-DENT ASSNT 20837 FEE SERV MED-RADIOGT 20871 SPECS/CONT ACT LENSES 
20807 DENT SESS FEES - OTH 20838 FEE SERV MED-AMO 20872 OPTICAL MISCLLANEOUS 
20808 REGIS TD NURSE FEES 20839 FEE SERV MED-PATHLGT 20873 RADIOLOGY 
20809 ENROLLED NURSE FEES 20840 FEE MED-PLASTIC SURO 20874 DENTAL RADIOLOGY 
20810 PHYSIOTHERAPIST FEES 20841 FEE MED-OTH SPEC SRG 20875 PATHOLOGY 
2081 I RADIOGRPHR SESS FEES 20842 FEE MED-OTH SPECLST 20876 ROAD AMBULANCE 
20812 SCIENTFC OFFCER FEES 20843 FEE SERV MED-OBS/GYN 20877 OTHER HEALTH ITEMS 
20813 OTH HEALTH PROF FEES 20844 FEE MED-NUERO SURO 20878 AIR AMBULANCE 
20814 PHARMACIST SESS FEES 20845 FEE MEDICAL-ENT SURO 20879 PHARMACEUTICAL 
20815 GP-CONTRACT 20846 FEE SERV DENT - GP 20880 HEARING 
20816 MED CONTRACT-SPECLST 20847 FEE DENT-ORAL SURGN 20881 RNDM URINALYSIS PROO 
20817 OTH MEDICAL-CONTRACT 20848 FEE DENT-ORTHODONTST 20882 OH&S - SIGHT SCREENG 
20818 DENT-GP-CONTRACT 20849 FEE DENT-PERIODONTST 20883 OH&S - OTHER SCREENG 
20819 DENT SPECLST-CONTRCT 20850 FEE DENT-PROSTHODNT 20884 OH&S - OTHER 
20820 DENT ASSTNT-CONTRACT 20851 FEE DENT-ENDODONTIST 20885 CIVLN-FEE PYMTS GP 
20821 DENT HYGNST-CONTRACT 20852 FEE DENT-LAB FEES 20886 CIV-FEE SRV PAY SPEC 
20822 DENT TECHNCN-CONTRCT 20853 FEE SERV DENT - OTH 20887 CIVILIAN -OCCUP HLT 
20823 REGTD NURSE-CONTRACT 20854 FEE DENT -RADIOLGST 20888 CIVILIAN - OPTICAL 
20824 ENROLLED NURSE-CONT 20855 FEES SERV - RN 20889 CIVILN-PHARMACEUTICL 
20825 PHYSIOTHPST-CONTRACT 20856 FEE PROF-PHYSIOTHPST 20890 CIVILIAN - HEARING 
20826 RADIOGRAPHER-CONTRCT 20857 FEE PROF-PHARMACIST 20891 CVLN-OTH HEALTH SERV 
20827 SCIENTFIC OFF-CNTRCT 20858 FEE PROF-RADIOGRAPHR 20893 CIV-CMO-PERM APPOINT 
20828 PHARMACIST-CONTRACT 20859 FEE -SCIENTFIC OFFCR 20894 CIVLN-REHAB PROVIDRS 
20829 OTH HLTH PROF-CONTRT 20860 FEE PROF-OPTOMETRIST 
20830 FEE SERV MED- GP 20861 FEE SERV PROF - OTH 
20800 MED FEES -GP 20831 FEE SERV MED -ANEST 20862 FEE PROF-PODIATRIST 
20801 MED SESS FEES-SPECST 20832 FEE MED-GEN SURGEON 20863 FEE PROF-PSYCHOLOGST 
Table3.l DEFMIS Account Code numbers and category descriptions. 
All accounts were entered onto the Defence Financial Management Information 
System (DEFMIS). This was a computer system developed by the Department of 
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Defence to record all financial transactions. Financial transactions were recorded using 
account and cost centre codes. Data for this chapter was obtained from the DEFMIS 
database. The DEFMIS database recorded total annual expenditure against specific 
account codes. Cost centre codes were used to identify different medical centres. The 
account codes reflected categories of Service provider e.g. general practitioner, general 
surgeon, and type of payment either contract, sessional or fee-for-service. A spreadsheet 
detailing the expenditure against each account code was obtained from the finance cell 
of Defence Health Service Branch and used to determine direct medical expenditure. 
Table 3.1 shows the account codes and the category description. 
Figure 3.1 shows that between 1992/93 and 1995/96 external medical costs for 
the ADF rose from $16.28M to $26.89M. This represents increases of 33%, 13.8% and 
8.5% respectively in the years after 1992/93. These cost increases were well above the 
prevailing rates of inflation for the corresponding periods which were 2.4%, 3.1 % and 
3 .2% respectively (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006). 
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Figure 3.1 
$26.89 
$24.78 
$21.78 
$16.28 
1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995196 
Direct Medical Costs (AG 39) for the ADF 1992/93-1995/96 
Account codes only allowed for crude grouping of expenditure into broad 
categories. Whilst the total payment to individual providers was available, it was not 
possible to break these figures down into episodes of care. 
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The author was commanding officer of the Canberra Area Medical unit for the 
period 1997-1999. Because costs on DEFMIS could not be apportioned between injury 
and illness, a dedicated database system was developed in 1997. This system involved 
the creation of referral numbers for every referral to an external service provider, which 
allowed individual episodes of care to be costed. The referral number was used as 
payment authorisation for any bill related to the same episode of injury or illness. 
An electronic invoice system was created using a lotus approach database. 
Each referral number screen had a field for whether the referral was for an injury or 
illness. The clerical staff, based on the doctor's referral and questioning the patient, 
determined if the referral was for injury or illness. This determination of injury or 
illness was then added to the financial system when the invoice was paid. For example, 
where a patient was referred to an orthopaedic surgeon, all subsequent activity such as 
radiology, pathology, anaesthetic, hospitalisation and ancillary costs were recorded 
against the one referral number. This system was not utilised at any other military 
health facility, so the data is unique within Defence. 
There was potential for ascertainment bias as the assignment to either injury or 
illness category reflected the assessment of the payments clerk. This assessment 
however, was informed by the original referral and feedback from the patient, 
reducing the possibility of bias. 
Using the referral number database, a 2-year sample of hospital and outpatient 
costs was obtained from the Canberra Area Medical Unit. To develop an Army 
estimate it would have been preferable to have had a total Army breakdown of injury 
and illness cost. Because this data did not and still does not exist in 2008, this thesis 
will rely on an estimate obtained by extrapolation from the Canberra dataset. 
Canberra is not representative of the rest of the Defence Force, as it has a greater 
percentage of senior and therefore older ADF members. This reflects the large number 
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of senior positions located within the Headquarter elements in Canberra. Twenty 
percent of the total Army is over the age of 35, while in the Canberra region 50% of the 
Army is over 35. The sample in this dataset comprised Army, Navy and Air Force 
personnel. 
This older group has a greater preponderance of medical as opposed to traumatic 
surgical problems. The percentage of injury episodes is likely to be higher in the 
younger and generally more active ADF populations in other parts of Australia, because 
they are engaging in physical training on a daily basis. With the exception of the Royal 
Military College Duntroon and the Defence Academy, Army members do not have 
organised daily physical training in Canberra. Nor do they engage in strenuous or 
demanding activities related to combat training. Consequently, the contribution of 
injury in this population is likely to be an underestimate, and therefore conservative. 
Table 3.2 displays fee-for-service costs only, as it was not considered possible to 
apportion contract hours or sessional periods. Injury episodes accounted for between 
16-18% of total external care episodes, but between 26 and 28% of total cost. The 
average cost of a payment for an injury-related episode was over 80% greater than that 
for illness. 
No Cost %No %Cost Cost/episode 
1997-98 
INJURY 1344 $1,159,528 15.8% 26.1% $862.74 
ILLNESS 7136 $3,287,065 84.2% 73.9% $460.63 
TOTAL 8480 $4,446,593 $524.36 
1998-99 
INJURY 1289 $1,114,590 18.4% 27.8% $864.69 
ILLNESS 5710 $2,888,218 81.6% 72.2% $505.82 
TOTAL 6999 $4,002,808 $571.91 
Table 3.2 Recorded external costs (AG 39-fee for service) by injury and illness for 
the years 1997/98 and 1998/99, Canberra Area Medical Unit. 
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Younger soldiers generally do not require treatment for medical conditions such 
as hypertension, kidney stones or gastro-intestinal dysfunction. These conditions 
predominate in the older group and the ratio of injury to illness episodes is likely to be 
greater than 27: 73. Therefore using the mean of 27% can be considered to be a very 
conservative figure when applied to the younger and more physically active group of 
soldiers outside of Canberra. 
That this proportion is likely to be an underestimate is supported by the 
experience of the US and British Armies as detailed in Chapter 1. Jones (Jones 1988) 
found that injury and illness presentations in US Army recruits were almost equal in 
number, with illness predominating (illness to injury ratio of 54:46). But when 
morbidity outcomes were compared, injury caused a 5 times greater loss of time from 
work than illness in males and a 21 times greater loss of work time in females. 
British Army population data based on medical attendances for the period 
January-July 1996 showed a ratio of illness to injury presentations of 61 :39. The rate of 
illness presentations was 100/1000/ month compared to 65.1/1000/month for injury. 
When training units were examined, initial illness rates were 24911000/month and 
initial injury rates were 196/1000/month, with an illness to injury presentation ratio of 
56:44 (British Army Medical Directorate 1996).The picture is somewhat different for 
review consultations where the injury rate was 98/1000/month compared to the illness 
rate of 8.9/1000/month, providing an illness to injury ratio of 92:8. Injuries caused 2.7 
times more lost work days than illness in the whole British Army (21911000 
soldiers/month versus 81.9/1000/ month). Injury accounted for 73% of all days lost 
from the workplace. 
Unfortunately, Defence collected Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) data 
are not helpful in developing an estimate of the relative contribution of injury to overall 
morbidity and cost. The OHS data are heavily skewed towards injury, as soldiers tend 
to raise a claim as evidence of a work related injury and illness is rarely claimed as 
there is a need to demonstrate an occupational link. As a measure of injury or illness 
incidence, the data is not accurate or reliable. 
The British Army figures were population based, and derived from their 
organisational health surveillance tool termed "J95". This tool recorded attendances as 
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either initial or review, due to injury, illness or other reasons and recorded the days of 
restricted duty or sick leave granted. This was a simple tool that recorded attendances 
under an ICD-9 chapter category, without any specific diagnostic coding. This allowed 
for simple categorisation at the clinic level by medical assistants. The British and US 
data did not include direct costs; they simply recorded the incidence of presentations 
and measured morbidity through days lost from the workplace. 
Limited data on the ratio of injury to illness is available from Australian 
Epitrack data. Epitrack is a health surveillance system modelled on the British "195" 
programme which is now called EPINATO and is used by all NATO forces for 
measuring medical workloads at primary care facilities. Epitrack was not adopted 
uniformly across all Defence medical centres in Australia, but has been used on 
operations overseas. 
Data was collected in 1998 at the Canberra Area medical centre using the 
Epitrack system. Unfortunately this was for a very small period of time, but provides an 
indication of the incidence of injury and illness presentations in first year officer cadets 
at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADF A). 
(n=391) 
Illness 
Rate per 100 
Injury 
Rate per 100 
Jan 
39 
10.0 
48 
12.3 
Feb 
124 
31.7 
66 
16.9 
Mar 
201 
51.4 
123 
31.5 
Apr 
131 
33.5 
61 
15.6 
Mean 
31.6 
19.1 
Table 3.3 Number and rate of injury and illness presentations in first year ADFA 
cadets for the period Jan-April 1998. 
Table 3.3 shows that for a young and active population of Officer cadets, the 
illness to injury presentation ratio was 62:38, similar to the ratio observed in the larger 
British population sample. 
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The contribution of injury to health costs in the broader Army is likely to be 
greater than that observed in the Canberra sample, but the 27% figure can be taken as a 
reliable lower bound. Based on the US and British data, the contribution of injury is 
likely to be of the order of 40% of total health costs and this figure will be used as an 
upper bound for the estimation of direct costs. In the absence of any other reliable data, 
the true proportional contribution of injury cannot be ascertained with any certainty. 
In a review of the cost of injury (Mathers 1999, more detail in section 3.5), 
injury and poisoning and musculoskeletal conditions accounted for 18% of recurrent 
health expenditures in the Australian population during 1993/94. This review provided 
a comprehensive breakdown of injury costs by age groups within the Australian 
Community. This is summarised in table 3.4. 
Age group Injury Costs % by age MSK Costs % by age Injury+ MSK % by age ($M). group ($M). group Costs ($M). group 
0-14 362.7 13.9% 91.8 3.1% 454.5 8.1% 
15-24 450.6 17.3% 178.1 5.9% 628.7 11.2% 
25-34 362.5 13.9% 305.8 10.2% 668.3 11.9% 
35-44 281.4 10.8% 372.0 12.4% 653.4 11.7% 
45-54 225.I 8.7% 385.3 12.8% 610.4 10.9% 
55+ 919.2 35.3% 1668.9 55.6% 2588.1 46.2% 
3001.8 5603.1 
Table 3 .4 Absolute and relative distribution of injury and Musculosketal (MSK) direct 
costs, by age in the Australian Population 1993-94. (From Mathers I 999) 
This data shows that the majority of injury and musculoskeletal costs were 
generated by those 55 years and older, with 35% of injury costs and 56% of 
musculoskeletal costs generated in that age group. The 15-24 year group had the second 
highest injury cost, while the 45-55 year group had the second highest musculoskeletal 
costs. Mathers argued that many of these musculoskeletal conditions were the late 
consequences of injury and should be considered as part of the injury spectrum. 
There is no Australian Army data that examines medical costs by age group as 
was done by Mathers. There is age related data on medical invalidity discharge and this 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 (Tables 4.12 and 4.13). From this data it is 
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Table 3.5 compares the age distribution of Australian population costs with the 
age distribution of medical invalidity within Army. The majority of injury related costs 
occur in the population older than 55, reflecting the high injury morbidity and cost of 
falls in the elderly. For the Army population, injury and musculoskeletal invalidity 
peaked in the 25-34 age group, where half of all invalidity occurred, but the relationship 
between invalidity rates and health costs is not clear. The compulsory retiring age for 
the Army was 55, with the majority of members retiring well before that age and 
seeking second careers. Not surprisingly, there were very few invalid retirements in the 
older age groups. 
Age Injury and MSK Costs. % by age group in % invalidity for lnjury and 
group ($M) Australian Population MSK reasons, by age group, Australian Army 
0-14 454.5 8.1% 0% 
15-24 628.7 11.2% 25.8% 
25-34 668.3 11.9% 50.0% 
35-44 653.4 11.7% 19.7% 
45-54 610.4 10.9% 4.5% 
55+ 2588.1 0% 
Table 3.5 Age related costs of injury in the Australian Population compared to age 
related invalid discharge rates in the Australian Army 1996/97. (From Mathers 1999) 
A breakdown of direct medical costs by nature of expenditure is detailed in 
figures 3.2 and 3.3. This data was derived from the DEFMIS database with fee for 
service data combined with other categories to produce aggregated groupings. Figure 
3.2 shows the total dollar cost to the ADF for external medical costs broken down by 
provider group. It can be seen that specialists and GP costs are the two major drivers of 
external expenditure followed closely by private hospital costs. The GP costs represent 
full-time contract medical officers who provided services in Army facilities. Figure 3.3 
shows that Specialists and Private Hospital costs accounted for 45% of all external 
ADF medical expenditure in 1995/96. 
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Figure 3.2. The distribution of external medical costs for ADF, 1994/5 to 1995/6. 
(Includes contract salaries and sessional payments) 
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Figure 3.3 The percentage contribution of various services to total ADF medical costs. 
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Using the 27% injury contribution figure with the total values shown in Figure 
3.1, Table 3.6 shows the estimated direct costs attributable to injury in the ADF. Given 
that the 27% figure is highly likely to be an underestimate, a 40% figure, consistent 
with incidence figures noted in other Armies, is also included to provide an upper 
estimate. Army represents approximately 50% of the ADF population, and therefore a 
proportional estimation is made. It is likely that Army would be responsible for a 
disproportionately higher percentage of the total injury cost. 
AG 39 Cost Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated 
Injury Cost Injury Cost Army Cost at Army Cost 
at27% at40% 27% at40% 
1992/93 $16.28M $4.40M $6.51M $2.20M $3.26M 
1993/94 $21.78M $5.88M $8.71M $2.94M $4.36M 
1994/95 $24.78M $6.69M $9.91M $3.35M $4.96M 
Table 3.6 Estimated direct cost of Injury for the Army 1992/93-1995/96 ($Millions). 
Year Cost difference between Cost Difference as a Cost Difference as a percentage 
two estimates. $M percentage of total cost of initial 27% cost estimate 
1992/93 $1.06M 6.5% 48.2% 
1993/94 $1.42M 6.5% 48.2% 
1994/95 $1.61M 6.5% 48.1% 
Table 3.7 The absolute and relative increase in Army costs arising from a 40% injury 
contribution estimate compared to a 27% injury estimate. 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show that an injury contribution estimate of 40% leads to an 
absolute increase in Army injury direct costs of between $1 million and $1.6M between 
1992/93 and 1994/95. In relative terms the upper bound produces a nearly 50% increase 
in the direct injury cost estimate. 
3.4 Injury Surveillance and cost data deficiencies 
An understanding of where, when and how injuries occur and who they occur to 
is critical for the development of interventions designed to prevent and control injuries 
(Cusimano 2007). The establishment of injury surveillance systems is widely 
considered a pre-requisite for injury prevention activities at a local level (Stone 1998). 
The WHO, in defining injury surveillance systems, state that "the final link of the 
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surveillance chain is in the application of these data to prevention and control" (Holder 
2001 ). Lund argues that "the most important aim of an injury surveillance system is to 
provide information useful in the prevention of injuries" (Lund 2004 ). However, many 
reported studies refer to surveillance as simply a data collection activity, rather than the 
first step towards the prevention of future injury (Holder 2001, Peden 2002). This is a 
crucial deficiency in the surveillance process for "information has value only if it is 
used for decision-making" (Frerichs 1991 ). 
In order for information to be used for decision making purposes it must be 
available in the first place. The major finding from the proceeding section was the 
paucity and poor quality of both health surveillance and cost data within the Australian 
Army at an organisational level. This is due primarily to the lack of an effective 
electronic health record within the Defence Health Services. 
Attempts has been made to introduce a Defence electronic health record (called 
HEAL TH Keys) since 1996, but the proprietary software chosen has met with a number 
of technical and customer difficulties. Its lack of user friendliness and complexity has 
meant that there has been strong resistance from the user community. This is especially 
marked in civilian medical practitioners, who have unfavourably compared it with the 
commercially available software packages currently in use within the Australian general 
practice environment. The software is cumbersome and can require up to 20 minutes to 
complete a simple primary care consultation; an unacceptable outcome when steady 
patient throughput is required. 
A recent review of injury surveillance in the ADF highlighted a number of 
deficiencies in injury data collection within the ADF. McKinnon (McKinnon 2008) 
described three key characteristics of an effective injury surveillance system: the 
ongoing, systematic collection of data, the analysis and interpretation of that data and 
the dissemination of information for prevention purposes. 
McKinnon noted that there was a scarcity of critical research directed at 
optimising the performance of injury surveillance systems and their utility for injury 
prevention purposes. The available research has focused on the technical design, 
construction or subsequent evaluation of these systems. McKinnon identified two areas 
that impacted negatively on the performance of injury surveillance systems: (1) the 
impact of human interaction with such systems i.e. the willingness of staff to use the 
system (Ashby 2003, Marson 2005); and (2) a lack of knowledge regarding optimal 
injury surveillance methods (Driscoll 2004, C. Finch, 2006). 
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McKinnon (McKinnon 2008) argues that Injury surveillance systems provide 
the foundation for priority setting by identifying problem areas. He also noted that there 
are currently few formal tools for establishing injury priority in society or the ADF. 
Any criteria adopted to prioritise injury issues identified by surveillance data should 
ultimately reflect the ADF context - the internal policies, ADF goals and objectives, the 
tolerability of the risk and the interests of stakeholders (Standards Australia/Standards 
New Zealand, 2004a). 
McKinnon (McKinnon 2008) recommended that the ADF adopt a two-stage 
injury surveillance process. This process was initially described by Lund (Lund 2004) 
and is characterised by two formal stages of data collection. The first step involves the 
collection of a minimal data set, as defined by the WHO (Holder 2001 ), on all injuries 
within a given context (i.e. an ADF establishment). The second step involves selected 
expansion of data collection on injuries of interest (e.g. ankle injuries), injured 
individuals (e.g. all recruits in week 3 of training) or places of particular interest (e.g. 
an obstacle course). This secondary form of data collection is aimed at identifying 
factors associated with particular injuries and aiding the development of prevention 
efforts (Lund 2004). Data collected by routine injury surveillance is unlikely to be able 
to describe all injury scenarios in sufficient detail to implement preventive initiatives. 
Moreover, surveillance systems are unlikely to be able to anticipate all of the possible 
correlates of injury (e.g. injury sites, events, causes I mechanisms, conditions and other 
contributing factors). 
McKinnon argues that the two stage approach is likely to capture the vast 
majority of injuries, even those unaccounted for at system inception, through a 
comprehensive secondary exploration of injury type, location and cause. (McKinnon 
2007). A large and comprehensive data collection process would likely produce a 
similar outcome as the two stage approach, but this would probably result in low data 
quality due to health staff being resistant to the effort required for expanded data 
collection (Marson 2005). It is also possible that much of the data would not be used, 
representing a poor return on investment, while secondary data collection provides a 
more efficient use of resources directed at injury surveillance. 
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By prioritising injury concerns based on a minimal data set, users of the 
surveillance data are not overwhelmed by information. Subsequent effort can then be 
directed at obtaining more data where the need is determined. The Defence Injury 
Prevention Program adopted a two-stage approach to surveillance data collection, but 
McKinnon argues that the second stage is considered part of the injury prevention 
process rather than an integral part of the injury surveillance process. He observes that 
" The importance of secondary data collection to inform prevention has been 
highlighted, but it has been viewed as an adjunct to injury surveillance in both OH&S 
risk management approaches of the ADF and within the Defence Injury Prevention 
Program - not as part of the surveillance process. Injury surveillance is the foundation 
of injury prevention. Once adopted by the ADF, the two stage framework will likely 
produce a higher quality information outcome through the systematic application of 
second stage collection measures and thereby optimise the reduction of preventable 
injuries" (McKinnon 2008). 
Attempts to improve injury surveillance in the ADF are underway, with the 
proposed incorporation of injury surveillance data into the Defence Occupational 
Health and Safety (OHS) reporting system. The current ADF injury/incident report 
(form AC563) contains a minimalist data set required for legislative compliance, but no 
data about contributing or potentially causative factors. These areas are well covered in 
the Defence Injury Prevention Programme (DIPP) surveillance form. Both forms are 
currently paper based only and require significant administrative effort to convert into 
an electronic form for analysis. 
A new form AC 563-2 has been developed by the Directorate of Occupational 
Health and Safety -Army which incorporates the DIPP injury surveillance minimum 
data set into the routine reporting of injury. The new form is electronic and can be sent 
via email and directly incorporated into a database. The report form was previously 
initiated by the individual, but the new form will be initiated at medical treatment 
centres. Once adopted the quality of injury surveillance data will improve markedly. To 
accurately capture costs will require a unique episode identifier to be appended to 
94 
medical bills. The referral number serves this purpose well and should adopted across 
the Defence Health Services. 
3.5 Australian Health Costs 
Mathers and Perm (Mathers 1999) performed a cost analysis on the health 
system costs of injury, poisoning and musculoskeletal diseases (MSD) in Australia 
during the period 1993-94. The direct health system costs of injury and poisoning 
amounted to $2,601 million in 1993-94, or 8.3% of total recurrent health expenditure. 
Musculoskeletal disorders (MSD) accounted for $3,002 million or 9.6% of total 
expenditures in 1993/94. 
Musculoskeletal disorders were not a major cause of death, but were responsible 
for significant morbidity and disability. Chronic MSD were reported by 29% of 
Australians aged 15 years and over and in 56% of Australians aged 60 years and over. 
Costs were even across age and gender bands with two exceptions; males aged 15-34 
where system costs were 2-3 times higher and women over 75 years where falls were a 
major source of costs. 
Cardiovascular and digestive diseases were the two most expensive groups, with 
digestive diseases boosted by the high cost of dental services. Musculoskeletal 
Disorders and Injury/poisoning were the third and fourth most expensive conditions, 
accounting for 18% of total health expenditure. Injury also accounted for 22.5% of all 
potential years oflife lost (PYLL) before age 75. 
Mathers noted that "Injury is a major factor in the aetiology of certain 
musculoskeletal conditions, particularly joint disruptions and osteoarthritis and perhaps 
back problems (although this connection may be more complex), and to some extent, 
some of the costs attributable to musculoskeletal conditions are late effects of injury. In 
addition, there is a somewhat arbitrary boundary between acute musculoskeletal 
damage (injury) and chronic musculoskeletal damage resulting from long term 
microtrauma or old injury. Costs associated with the latter are generally classified to 
musculoskeletal disorders. It is not possible to quantify the proportion of 
musculoskeletal disorder costs that are attributable to injury as an underlying cause". 
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One indication of the importance of prior injury comes from the 1993 ABS 
Survey of Disability, Aging and Carers (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1993a). Injury 
was stated to be the underlying cause by 27% of those who were disabled with a 
musculoskeletal condition. This is much higher than the proportion for all disabling 
conditions (17%). 
In his study Mathers elected not to measure indirect costs because in his view, 
"methodologies for measuring indirect costs are either contentious and/or at an early 
stage of development". Mathers noted two issues that needed to be considered when 
reviewing this direct cost data; 
(1) expenditure per se, does not indicate the loss of health involved or the 
priority for intervention, and 
(2) while the data provides a broad picture of the health system, it needs to 
be interpreted with caution in specific disorders. Analysis of actual costs 
incurred will yield more accurate results. 
Table 3.8 shows that back disorders were the most expensive musculoskeletal 
condition followed closely by osteoarthritis. In terms of external causes, accidental falls 
were the most expensive at $806M (31 % ) followed by adverse effects of medical 
treatment with $401M (15.4%) and road traffic accidents $370M (14%). 
Cause 
Back problems 
Osteoarthritis 
Muscle, tendon, soft tissue problems 
Joint derangement and disorders 
Neck problems 
Cost 
$700M (23%) 
$601M (21%) 
$519M (17%) 
$430M (14%) 
$160M (5%) 
Table 3 .8 The 5 leading causes of Musculoskeletal Disorder (MSD) cost in the 
Australian population 1993/94. 
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Age Group Males Females Persons 
Total Musculoskeletal 
15-24 $101.4M (8.0%) $76.7M (4.4%) $178.IM 
25-34 $171.0M (13.6%) $134.8M (7.7%) $305.8M 
35-44 $179.0M (14.2%) $193.0M (11.1%) $372.0M 
Back Disorder 
15-24 $12.2M (3.8%) $17.6M (4.7%) $29.8M 
25-34 $56.6M (17.5%) $40.7M (10.8%) $97.3M 
35-44 $61.7M (19.1%) $54.7M (14.5%) $116.4M 
Table 3.9 The cost distribution by the age group of total musculoskeletal disease and 
back disorders. 
Table 3.9 shows that males aged 15-44, accounted for 36.8% of total 
musculoskeletal costs, compared to 23.2% in females of the same broad age group. For 
back disorder, males aged 15-44 accounted for 40.4% of total costs compared to 30% in 
females. 
3.6 Defence Compensation Schemes 
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is self insured for Workers Compensation 
purposes, and therefore funds its outlays directly from its appropriation. All other 
Commonwealth Departments and civilian members of the Department of Defence are 
covered by COM CARE, to whom they pay a premium based upon their claims 
experience. This premium is linked to the departmental claims record and was $11 
million for Defence civilians in 1994/95. 
ADF compensation outlays have been considered "below the line" costs. While 
the ADF has routinely bid for funds to settle compensation issues it has consistently 
under-estimated the true cost. Compensation costs were funded by the Department of 
Finance on a "no win-no loss" basis. This meant that compensation funding was 
guaranteed by the department of Finance. If the ADF had overbid for compensation 
costs then excess funds would have been returned. In the case of an underbid, the ADF 
provided details of any outstanding liability and the Department of Finance reimbursed 
the total cost at no loss. 
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Members of the ADF are covered by the Safety, Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 1988 (SCRA) and the Veteran's Entitlement Act (VEA), both as 
amended by the Military Compensation Act 1994. (A new Military Rehabilitation and 
Compensation act was enacted on 1 July 2004). Dual coverage was available for many 
members of the ADF with coverage provided internally by the Military Compensation 
Scheme (MCS) and externally by the Department of Veterans Affairs (DV A). The dual 
entitlements are complex, but those who enlisted after 7 April 1994, and who have not 
had peacekeeping or operational service have no external coverage under the VEA. 
3. 7 Defence Compensation Processes 
The Department of Defence administered the SRCA on behalf of the single 
Service Offices. When injured, members completed a "Claim for Compensation and 
Rehabilitation Form AB 168" and this was submitted to the Defence Compensation 
section. A report of injury should also have been made through administrative channels. 
Claims were assessed to determine if the condition arose as a result of ADF service or 
was materially contributed to by ADF service. Once liability had been accepted a 
number of benefits were potentially available. Where an employee suffered an injury 
resulting in incapacity of 28 days or more or a permanent impairment, the Department 
of Defence was required to provide and manage a rehabilitation programme to achieve 
the greatest achievable recovery and earliest possible return to work. The responsibility 
for rehabilitation rests with the respective Service. 
3.8 Military Compensation Costs 
Figure 3 .4 shows the number of compensation claims made by each Service 
during the period 1992/93 to 1995/96. It clearly shows that Army members made a 
significantly greater number of claims compared to their Navy and Air Force 
counterparts, even after allowing that the Army is twice the size of the other two 
organisations. Figure 3.5 shows that ADF compensation costs rose sharply in the mid 
1990's, doubling in the 4 years between 1992/93 and 1995/96. 
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Figure 3 .4 The number of claims made by the three Services, 1992/93 to 1995/96. 
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Figure 3.5 Total compensation costs for the Australian Defence Force, 1991/92 to 
1995/96. 
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Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show that Army was responsible for the majority of the ADF 
compensation costs, increasing steadily from 66% of total compensation costs in 
1991/92 to 73.5% in 1995/6. These compensation costs were primarily borne by 
government as the ADF was reimbursed its compensation costs by Treasury. 
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99 
Figure 3.6. The relative compensation outlays for the three Services, 1991/2 tol 995/6 
1995/96 73.5% 
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Figure 3. 7. The relative compensation cost contribution of each of the three Services. 
Figure 3 .8 shows that Army was responsible for a disproportionate percentage 
of compensation costs being only 45% of the total strength of the ADF but accounting 
for 71 % of total compensation costs. The relative strength figures for the three services 
shown in Figure 3 .8 were drawn from the Defence Annual Report 1994/95 (Department 
of Defence 1995). As at 30 Jun 1995, there were 26,199 members of the Army, 17, 466 
100 
members of the Air Force and 14,555 members of the Navy. Strength figures fluctuate 
through any given part of the year and are traditionally reported as at the end of the 
financial year. Figure 3.9 shows that the average cost of compensation claims did not 
differ greatly between the three Services, with Army again having the highest average 
cost per claim. 
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Figure 3 .8 The relationship between relative Compensation costs and relative strength 
for the three Services FY 1994/95. 
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Figure 3.9 Average cost per claim accepted by Service 1993/94 to 1995/96. 
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The rate of growth in compensation costs was significantly greater than the 
prevailing inflation rates. Plotting the costs and performing a simple regression analysis 
produces the equations shown in Table 3 .10. The regression equations show a high 
predictivity for Army and Navy, with the slope of both regression lines differing 
significantly from zero with R2 of 0.91 and 0.86 respectively. Air Force on the other 
hand had a slope that was not significantly different from zero, and therefore was 
essentially a horizontal line, indicating that Air Force costs were essentially stable. 
Figure 3 .10 shows the slope of these equations 
Regression 95% CI of Slope 
Army y = 7.095x - 14113 (3.05 - 11.14) R2 = 0.91 p= 0.011 
Navy y = l .052x - 2090 (0.26 - 1.85) R2 = 0.86 p= 0.025 
Air Force y = 0.554x - 1097 (-0.32 - 1.42) R2 = 0.58 p= 0.14 
Total y = 8.70x - 17301 (3.71 - 13.70) R2 = 0.91 p= 0.011 
Table 3 .10 Simple regression equations for Single Service Compensation costs. 
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The passage of time from commencement to completion of this thesis has 
allowed the accuracy of these equations to be tested against actual compensation costs. 
Table 3.11 shows predicted and actual compensation costs from 1997 to 2002. 
Table 3.11 shows that the equation for ADF costs was not particularly accurate, 
with overestimation between 1997 and 1999 and significant underestimation from 2000 
to 2002. In the case of Army, the equation was again an overestimate between 1997 and 
1999, but highly predictive between 2000 and 2002. This suggests that the Air Force 
and Navy rates of cost increase changed significantly during this period. 
Predicted 
Predicted Actual Variation Actual Variation 
Year Army 
ADF Costs Costs Actual/Predicted Costs Actual/Predicted 
Costs 
1997 $72.9M $61.9M -15.1% $55.7M $45.4M -18.5% 
1998 $81.6M $66.lM -19.0% $62.8M $46.2M -26.4% 
1999 $90.3M $85.4M - 5.4% $69.9M $60.6M -13.3% 
2000 $99.0M $118.M +19.4% $77.0M $79.5M +3.2% 
2001 $107.7M $125.M +16.8% $84.lM $81.8M -2.7% 
2002 $116.4M $141.M +21.8% $91.2M $90.6M -0.7% 
Table 3 .11 Predicted and actual ADF and Army Compensation costs, 1997-2002. 
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Figure 3.12 The percentage of compensation claims by body site,1993/94. 
Compensation costs doubled in the four years from 1991/92 to 1995/96 from 
$34M to $70M. These costs doubled again in the six years from 1996 to 2002 rising 
from $70M to $141M. During this 8-year period the size of the Defence force 
decreased by 15%. This rate of cost increase would not be tolerated in the private 
sector. 
The high compensation costs are also reflected in rehabilitation costs. Figure 
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3 .11 shows the relative expenditure for rehabilitation of the three Services in 1995/96. 
Army expenditures were five times greater than either Navy or Air Force. Figure 3.12 
shows the body locations for which compensation was claimed. The back was the most 
common site responsible for nearly 20% of all claims, followed by the knees with 18% 
and the leg/foot with 1 7%. 
3.9 Compensation Liability costs 
In October 1996, the Australian Government Actuary released a report into the 
Military Compensation Scheme (MCS) (Thorburn 1996). The terms of reference were 
to estimate the liability for outstanding claims as at 30 June 1995, and to estimate the 
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notional premium that would be required to fund claims arising during 1995/96. The 
rationale for this project was to identify aspects where management intervention might 
lead to improved outcomes or reduced costs. As the authors noted "Measurement and 
management of long term liabilities is consistent with the level of accountability 
expected by the greater community ". 
The estimation of liabilities was required for the Department of Defence to 
satisfy its accrual reporting obligations. The report allowed management to determine 
the financial impact of both past and planned management actions. Data collection 
within the compensation organization was noted to be poor, with no regular matching 
of claims data with payments data. There were two methods of making payments. 
Incapacity and dependent children payments were paid through the Defence 
Department civilian payments system CIVILPRISM, whilst all other payments were 
made through the Defence Financial Management Information System (DEFMIS). Both 
systems are computerised ledger systems, but were not linked to each other. 
Estimates of liability were calculated by projecting future claims payments and 
then making an allowance for claim inflation. The projected payments were then 
discounted to a present value. The discounting recognised the time value of money, and 
enabled realistic comparison of long-term financial arrangements. In civilian 
compensation and insurance schemes, assets are held to support liabilities, so 
discounting recognises that income will be earned on the assets till the claims are paid. 
While the Military Compensation Scheme (MCS) is unfunded, it was 
considered appropriate to discount the liabilities using an assumed rate of interest, in 
order to arrive at a meaningful estimate of the present value of the outstanding liability. 
The assumed interest rate was 8.5%, consistent with the return on Commonwealth 
securities in 1995, with a term similar to that of the liabilities. This rate was also 
consistent with the requirements of Australian Accounting Standard 26 (AAS26), 
which specified that a current rate of interest be assumed when valuing outstanding 
claims liabilities. 
Claim inflation acknowledges the fact that payments will increase over time. 
This occurs for many reasons, e.g. incapacity payments are linked to earnings, and lump 
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sums are indexed to inflation. There is also superimposed inflation, where the rate of 
total growth of the scheme exceeds the rate of inflation. 
Medical costs in other schemes have been noted to increase at a greater rate than 
wage inflation. This is due to a combination of new technology and increased life 
expectancy, leading to treatment costs occurring over a longer period. Average lump 
sum payments in other schemes have also been observed to increase at a rate greater 
than inflation. 
The study assigned a benefit growth rate of 4.5%, which was consistent with 
medium term economic forecasts for wages growth at that time. Incapacity payments 
and payments to dependant children were assumed to grow at this rate. All other 
payments were assumed to be subject to superimposed inflation of 3%, giving a total 
claim inflation of7.5%. The setting of this 3% rate was judgmental and based on levels 
experienced in comparable schemes. 
The MCS was responsible for 7 main types of payment; Incapacity payments, 
Lump sum payments for permanent incapacity, Lump sum payments for non-economic 
loss, Medical expenses, Rehabilitation costs, Death benefits, and Other benefits. The 
actuarial analysis divided these payments into two groups; incapacity and non-
incapacity payments. For the purposes of estimation, incapacity was broken down into 
3 categories; 
(a) Short-term - payments made within 12 months of commencing benefit, 
(b) Long term - payments made 12 months after commencement of benefit 
and, 
( c) Long-term incurred but not reported (IBNR) - refers to claimants who 
were injured before valuation date, who were not in receipt of benefits at 
date of valuation, but who will receive incapacity payments in the future. 
Incapacity payments consisted of normal weekly earnings (NWE) for 45 weeks, 
75% ofNWE if incapacity continued past 45 weeks and top-up payments of between 
80-100% of NWE in specific circumstances. These incapacity payments were made 
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under the auspices of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act (SRCA) of 
1988. Payment for incapacity ceased ifthere was 'recovery', death or the attainment of 
age 65. 
In 1994/95, there were 2503 incapacity claimants who received $23.572 million. 
Of these, 75% were long-term claimants (on benefits for> 12 months). A regularly 
observed occurrence was that beneficiaries receiving benefits for a long time were less 
likely to cease than those in receipt for a short time. Cessation rates drop off quickly as 
the length of time on benefit increases, and then they level off. This phenomenon is 
typically observed in other compensation schemes. 
From 1 July 1993 to 1 July 1995 the number of long-term claimants increased 
from 820 to 933, a rise of 13.8%. The rate of cessation of payments was 25% for those 
on benefits for less than 2 years, but only 5% for those on benefits for more than 10 
years. The average long-term claimant was aged 47, received $16,630 per annum and 
had been in receipt of benefit for 10.5 years. It was assumed in the analysis, based on 
observed experience that 25% of all claimants would continue to receive benefits for at 
least 10 years. 
Over 50% of the liability attendant to long-term claimants, related to injuries 
prior to 1980, i.e. injuries that occurred 15 years before the valuation date. If all else 
was equal, this suggested a substantial liability existed for more recent injuries, where 
claimants were not in receipt of incapacity payments. It was projected that incapacity 
payments to existing claimants would continue to be made for at least another 15 years, 
because the rate of cessation was only slightly higher than the assumed claims inflation 
rate. 
The average delay from time of injury to date of reporting was 4.5 years in long-
term claimants. The average delay from date of injury to date of incapacity payments 
was over 8 years. This was very different to other worker's compensation schemes and 
was due to the unique interaction of the ADF health services, where free medical and 
dental care was provided. However this pattern created a substantial IBNR liability. 
The estimation of IBNR liability was based on the historical profiles of existing 
long term claimants. The average long-term claimant commenced benefit at age 36 and 
had an average initial benefit of $16,63 0 p.a. The liability estimate for this average 
individual was $139,330, discounted to 1994/95 dollars. 
After the benefit liability estimation it was noted that a substantial liability 
existed to also make incapacity payments ($157.4m) and this liability in respect to 
injuries sustained prior to 30 June 95 was expected to continue to the middle of next 
century. 
Service Longterm Long Term IBNR Short term Total 
Army $86.8M $92.6M $39.5M $218.9M 
Navy $25.2M $36.2M $13.7M $75.IM 
RAAF $24.2M $28.6M $12.3M $65.IM 
TOTAL $136.2M $157.4M $65.5M $359.IM 
Table 3.12 The outstanding claims liability ($M), as at 30 June 95, by Service. 
(Inflated and discounted to $1995). 
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Table 3.12 shows the estimated outstanding claims liability for the three 
Services. Army again had the largest liabilities being two thirds of the total ADF 
liability and three times the Navy and Air Force liabilities. Army was responsible for 
61 % of the total estimated liability despite representing approximately 50% of the 
strength of the ADF. This disproportionate liability is a consequence of the physically 
demanding lifestyle of Army members and is reflected in the preponderance of 
musculoskeletal injuries observed in soldiers. 
3.10 Incapacity liability costs. 
Table 3.9 shows the calculated liability for incapacity payments broken down by 
cause. Incapacity payments for back injury were the single largest cost ($132 million). 
Back injuries represented 3 7% of total liabilities and were over twice the size of the 
next largest cause of knee injury. These costs reflect the greater degree of permanent 
disability seen in sufferers of chronic low back pain, compared to those with chronic 
knee pain. 
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Injury Group Long Term Long Term IBNR Short Term TOTAL 
Back $52.7M $61.5M $18.2M $132.4M (36.9%) 
Knee $18.2M $22.4M $12.8M $53.4M (14.9%) 
Lower limb $11.2M $12.5M $1 l.5M $35.2M (9.8%) 
Upper Limb $7.0M $8.3M $7.4M $22.7M (6.3%) 
Head $6.7M $7.3M $2.0M $16.0M (4.5%) 
Stress $7.6M $8.0M $1.8M $17.4M (4.8%) 
Other $32.8M $37.4M $1 l.8M $82.0M (22.8%) 
Table 3.13 Outstanding incapacity liability claims $M, by injury group, as at 30 June 
1995. (Inflated and discounted to $1995). 
Back and knee injury together accounted for 52% of total incapacity payments. 
This rises to 72% iflower limb, upper limb and head injuries are included. Of note was 
the low level of stress related incapacity, which is in stark contrast to the civilian claims 
experience. Included in the other category were hearing loss (1.3%), Spinal injury 
(0.4%), Trunk (4.0%) and Unspecified (17.1 %). 
As the musculoskeletal causes of liability have been determined to be 
responsible for 72% of total compensation costs, it is considered reasonable to use this 
figure as a proportionate estimate for the contribution of injury to overall compensation 
costs. This is likely to be a reliable lower bound estimate of the true cost. 
3.11 Non-Incapacity liability costs 
Non-Incapacity payments include the following benefits; Lump sum payments 
for permanent impairment and non-economic loss, Medical, hospital and 
pharmaceutical costs associated with the compensable condition, Re-imbursement of 
household and attendant care benefits, Vocational and medical rehabilitation costs, and 
Lump sum and payment death benefits to dependants. 
Table 3.14 shows a steady increase in total lump sum payments between 
1993/94 and 1995/96. Average lump sum payments for permanent impairment 
increased from $10,416 in 1993/94 to $14,033 in 1995/96. The number oflump sum 
payments also increased from 845 to 963. 
Payment type 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 ** 
Permanent Impairment $8.801M $11.203M $13.514M 
Non-Economic Loss $3.292M $3.894M $9.125M 
Medical expenses $5.127M $5.764M $5.440M 
Rehabilitation Costs $1.951M $1.504M $1.648M 
Death Expenses $3.058M $2.753M $1.587M 
Other $1.608M $2.341M $2.570M 
TOTAL $23.837M $27.459M $33.884M 
Table 3.14 Non-Incapacity payments for the financial years 1993/4 to 1995/6 ($M) 
(**First 10 months only.) 
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In the estimation of liability for non-incapacity payments the actuaries 
experienced significant difficulty in matching payments to claims; only 50% of 
payment records could be matched to claims records. The calculation of the liability 
was rendered difficult for a number of reasons; a short observation period, payment 
experience changed dramatically over the period of observation and the long delay 
between injury and the lodging of a claim. Of the 963 payments in 1995/96, 50% were 
for injuries that occurred more than 5 years earlier and 20% for injuries that occurred 
more than 10 years earlier. Thus the trend in payments experience was no guide to the 
underlying injury experience. 
Three factors were thought to influence the delay in claim lodgement; 
(1) ADF health services provided medical care and ADF members received 
full pay whilst receiving treatment. This removed any incentive to lodge 
an immediate claim, 
(2) The perception amongst serving personnel that lodgement of a claim 
may pose a career threat, and 
(3) There was no legislative requirement that claims be lodged within a 
certain time after injury. 
Most accident schemes require that claims be notified within a certain period, 
usually 6 months. For private sector schemes this is essential in order to manage and 
underwrite the schemes, allowing insurers to provision against expected liabilities. 
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The observed experience in the MCS is that the longer the delay in claiming, the 
smaller the settlement. This probably reflects the fact that severe injuries are probably 
compensated relatively quickly, whilst less severely injured servicemen do not seek 
compensation until they discharge from the Service. 
The increase in claims was attributed to an increasing awareness of the scheme 
amongst claimants, and the actuaries noted that there may be increasing claim numbers 
even ifthe rate of injury remained stable. Increased awareness can result in the bringing 
forward of claims which would otherwise have been settled later. This may present the 
appearance of a deteriorating claims experience. 
3.12 Non-economic loss. 
Payment for non-economic loss was a feature of the 1988 SRCA, but not the 
prior legislation. However, a full Federal Court hearing in 1994 held that compensation 
for non-economic loss was payable in respect of injuries sustained before the 
commencement of the current act. As a consequence, the actuaries assumed that all 
future claims for permanent incapacity would attract a payment for non-economic loss. 
Payment Type Anny Navy RAAF TOTAL 
Permanent impairment $48.2 M $8.4 M $10.5 M $67.1 M 
Non-Economic loss $38.6 M $6.7M $8.3 M $53.6 M 
Medical Expenses $41.7 M $7.6M $7.9M $57.2 M 
Rehabilitation Costs $7.5 M $0.8M $1.4 M $9.7M 
Death Benefits $5.6M $1.0 M $1.2 M $7.8M 
Other $15.1 M $2.7M $3.4 M $21.2 M 
TOTAL $156.7 M $27.2 M $32.7 M $216.6 M 
Table 3.15 Summary of outstanding liability estimates for non-incapacity payments, 
by Service as at 30 June 95 (Inflated and discounted $1995). 
Table 3 .15 again demonstrates the disproportionate liabilities of Army, 
representing an estimated 75% of the total estimated liability costs for non-economic 
loss. The interaction of the ADF health service made rehabilitation cost comparisons to 
other schemes difficult. The majority of rehabilitation costs were for discharged 
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members, thus a substantial in-service rehabilitation programme absorbed a significant 
part of the rehabilitation cost that would otherwise fall to the compensation scheme. 
Injury Group Permanent Non- Medical Rehabili- Other Total 
Impairment Economic Expenses tation 
Loss 
Back $15.IM $12.0M $13.7M $4.0M $5.8M $50.6M (24.2%) 
Knee $18.8M $15.0M $11.9M $1.6M $2.8M $50.1 M (24.0%) 
Lower limb $10.8M $8.6M $5.8M $1.4M $2.0M $28.6M (13.7%) 
Upper Limb $7.9M $6.4M $3.IM $0.6M $I.3M $19.3M (9.3%) 
Head $2.5M $2.0M $4.7M $0.3M $1.4M $10.9M (5.2%) 
Stress $I.3M $1.IM $1.9M $0.2M $0.5M $5.0M (2.4%) 
Other $10.7M $8.5M $16.IM $1.6M $7.4M $44.3M (21.2%) 
Total $67.IM $53.6M $57.2M $9.7M $21.2M $208.8M 
Table 3.16. Summary of outstanding liability estimates for non-incapacity payments, 
by body region. (Inflated and discounted $1995). 
Table 3.16 summarises the total compensation liabilities by body region. As 
seen previously, back and knee injuries were dominant and musculoskeletal causes 
accounted for 71.2% for total costs ( 76.4% including head). One of the primary 
reasons for this actuarial analysis was to calculate a notional premium on the same 
basis as used in the workers compensation industry. This premium represents the 
amount that, with assumed interest income, would be sufficient to meet eventual claims 
and the associated administration costs arising from injuries that occurred during 
1995/96. Table 3.17 shows the total Single Service liability for outstanding claims and 
the notional premium required to cover these liabilities. Army was responsible for 65% 
of total liabilities, and its premium was 3.8% of salaries ($44.3m). This was 
significantly higher than either Navy or Air Force. 
Service 
ARMY 
NAVY 
RAAF 
TOTAL 
Outstanding Claims 
Liability 
$375.6m 
$102.3m 
$97.8m 
$575.7m 
Premium for 1995/96 
(% salaries) 
$44.3m (3.8%) 
$ l 1.2m (1. 7%) 
$11.lm (1.5%) 
$66.6m 
Table 3.17 Estimated total ADF liabilities and notional premium, 1995-97. 
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To put this in perspective most private sector employers strive to have their 
worker's compensation premium at or below 1.5% of salaries. Navy and RAAF have 
premiums comparable to the private sector, while Army's notional premium is 2.5 
times greater than the industry benchmark. This places Army in the worst category of 
employer from a compensation perspective. 
3.13 2002 Actuarial Update 
The Australian Government Actuary repeated its analysis of ADF compensation 
data in 2002. The following section compares the 1995 and 2002 data using the updated 
data from the 2002 report (Martin 2003). 
Service Year Incapacity Non-Incapacity TOTAL$M 
Payments $M Payments $M 
ARMY 1995 $218.90M $156.70M $375.60M 
2002 $53 l .70M $391.00M $922.70M 
Increase (142.9%) (149.5%) (145.7%) 
NAVY 1995 $75.lOM $27.20M $102.30M 
2002 $127.80M $111.lOM $239.00M 
Increase (70.2%) (308.5%) (133.6%) 
RAAF 1995 $65.lOM $32.70M $97.80M 
2002 $92.lOM $88.60M $180.80M 
Increase (41.5%) (170.9%) (84.9%) 
Total 1995 $359.lOM $216.60M $575.70M 
2002 $7l3.60M $590.80M $1,342.40M 
(98.7%) (172.7%) (133.1%) 
Table 3.18 The absolute and relative increase in liabilities for the ADF between 
1995 and 2002 (inflated and discounted to $Al 995 and $A2002). 
Table 3.18 shows that liabilities for Army, Navy and Air Force increased by 
145%, 133% and 85% respectively. The overall increase in ADF liabilities was 133%. 
There was a dramatic increase in Navy and Air Force non-incapacity payments, most 
likely related to legislative changes in 1994. The increase of Army incapacity payment 
liabilities was twice that of Navy and three and a half times that for Air Force. 
Table 3.19 shows the increase in liabilities by selected body regions. Liability 
for back injury increased by 124 %, for knee injury by 151 %, for lower limb injury 
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byl 90% and for upper limb injury by 245%. The overall total increase in liabilities was 
179%. This dramatic increase in liabilities was likely to be the result of major changes 
in personnel policy that occurred in 1999. Prior to then, the ADP had an 
accommodating approach to injured members. From that time onwards there was a 
requirement for members to be employable and deployable that is, fully fit for overseas 
deployment. This was linked to a significant restructure, which outsourced and 
civilianised many military jobs that were suitable for rehabilitating or injured members. 
Jn jury Permanent Non-economic Medical 
Year Rehab Other Total 
group Impairment loss expenses 
Back 1995 $15.IM $12.0M $13.7M $4.0M $5.8M $50.6M 
2002 $32.9M $19.IM $31.6M $9.5M $20.3M $113.4M 
Knee 1995 $18.8M $15.0M $1 l.9M $1.6M $2.8M $50.IM 
2002 $47.0M $32.5M $25.9M $5.6M $15.2M $126.2M 
Lower 1995 $10.8M $8.6M $5.8M $1.4M $2.0M $28.6M 
Limb 2002 $30.5M $19.4M $15.0M $4.IM $13.8M $82.8M 
Upper 1995 $7.9M $6.4M $3.IM $0.6M $I.3M $19.3M 
Limb 2002 $28.0M $18.2M $9.8M $2.7M $7.9M $66.6M 
Total 1995 $67.IM $53.6M $57.2M $9.7M $21.2M $208.8M 
2002 $185.7M $1 I4.0M $144.5M $29.8M $109.0M $582.9M 
Increase (176%) (112%) (152%) (207%) (414%) (179%) 
Table 3.19 Liability estimates by selected Body region (Inflated and discounted). 
Consequently, if an injured member could not return to fully deployable fitness 
then they would be discharged as below medical standards or not deployable. This led 
to an increase in medical discharges with the attendant increase in liabilities. 
In determining the relative contribution of injury to overall compensation costs 
in 1995/96, a figure of 72% was chosen. This is based on the data on estimated 
liabilities produced by the Australian Government Actuary. There is no published data 
showing actual costs incurred by body part. It is assumed that the actuary had access to 
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actual expenditure in calculating the estimated liabilities. This 72% figure is a rounding 
up of the 71.2% liability contribution figure from 1995, and acknowledges that many of 
the cases within the head category would be classed as injuries, but are not included in 
this figure. Thus a 72% figure likely represents a reliable lower bound estimate. 
3.14 Conclusion 
The costs attributable to injury are not visible within the ADF health system or 
to senior management. Because the accounting system records only broad categories of 
payment it is impossible to accurately assess the organisational cost of injury. The lack 
of adequate health surveillance coupled with no linkage to cost data makes accurate 
determination of direct injury costs not possible at present. Health surveillance and cost 
data in the ADF was and remains rudimentary and not linked in any meaningful way. In 
this thesis, a unique database was established to link episodes of care with subsequent 
costs through the use of a referral number. Unfortunately, no serious attempt to adopt 
this database across the Defence Health environment was subsequently made. 
The data used to estimate direct costs in this chapter are the most accurate 
available, albeit in a population not representative of the Army as a whole. It is the only 
data available for which there is an accurate link between an episode of injury and the 
subsequent costs incurred. The Defence Health Service continues to use a cash 
payment system that is focussed on managing to a global budget, rather than a system 
which links episodes of illness and injury with their ultimate costs. 
An understanding of where, when and how injuries occur is critical for the 
development of interventions to prevent and control injuries. The Defence Injury 
prevention Program has shown the value of injury surveillance and prevention activities 
at a local level. As Bonnie (Bonnie 2002) noted "one of the highest priorities in injury 
prevention and treatment is to improve capabilities for injury surveillance, interpreting 
injury data and translating data into policy-relevant terms, and predicting and 
measuring the effects of interventions." 
In order for information to be used for decision making purposes it must be 
available in the first place. The major finding from the proceeding section was the 
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paucity and poor quality of both health surveillance and cost data within the Australian 
Army at an organisational level. The failure of the Defence Health Services to 
implement a reliable and effective electronic health record has stymied the collection of 
injury surveillance data. Steps are underway to procure a commercial-off-the-shelf 
software package for use in Defence medical facilities, but its procurement is not 
anticipated before 2010. 
Surveillance systems can be described as information loops, with data coming in 
and information being returned to those who need it. The loop is complete when the 
information is applied (Buehler, 1998). The use of surveillance information should be 
an ongoing part of the Defence management cycle; requiring adequate funding and a 
business environment that encourages and supports the collection, analysis and use of 
data.(Holder 2001). This will require support from military leaders to prioritise injury 
prevention and utilise the information derived from surveillance to take preventative 
action. In limited locations, the Defence Injury Prevention Program has achieved this, 
but data collection difficulties and a lack of resources has prevented wider application, 
and led to subsequent disuse of the system. 
McKinnon (McKinnon 2008) identified a number of failings in the existing 
Defence injury surveillance efforts and reinforced the view that effective Injury 
surveillance systems provide the foundation for priority setting, but noted that there are 
currently few formal tools for establishing injury priority in the general community or 
the ADF. 
McKinnon argues that a two stage approach to injury data collection is likely to 
capture the required information for the vast majority of injuries of interest to the ADF. 
By prioritising injury concerns based on a minimal data set, users of surveillance data 
will avoid the risk of being overwhelmed by information. Subsequent efforts can then 
be directed at obtaining more data where the need is determined. The introduction of a 
comprehensive and reliable injury surveillance system is critical for the adequate 
prevention and control of injuries. Linking injury data to cost data enables a rational 
allocation of priority of effort based on those injuries which have the greatest cost 
impact. 
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Data from the US and British armies supports the view that the contribution of 
injury to health costs in the broader Army is greater than the 27% figure obtained from 
the Canberra sample in this chapter. While the 27% figure is a likely to represent an 
accurate lower bound, the Allied data supports the use of a 40% figure as an upper 
bound. 
Use of a 40% estimate of injury contribution, results in an absolute increase in 
Army direct injury costs of between $1.0 and $1.6 Million between 1992/93 and 
1994/95. In relative terms, the upper bound produced a nearly 50% increase in the 
direct injury cost estimate. While injury and musculoskeletal morbidity in the general 
Australian population is concentrated in the older age groups, the Australian Army 
invalidity data shows a preponderance in the 25-34 age group, reflecting the impact of 
the intensely physical nature of Army service on younger members. 
Actuarial review of the AD F's compensation liabilities by the Australian 
Government Actuary noted that data collection within the compensation organization 
was poor, with no regular matching of claims data with payments data, mirroring the 
findings within the Defence Health Service. The actuaries noted that in 1995/96, 50% 
of claims were for injuries that occurred more than 5 years earlier and 20% for injuries 
that occurred more than 10 years earlier. The trend in payments experience was 
therefore no guide to the underlying injury experience. 
The average delay from time of injury to date of reporting was 4.5 years in long-
term claimants, with the average delay from date of injury to date of incapacity 
payments being over 8 years. This differs from other worker's compensation schemes 
and was due to the ability to access free ADF health services, whereas civilian workers 
must lodge a compensation claim in order to be eligible for payment of medical 
expenses. This failure to report injuries in a timely manner makes it extremely difficult 
to provision for future costs and suggests a significant sting in the compensation 
liability tail. 
Army was responsible for 61 % of the total estimated compensation liabilities in 
1995, despite representing nearly 50% of the strength of the ADF. Musculoskeletal 
conditions were responsible for 78.2% of total outstanding compensation liabilities in 
2002, compared to 71.2% of total liabilities in 1995. This would suggest that the 
117 
relative importance of musculoskeletal injury increased during the intervening period, 
and is most likely linked to the less forgiving retention policy for injured soldiers 
implemented in 1998. 
Based on the calculated liabilities by body region produced by the actuaries, an 
estimate of 72% was made for the contribution of injury in 1995 to total compensation 
costs. This is considered to be a reliable lower bound estimate of the true contribution 
to compensation cost, as head injuries were not included. 
A notional worker's compensation premium was calculated based on the 
estimated compensation liabilities for each Service, with Army's premium being 3.8% 
of wages compared to Navy (1.7%) and Air Force (1.5%). To put this in perspective 
most private sector employers strive to have their worker's compensation premium at 
or preferably below 1.5% of salaries. Navy and RAAF have notional premiums 
comparable to the private sector, while Army's notional premium is 2.5 times greater 
than the industry benchmark. This places Army in the worst category of employer from 
a compensation perspective. 
The true extent of compensation and future liability costs have been hidden 
from Defence policy makers. Free from the constraints of a worker's compensation 
premium, the ADF has not focussed on injury reduction as a high priority, unlike their 
counterparts in civil industry. The Department of Veterans Affairs now has 
responsibility for compensation payments, and future liabilities will be borne by them 
and not the Department of Defence. 
AG39 Medical Costs 
Compensation Costs 
Total 
Outstanding Compensation 
Liabilities 
Estimated Direct Cost of Injury 
to Army $A 1996 
$3.63M -$4.96M 
$37.40M 
$41.03M 
$270.0M 
Table 3.20 Estimated total direct costs and outstanding liabilities for Army, 1996. 
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The estimated direct cost of injury for the Army in 1996 is shown in table 3 .20. 
The lower bound of AG39 cost attributed to Army injury was estimated to be 27% of 
Army's external medical expenditure, while the upper bound cost was estimated to be 
40%. Army's total compensation cost in 1995/96 was $5 l .95M, and using a figure of 
72% of compensation costs being attributable to injury, gives an estimate of $37.40M. 
The total direct cost of injury to Army in 1996 was estimated to be $41.03M, while the 
outstanding liability for injury was estimated to be 72% of total claims or $270.0M. 
To obtain accurate and reliable data a comprehensive injury surveillance system 
must be introduced into the ADF, and be linked to accounts data. For any meaningful 
change in policy approach or allocation of resources, the true extent and nature of costs 
must be visible. Current attempts to improve injury surveillance in the ADF by 
incorporating injury surveillance data into the Defence Occupational Health and Safety 
(OHS) reporting system offers some hope that this can be achieved. 
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Chapter 4. Indirect costs of Injury for the Australian Army 
4.1 Introduction 
Traditional approaches to indirect costing have focussed on production losses 
and the quantum of foregone wages. Invalid pensions are not usually considered to be a 
cost, but a transfer payment which helps to alleviate the total loss to an individual. They 
are not considered part of direct medical costs, so this chapter will include both defence 
invalid pensions and veteran's affairs pensions as part of the scope of indirect cost 
analysis. This approach is taken because these pension costs are a real and significant 
burden on the public purse, and provide an opportunity to place a value on a cost not 
normally considered. 
Indirect costs resulting from injury to soldiers comprise a number of different 
components. These include: 
(a) loss of military operational readiness, 
(b) veterans affairs pensions, funded by the taxpayer, 
( c) invalid pension costs, partially funded by defence member contributions, 
( d) working days lost and restricted duties, borne by the employer, and 
( e) potential lost earnings due to invalidity, borne by the individual and 
society. 
In a military context, the loss of potential future earnings is partially offset by 
transfer payments from invalid or veteran's pensions. 
4.2 Military Operational Readiness 
The Army does not produce goods in a traditional economic sense. Its output is 
operational capability. This is the capability to mount both defensive and offensive 
operations in support of the defence of Australia. In many ways, this could be viewed as 
a form of insurance, for which the Nation pays a premium in the form of the Defence 
Budget. 
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It is difficult to measure capability, as this is a categorical rather than continuous 
variable. There is an associated term called operational "readiness" which better lends 
itself to measurement. This term describes the readiness of both individual soldiers and 
units to deploy on operations. The distinction is important as while an under strength 
unit may not be ready at the organisational level, it can be reinforced with personnel 
and the operational capability retained. 
A unit is established at a given strength of 100%. At any given time there will 
be people absent for a number of reasons such as courses, holidays, resignation and 
injury. In addition to absences there are a number of individuals who are medically 
restricted in some way, and depending on their specific trade or job can be termed as 
"non-effective" or not ready. A soldier who is ready for a deployment to anywhere in 
the world was classed as "Fit Everywhere" or FE. 
30-Jun-93 30-Jun-94 30-Jun-95 30-Jun-96 
Figure 4.1 The percentage of Army Personnel not FE 1993 to 1996. 
Figure 4.1 shows during the 4-year period 1993-1996 approximately 17% of the 
Army was not fully medically fit or FE. The actual impact of this will have varied 
depending on the level of medical disability, but reflects the high prevalence of 
morbidity within the Army population. 
Medical fitness was determined by what was termed the Physical Employment 
Standard (PES) (see section 7.4) The PES is a categorical grading system that 
determined physical capability and employability. The categories in use in 1996 were 
Fit Everywhere (FE), Communications Zone Everywhere (CZE- mild limitations), Base 
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Everywhere (BE- moderate limitations), Home Only (HO - severe limitations), Below 
Medical Standards (BMS) and Medically Unfit (MU). The latter two classifications 
usually resulted in medical discharge from the Army. 
The PES was determined by the result of what was termed a PULHEEMS 
profile. PULHEEMS is an acronym that stands for Physical, Upper limb, Lower limb, 
Hearing, Eyes (L/R), Mental capacity and Stability. PULHEEMS gradings are divided 
into four categories with the following implications: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
grade 2 - normal and FE (Fit Everywhere); 
grade 3 - impaired (not FE), but able to perform most tasks; 
grade 7 - severely impaired, significant restrictions and not 
suitable for field deployment; and 
grade 8 - medically unfit for continued military service. 
The Lor lower limb grading was recorded at the time of a member's periodic 
medical examination and the profile stored on a database at the Army Soldier Career 
Management Agency (SCMA). This database was terminated in the mid 1990's as a 
Defence- wide personnel management database was adopted. As the PULHEEMS 
profile was only used by Army, data fields for it were not included in the new database. 
Consequently for many years, there was no simple way of determining the causes of 
medical downgrading. To ascertain the cause of a medical downgrading required the 
manual review of the individual's paper health record. 
The only data available on the cause of medical downgrading comes from the 
old Army database (Rudzki 1994). Using the L grading as a marker for lower limb 
injuries (including the spine), Table 4.1 shows the number of members who were not 
L2 or Fit Everywhere during the years 1987-92 
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LGRADEAS 
ARMY %LARMY %0FARMY %OF 
YEAR L3/L7/L8 NON-FE STRENGTH STRENGTH NON-FE NON-FE 
1987 3 010 4 131 31 027 9.7% 13.3% 72.9% 
1988 3 278 4 292 32 025 10.2% 13.4% 76.4% 
1989 3 368 4 356 31 282 10.7% 13.9% 77.3% 
1990 3 800 4 683 30 624 12.4% 15.3% 81.1% 
1991 4 077 4 985 31 002 13.1% 16.1% 81.8% 
1992 4 215 5 120 29 945 14.1% 17.1% 82.3% 
(These figures include soldiers who were discharged during the year noted. Army strength as at 30 June 
of each year) 
Table 4.1 The number and relative contribution oflower limb downgrading to Non-FE 
medical classifications, 1987-92 (from Rudzki 1994). 
Consistent with previous chapters, the overwhelming majority of morbidity 
was associated with lower limb and back injuries. The number downgraded due to 
lower limb causes increased from 73 per cent in 1987, to 83 per cent in 1992, thus 
demonstrating the importance of lower limb and back injuries in the loss of combat 
strength. 
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30-Jun-93 30-Jun-94 30-Jun-95 30-Jun-96 
Percentage of Male and Female Soldiers not FE 
Figure 4.2 Percentage of male and female soldiers not fully medically fit 1993-1996. 
Figure 4.2 shows that the morbidity in females was substantially higher than for 
males. This is consistent with higher injury rates reported in female soldiers. (Rudzki 
1994) 
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There was and still is no agreement or policy as to what constitutes an 
appropriate level of unit readiness. Ideally it would be 100%, but due to necessary 
absences this is unrealistic. A figure of 90% of establishment strength has been used in 
some areas as a reporting trigger. For Army Reserve units, the minimum level of troop 
strength for a unit to remain effective is considered to be 60% (The Auditor General 
1990). Once a unit drops below this level it has lost a substantial amount of its 
experienced personnel and cohesion. In combat, these units are withdrawn and rebuilt 
with new reinforcements. 
If peacetime units fall below 60% effective manpower, then it can be argued that 
there is a significant reduction in operational capability of that unit. Given that the 
Army is a form of insurance, any inability to provide troops ready and able to deploy 
when required is of concern. 
Military units are manned on the basis of three criteria, Operational level of 
Capability (OLOC), Minimal level of capability (MLOC) and Present level of 
capability (PLOC). The ratio of PLOC to OLOC is a measure of the personnel strength 
at a given point in time. The percentage deficiency represents a cost to readiness, as the 
capability remains, provided supplementation with additional personnel allows the 
maximal use of existing military materiel. 
Medical restriction and medical downgrading increase the impact of existing 
staffing shortfalls. If a soldier is permanently or temporarily restricted, he cannot 
perform the arduous tasks of a combat soldier. He is not ready for deployment and 
therefore his restriction should be included in any calculation of operational readiness. 
Currently this is not the case. The cost of acquiring and training soldiers is wasted if 
they are not fit and able to deploy, and the country pays a price in terms of its security. 
The Army is funded on the basis that it is able to fight, albeit with medium to long-term 
notice. However it must maintain minimum standards of short-term readiness to ensure 
that taxpayer's funds are justified. 
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4.3 Invalid Pension Costs 
4.3.1 The Civilian Experience 
Invalidity as a result of workplace injury increased dramatically in NSW during 
the 1990' s. Between 1991/2 and 1996/7 there was a 13 0% increase in workers 
designated as permanently impaired (2989 vs. 6880) (Workcover Authority 1998). In 
absolute terms, 16% of male and 15% of female workers compensation claimants were 
designated as permanently impaired. 
During this 5-year period the average size of awards (pain and suffering, and 
weekly benefits) increased by over 25% in real terms (New South Wales Attomey-
General's Department 1997). This increase in permanent impairment adversely affected 
the financial status of the Workcover authority, changing it from a surplus of $1.2 
billion in 1994 to an increasing deficit of $454 million at 30 June 1996. No information 
was available as to whether optimal health outcomes were achieved. 
4.3.2 The ADF System 
Each Service has distinct criteria for determining the medical fitness of its 
members and therefore if a member is to be discharged on invalidity grounds, but all 
members retired as Medically Unfit (MU) were entitled to an invalidity benefit. 
Invalidity benefits were not granted to members with less than two years of service who 
had a pre-existing complaint not materially aggravated by military service. 
There are two ADF specific pension schemes in existence; the Defence Force 
Retirement & Death Benefit scheme (DFRDB) and the Military Superannuation 
Benefits Scheme (MSBS). DFRDB was introduced in 1973, replacing an older scheme, 
while MSBS was introduced in 1991. The DFRDB scheme was closed to new members 
in 1992. Invalidity entitlements under these pension schemes are granted if the member 
is medically discharged from the Service and is unable to obtain civilian employment in 
the field for which he or she was qualified. 
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For MSBS, the MSBS Board determines the level of invalidity after reviewing 
information about the member's skills, qualifications, experience and the relevant 
Service medical documents. On occasions an independent medical opinion may be 
sought. Benefits fall into 3 categories; 
(a) Class A - deemed as> 60% incapacity as determined by independent 
specialist medical review, 
(b) Class B - between 30-59% incapacity, and 
( c) Class C - < 30% incapacity for the purposes of obtaining employment. 
Determining a pension class will vary according to occupation. For example, a 
clerk can be reasonably expected to obtain similar employment, while an infantryman 
would require extensive retraining to be suitable for civilian employment. Therefore 
with a similar incapacity the clerk may be given a class B pension while the 
infantryman would receive a class A pension. 
The payment of benefits varies under the two schemes. Under DFRDB, a Class 
A pension recipient receives 76.5% of his final salary, and a Class B recipient receives 
half that (38.25%). A Class C recipient is entitled to a refund of his contributions and a 
lump sum benefit equal to one half of his refund. 
Under MSBS, the Class A entitlement is the member benefit of contributions 
plus interest and the employer benefit calculated on the service a member could have 
achieved from entry to age 5 5 (or statutory retiring age if greater than age 5 5). The 
member component is paid as a lump sum. The employer component is paid as an 
indexed pension. The pension entitlement is calculated using a complex formula. A 
soldier aged 30 who had 10 years service prior to 1996 and was invalided Class A, 
would receive a lump sum of $253,000 ($Al 996) and a pension of $21,125 indexed 
annually. 
Invalided members receive these benefits for life if they are unable to find work, 
and on death there are reversionary benefits for surviving spouses. For Class C 
recipients the benefit is the refund of the member's contribution plus interest and the 
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preservation of the employer benefit until age 55. Invalid pensions are not adjusted 
because of other income, but Commonwealth payments (Social security, compensation 
and Repatriation) may be adjusted to take into account the amount of the pension. 
Classifications are regularly reviewed, with movements up or down depending on 
changed circumstances. 
4.3.3 The Department of Veteran's Affairs System 
Any soldier with more than 3 years continuous service before 1992, who 
sustained a service-related injury or illness that resulted in impairment, possesses an 
entitlement for a Department of Veteran's Affairs (DVA) pension. There are a number 
of different types of pension and they vary according to the level of impairment. DV A 
pensions are payable to ADF members who are still serving. ADF members, depending 
on their circumstances, are entitled to receive pensions from both their Defence scheme 
and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Recent legislative changes now allow for 
crosschecking and adjustment of pension levels depending on circumstance. 
4.4 Veteran's Affairs Pensions Costs 
Figure 4.3 shows the percentage of veteran's affairs pension recipients in 1994 
by category of entitlement. The most common beneficiaries were the World War 11 
veterans, but Defence Force/ Peacekeeping troops comprised the second largest 
category of recipients. This group has nearly twice as many pensioners as former 
Vietnam veterans. 
Figure 4.4 shows the relative proportion of pension outlay cost by category. 
Defence /Peacekeeping comprised 8.08% of total DVA invalid pension outlays, which 
was third only to Vietnam War veterans at 8.68%. As the number of World War II 
veterans decline, the relative importance of Defence Force pensions will increase. 
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Figure 4.3 The relative proportion ofDVA pensioners, by entitlement category, 1994. 
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Figure 4.4 The percentage of invalid pension outlay, by entitlement category, 1994. 
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Figure 4.5 The number of Defence Force /Peacekeepers receiving an invalid pension 
as at 1 July of that year. 
Looking at total costs however provides little information about trends. Figure 
4.5 shows a steady increase in the number of disability pensions provided to Defence 
Force members or peacekeepers during the period 1992/3 to 1995/96. There was an 
absolute increase of 10,047 pensioners, representing a 70% increase in recipients during 
the 5 years between 1991 and 1996. 
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Fig 4.6 The number of new ADF/Peacekeeper pensioners, 1991/92 to 1995/96. 
Figure 4.6 shows the annual increase in new invalid pensioner numbers over 
this period, with the numbers rising steadily between 1991and1995. The number of 
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new pension recipients dropped of sharply in 1996, and there is no obvious explanation 
for this. 
Figure 4. 7 represents these increases in percentage terms showing a rate of 
increase in pensioners rising from 8.5% in 1991/92 to 14.3% in 1994/95. 
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Figure 4. 7 The percentage increase in the number of new invalid pension recipients, 
1991/92 to 1995/96. 
$100.000 
$82.138 
UI $75.000 
c: 
~ 
i 
~ 
.5 $50.000 
UI 
>-
"' ;::; ::J 
0 
c: $25.000 0 
·u; 
c: 
Cll 
a. 
$0.000 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Figure 4.8 Total DVA pension outlays 1991-1996 for Defence Force members. 
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Figure 4.8 shows the actual cost of these pensions for that period. Total pension 
outlays rose from $35M to $82M in the 6 years from 1991 to 1996, representing a 134% 
increase in pension costs over that period. 
Figure 4.9 shows the annual increase in pension costs over this same period and 
these ranged from 12.3% between 1991and1992 to 26% between 1994 and 1995. 
Interestingly, despite an 8.5% increase in the number of new pensioners in 1996, 
pension costs rose by 19.1 %. There was no data available from the Department of 
Veterans Affairs on the type of conditions leading to the awarding of invalidity 
pensions. There is data available from the MSBS scheme on the causes of medical 
invalidity from the Army, and it is reasonable to assume a close relationship between 
invalidity reasons for discharge and the consequent awarding of invalid pensions by 
DVA. 
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Figure 4.9 The annual percentage increase in invalid pension costs for Defence force 
members. 
Table 4.2 shows the causes of invalidity for which member were entitled to a 
disability pension under the Military Superannuation and Benefits Scheme (MSBS). 
Musculoskeletal causes were again dominant, being responsible for between 72% and 
78% of all invalidity, with a mean value of 75.6%. 
Cause of Invalidity 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 
Malignancy 4 (4.2%) 4 (3.2%) 7 (3.7%) 
Digestive system 0 (0.0%) 2 (1.6%) 3 (1.6%) 
Mental Health 11 (11.6%) 21(16.8%) 29 (15.2%) 
Other 6 (6.3%) 8 (6.4%) 5 (2.6%) 
Musculoskeletal 74 (77.9%) 90 (72%) 147 (77%) 
Table 4.2 Causes of Army invalidity recorded by the MSBS scheme, for which 
members were entitled to an invalidity pension 1996-97 to 1998-99. 
4.5 Estimation of Army injury-related DV A invalid pension costs 
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To estimate the amount ofDVA pension costs attributable to Army injury the 
following assumptions were made. 
(a) Army's costs are disproportionate to its numbers, therefore while 
representing approximately 50 % of ADF strength it is estimated that 
Army would account for 72% of pension costs, i.e. in similar proportion 
to it's outstanding compensation liabilities(as detailed in Chapter 3) and, 
(b) Of the Army related invalid pension costs, it is estimated that 75.6% of 
these costs will be the result of an injury, similar to the proportion of 
invalidity due to musculoskeletal causes. 
1995-96 Pension increase 
72%Army 
75.6% Injury 
Estimated Ongoing Annual Liability 
1996 Pension Cost 
72% Army 
75.6% Injury 
Estimated Pension Cost 
$13.16M 
$9.48M 
$7.16M 
$82.14M 
$59.14M 
$44.71M 
Table 4.3 Estimated DV A pension cost and ongoing annual 
pension liability attributable to Army injury, 1996. 
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Between 1995 and 1996 veterans' pensions increased by $13.16M dollars and 
the proportion attributed to Army injury was estimated to be $7.16M. The total ADF 
annual invalid pension cost in 1996 was $82.14M, with the Army component of 
continuing pension liability estimated to be $59.14M, with the proportion attributable 
to injury estimated to be $41.40M. The ongoing pension liability will compound as new 
invalid pensioners are added. Table 4.3 illustrates this estimate. 
4.6 The Cost of ADF (MSBS/DFRDB) Invalidity Pensions 
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Figure 4.10 The cumulative number of invalidity discharges and invalid pension 
recipients, MSBS, 1991/92 to 1994/95. 
Figure 4.10 shows the accumulating number of invalid pensioners in the MSBS 
pension scheme from its inception in 1991-92. Those receiving invalidity pensions rose 
from 3 7 in 1991-92 to 490 in 1994-95. This dramatic increase is explained by the 
transitional nature of the new pension scheme. The old DFRDB scheme was closed in 
1992, but members were still eligible for invalidity benefits from that scheme. 
Figure 4.11 shows that invalidity is primarily a male phenomenon, but this is 
hardly surprising given that 88% of the ADF is male. Females comprised 15% of new 
invalid pensioners in 1994-95 which was broadly proportional to their numbers in the 
ADF population. 
133 
Figure 4.12 shows the cumulative cost of invalid pensions paid out by the 
MSBS scheme over the first four years of its operation. It can be seen that Army was 
responsible for the overwhelming share of pension costs, rising from 59% of all invalid 
pension costs in 1991 /92, to 69% of pension costs in 1993/94. 
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Figure 4.11 The cumulative number of male and female invalid pensioners, MSBS, 
1991/92 to 1994/95. 
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Figure 4.12 Annual MSBS pension liabilities, by Service, 1991/2 to 1994/95 
In absolute terms, MSBS invalid pension costs rose at an alarming level over 
that 4-year period, from a total of$0.619M in the first year to $6.851M in 1993/94. 
This represents a 10-fold increase in new costs over 4 years. 
1994/95 $20.583 
$0.000 $5.000 $10.000 $15.000 $20.000 $25.000 
$A Millions 
Figure 4.13 Annual DFRDB pension liabilities, by Service, 199112 to 1994/5. 
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Figure 4.13 shows the increase in DFRDB pensions over the corresponding 
period. In absolute terms, the costs of invalid pensions rose by only half that of the 
MSBS scheme. This is paradoxical in that the DFRDB scheme contained much older 
contributors who were theoretically more likely to be invalided, whilst the MSBS 
scheme held primarily younger and more recent entrants into the ADF. This anomaly 
can be explained by the high rate of attrition in recent ADF entrants and a "healthy 
survivor" effect in the DFRDB population 
Table 4.4 shows the absolute and relative increases in invalid pension costs over 
the 4-year period 1991192 to 1994/95. It can be seen that in the MSBS scheme there 
were dramatic increases in absolute pension costs which were reflected in the high 
percentage increases ranging from a 355% increase in the second year to a 163% 
increase in the fourth year. 
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The DFRDB scheme has been running for over 20 years and many of its invalid 
pensioners are aged and frail. A number die each year and are replaced by new 
pensioners. This "turnover" effect masks the real increase in new pension costs. For 
MSBS, being a new scheme, the rate of increase in both pensioner numbers and 
pension costs accurately represents cost increases and demonstrates a substantial 
ongoing liability for future pension costs. 
91 /92-92/93 92193-93194 93194-94195 
MSBS 
Annual ADF increase $1.581M $2.002M $2.649M 
% increase 355.4% 191.0% 163.0% 
Army $0.915M $1.585M $1.834M 
% increase 250.7% 123.8% 64.0% 
% of total increase 57.9% 79.2% 69.2% 
DFRDB 
Annual ADF increase $0.726M $0.315M $1.461M 
% increase 2.2% 0.9% 4.2% 
Army $0.526M $0.400M $1.IOOM 
% increase 2.8% 2.1% 5.6% 
% Total increase 72.5% 127.0% 75.3% 
Table 4.4 The absolute and relative increases in ADF and Army invalid pension costs, 
1991/92 to 1994/95, MSBS and DFRDB. 
Of particular note is that the cost of Army invalid pensions after 4 years of the 
MSBS scheme was $4.7M. This represents 23% of the invalid pension costs of the 
DFRDB scheme that has been running for over 20 years. For Navy and Air Force the 
corresponding figures were 16% and 12% respectively. 
Army was responsible for over 70% of increased invalid pension costs in both 
the MSBS and DFRDB schemes. The anomaly in the DFRDB figures was due to a 
reduction in Air Force invalid pensions paid in 1993/94. This inflated the contribution 
of the Army increase to a relative figure in excess of 100%. 
96/97 Total % 97/98 Total % 98/99 Total % 
Spine Invalidity Spine Invalidity Spine Invalidity 
Navy 7 35 20.0% 12 44 27.3% 4 47 8.5% 
Army 45 95 47.4% 50 125 40.0% 71 191 37.2% 
Air 19 51 37.3% 16 47 34.0% 6 33 18.2% 
Table 4.5 The relative contribution of spine disorders to Class A and B invalidity, 
1996/97 to 1998/99 (MSBS data). 
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Disorders of the spine were the single most significant cause of invalidity for the 
period 1997-1999. Table 4.5 shows the number of spine discharges as a percentage of 
total invalidity. 
Army Pension costs 1995 MSBS 
Army Pension costs 1995 DFRDB 
Total 
75.6 % Injury 
MSBS Annual Pension Liability 1995 
DFRDB Annual Pension Liability 1995 
Total 
75.6% Injury 
$1.834M 
$1.lOOM 
$2.934M 
$2.218M 
$4.699M 
$20.583M 
$25.282M 
$19.113M 
Table 4.6 Estimated Army invalid pension costs and annual pension liability 1996. 
From Table 4.5 it can be seen that disorders of the spine accounted for between 
37% and 47% of total invalidity in Army. This was consistently higher than for the 
other two Services, despite fluctuations. The cost of spinal disorders will be examined 
in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7. The contribution of musculoskeletal conditions to 
invalidity was shown in Table 4.2, and therefore an estimate of 75.6% (representing the 
three year average) was used to calculate the proportion of DFRDB and MSBS pension 
costs attributable to injury. Table 4.6 shows the estimated Army injury contribution to 
invalid pension and ongoing pension liability costs for 1995. 
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4. 7 Working days lost and restricted duty costs 
Working days lost are a traditional measure of productivity loss and the loss is 
usually equated to the daily salary. Restricted duties are not normally costed, but in a 
military context, restrictions represent a significant loss of production or a loss of 
"capability". 
Days of lost or restricted duty are reported through the Defence Occupational 
Health and Safety system, utilising a form AC 563 -Report oflnjury or Incident. The 
data used in this section was drawn from the Defence Occupational Health and Safety 
database. This data represents productivity loss from short-term acute injuries. The days 
lost is recorded as at the time of the report form being submitted, usually within 30 days 
of the injury. The OHS database did not record data on long term invalidity. 
No. Injuries Total No Rate of Injury 
Reported 
Days Lost Days/Injury 
Troops I 1000 Troops 
Army 
Males 6058 8774 1.45 23377 259.1 
Females 904 2391 2.64 2632 343.5 
Air Force 
Males 953 1128 1.18 14746 64.6 
Females 200 143 0.72 2754 72.6 
Navy 
Males 2561 568 0.22 12563 203.9 
Females 430 208 0.48 2116 203.2 
Total 
Males 9572 10470 1.09 50686 188.8 
Females 1534 2742 1.79 7502 204.4 
Table 4.7 Reported injuries, rates and days lost by Service and gender, 1995/96. 
Table 4.7 shows that there were 11,106 reported injuries in the ADF during 
1995/96, with an associated loss of 13,212 days of work. For Army there were 6,962 
reported injuries and 11, 165 days lost (84.5% of total). 
For the purposes of this calculation the value of a lost day will be set at that of a 
private soldiers daily wage in 1996. The annual salary was $31,627 and military salaries 
are calculated on a 365-day basis, giving a daily salary of $86 per day in 1996. The 
cost of one day of restriction is estimated to be half that or $43 per day. 
In Table 4.8, the dollar cost for lost workdays was calculated at $86 per day. 
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This is a very low estimate of production loss as many of these days lost would have 
been incurred by members of higher rank and pay. Also, civilian workers are 
remunerated on the basis of a 38-hour work week, so the 365 day method used in this 
calculation will provide a low estimate. 
No of injuries Days Lost Cost Total Troops Cost/ Injury Cost per capita 
Army 
Males 6058 8774 $763,338 23377 $126.00 $32.65 
Females 904 2391 $208,017 2632 $230.11 $79.03 
Air 
Force 
Males 953 1128 $98,136 14746 $102.98 $6.66 
Females 200 143 $12,441 2754 $62.21 $4.52 
Navy 
Males 2561 568 $49,416 12563 $19.30 $3.93 
Females 430 208 $18,096 2116 $42.08 $8.55 
Total 
Males 9572 10470 $910,890 50686 $95.16 $17.97 
Females 1534 2742 $238,554 7502 $155.51 $31.80 
Table 4.8 Estimated cost ($1996) of lost production, by Service and gender, 1995/96. 
Army suffered an estimated $977,355 in lost production due to workplace 
absence. This is nine times more than production losses in Air Force and over fourteen 
times greater than Navy. Increased Army female rates of injury were also reflected in 
increased costs for workplace absence. Cost per injury and cost per capita were twice 
that of males. A similar ratio was seen in Navy, but the absolute values were one-tenth 
the costs of Army. 
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Figure 4.14 Days lost per reported injury by Service and Gender, 1995/96. 
Figure 4.14 illustrates the increased female morbidity and shows that Army had 
five times more days lost per injury than Navy (2.64 vs. 0.48) and nearly four times that 
of Air Force (2.64 vs. 0.72). 
Drummond (Drummond 1986) argues that salary under represents the value of 
lost production, because it excludes employment on-costs which are traditionally 40% 
of salary. In the case of military salary, this would increase the value of the daily 
production loss to $122 per day. 
Salary Cost On-Costs 
Incidents Lost Days % Costs 
($Al996) (40%) added 
Army 6,962 11, 165 $971,355 $1,359,897 84.5% 
Navy 2,991 776 $67,512 $94,516 5.8% 
Air Force 1,153 1,271 $110,577 $154,807 9.6% 
Total 11, 106 13,212 $1,149,444 $1,609,221 
Table 4.9 Estimated ADF lost production with employment on-costs added. 
Table 4.9 shows that Army production losses increase to $1.36M when on-costs 
are included. Even taking into account the low daily wage cost figure, these figures are 
likely to be a significant underestimate, because Occupational Health and Safety 
reporting mechanisms have poor compliance. Where the more robust injury reporting 
system of the Defence Injury Prevention Program was in place, reporting of injury was 
increased 10-12 fold over earlier OHS reporting. 
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4.8. The cost of injury to the soldier: foregone wages due to invalidity 
4.8.1 Calculation of the value of foregone wages 
Traditional burden of disease studies seek to value lost production using lost 
wages and then use discounting to estimate the present value of those foregone wages. 
It is important to avoid double counting of production loss and state benefits (transfer 
payments) as including both will inflate the cost burden (Drummond 1986). Including 
transfer payments examines the impact on the public purse, as well as looking at the 
costs to the individual or community as a whole. 
Prior to 1978 it was common for analysts to argue that the potential to avert 
production losses was the major justification for investment in health services. This 
view no longer prevails (Drummond 1986) and the current argument is whether they 
should be included at all, as part of the benefit of health service investments or as part 
of the cost of giving treatment. The main argument for inclusion is that production 
losses or gains are important to the community, and all other things being equal, society 
prefers treatments that remove the patient from the workforce for the shortest possible 
time. 
The opposite view holds that earnings loss is a poor measurement of production 
loss. It is not clear whether production is actually lost, especially with high 
unemployment, and society's willingness to pay for preventing production loss may 
have already been incorporated into other estimates of health benefits. Including 
production losses leads to priority settings based on the type of job a sufferer has. 
Policy makers may not wish to set priorities in this way. 
In cases of short-term illness it is doubtful that production is lost, because 
staffing levels in large organizations are often based on the assumption of a degree of 
absence across the total pool of employees. In this case, a reduction in sickness levels 
may release workers for other tasks, but this would not necessarily result in a 
proportionate increase in the firm's production. In most studies, the range of costs 
considered is quite limited, and usually restricted to easily quantified costs. Few studies 
attempt to measure the intangible aspects of morbidity and mortality (Drummond 
1986). 
4.8.2 Lost earnings of Australian Soldiers 
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Foregone wages due to premature invalidity were calculated using the ADF 
salary scale in effect at 1 March 1996. It was assumed that members would have normal 
career progression over a 20-year military career and then retire. It was also assumed 
that the military pension coupled with any new salary would maintain income at the 
retirement level until age 55. The 1996 salary was inflated annually using a figure of 
3%, which was deemed to be an approximate average of CPI increases over the period 
1996-2004, which ranged from 2 to 6 % (Table 4.10). 
2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 
Sydney 6.2 3.0 2.8 2.1 
Melbourne 6.0 2.8 3.3 2.2 
Brisbane 5.9 2.9 3.2 2.9 
Adelaide 5.7 2.8 4.0 3.0 
Perth 5.5 2.7 2.8 2.0 
Hobart 5.8 2.0 3.3 2.5 
Darwin 5.4 2.1 2.3 1.4 
Canberra 6.2 2.5 3.3 2.6 
All Cities 6.0 2.9 3.1 2.4 
Table 4.10 Percentage change in CPI values 2001-2004 (from ABS Website) 
Table 4 .11 shows the estimated lost wages discounted back to $A 1 996 and the 
accompanying offset of pension transfer payments. It was assumed that members would 
continue working until age 55 and then retire. Salary loss at age 55 was then discounted 
using a discount rate of 5% to the net present value (NPV). NPV losses were then 
adjusted for invalid pension transfer payments. 
Transfer payments were calculated using the DFRDB formula of 76.5% of final 
salary for Class A pension and 38.25% of final salary for Class B pensions. These 
pension payments were also inflated at a rate of 3.0%, and then discounted using a 
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rank of Warrant Officer Class 2. It was also assumed that members who took retirement 
after 20 years would maintain at least parity with their last military salary, given a 
second job supplemented by their military pension. In many cases they would exceed 
their last military salary. 
Class A Pension Class B Pension 
Age NPV of Lost Wages 
adjusted loss adjusted loss 
18 $822,560 $476,320 $683,501 
19 $821,655 $205,753 $574,293 
20 $806,289 $201,918 $563,559 
21 $790,626 $198,009 $552,616 
22 $799,044 $218,410 $565,847 
23 $820,380 $233,307 $584,597 
24 $804,009 $201,407 $561,989 
25 $785,674 $196,831 $549,180 
26 $766,983 $192,166 $536,122 
27 $747,928 $187,411 $522,810 
28 $797,400 $251,459 $578,136 
29 $779,035 $195,249 $544,572 
30 $756,846 $189,711 $529,070 
31 $734,226 $184,065 $513,268 
32 $711, 166 $178,310 $497,158 
33 $687,659 $172,444 $480,736 
34 $753,406 $256,174 $553,705 
35 $743,106 $264,205 $523,204 
36 $720,755 $260,543 $505,678 
37 $691,339 $250, 178 $483,364 
38 $660,962 $239,221 $462,142 
Table 4.11 Net present value (NPV) of lost wages by age of invalidity and after 
adjustment for invalid pension transfer payments. 
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Class A Residual loss Class B residual loss 
Age 
%NPV %NPV 
18 57% 83% 
25 29% 70% 
30 25% 69% 
35 35% 70% 
40 27% 70% 
45 31% 71% 
50 36% 71% 
Table 4.12 The effect of pension transfer payments on the loss of lifetime earnings. 
It was also assumed that all invalid pensioners would, under normal 
circumstances have worked until age 55 before taking retirement. Therefore, the work 
life expectancy of an 18-year-old recruit was taken to be 37 years and that of a 38-year-
old Warrant Officer to be 17 years. Because the majority of the Army consists of Other 
Ranks and there is no way to differentiate between Officers and Other Ranks, it was 
decided to use the Other Rank pay scale and not the Officer pay scale. This will result 
in an underestimate of the true cost but will improve confidence in the calculation as a 
minimal estimate. 
Table 4.12 shows the significant effect of transfer payments on final loss of 
wages. For Class A pension beneficiaries, the net residual loss is between 25-30% of 
the estimated NPV of lost wages. The very low initial salaries of recruits skew the 
figures for 18-year-old members. For Class B pensioners there is a consistent 30% 
residual reduction in the NPV of lost wages across most age groups. 
It is also important to test the sensitivity of the results by applying a variety of 
discount rates. It can often be shown that the choice of a discount rate between the 
range 2-10% does not affect the study result (Drummond 1986). 
Table 4.13 shows the effect of different discount rates on the NPV of lost 
wages. The effect is most marked in those members who are invalided early in their 
careers, but the discount rate becomes much less significant once the member is over 
the age of 45 years. 
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Years of 
Age Foregone Salary NPV 5%rate NPV 2%rate NPV 10%rate 
Service 
0 18 $2,110,351 $822,560 $1,392,388 $429,608 
19 $2,032,855 $821,655 $1,362,501 $441,081 
2 20 $1,943,861 $806,289 $1,318,874 $438,202 
3 21 $1,857,459 $790,626 $1,275,671 $435,127 
4 22 $1,830,745 $799,044 $1,272,312 $444,979 
5 23 $1,832,460 $820,380 $1,288,769 $462,653 
6 24 $1,748,372 $804,009 $1,244,907 $460,209 
7 25 $1,665,165 $785,674 $1,199,872 $455,874 
8 26 $1,584,382 $766,983 $1,155,274 $451,244 
9 27 $1,505,952 $747,928 $1,l I I,109 $446,300 
IO 28 $1,568,300 $797,400 $1,169,898 $481,385 
11 29 $1,490,438 $779,035 $1,125,690 $478,588 
12 30 $1,411,540 $756,846 $1,078,543 $471,968 
13 31 $1,334,940 $734,226 $1,031,853 $464,899 
14 32 $1,260,572 $711,166 $985,616 $457,348 
15 33 $1,188,369 $687,659 $939,829 $449,285 
16 34 $1,273,122 $753,406 $1,017,269 $498,424 
17 35 $1,221,294 $743,106 $987,836 $501,314 
18 36 $1,154,792 $720,755 $944,659 $494,554 
19 37 $1,079,875 $691,339 $893,353 $482,625 
20 38 $1,006,768 $660,962 $842,167 $469,476 
21 39 $751,927 $523,596 $644,787 $390,281 
22 40 $707,696 $503,334 $612,567 $380,656 
23 41 $663,465 $482,058 $579,702 $370,067 
24 42 $619,234 $459,718 $546,181 $358,420 
25 43 $575,003 $436,261 $511,989 $345,607 
26 44 $530,772 $411,632 $477,113 $331,514 
27 45 $486,541 $385,771 $441,540 $316,011 
28 46 $442,310 $358,617 $405,255 $298,958 
29 47 $398,079 $330,105 $368,244 $280,200 
30 48 $353,848 $300,168 $330,494 $259,566 
31 49 $309,617 $268,734 $291,988 $236,869 
32 50 $265,386 $235,728 $252, 712 $211,901 
33 51 $221,155 $201,072 $212,651 $184,437 
34 52 $176,924 $164,683 $171,788 $154,227 
Table 4.13 Sensitivity analysis of the effect of different discount rates on the NPV, 
based on age and years of service. 
4.8.3 Estimated Salary loss in invalided soldiers 
In the following analysis transfer payments have been included in order to 
estimate the net loss of income to an invalidity recipient. The net loss will be 
considered as a productivity loss, borne by the individual rather than society. The 
transfer payment is a cost borne by government (society). 
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For the financial year 1996/97 there were 197 disability discharges from the 
ADF comprising 63 Class A and 134 Class B pensions. For Army there were 40 Class 
A and 68 Class B Pensions, representing 63% of all ADF Class A pensions and 51 % of 
all Class B pensions. The MSBS figures provide an age breakdown for the type of 
diagnosis but not for class of pension. Based on the 1996/97 proportion of Class A and 
Class B we will assume that 3 8% of invalidity will result in a Class A and 62% will 
result in Class B. 
Table 4.14 shows the age distribution of invalidity pensions for Army in 
FYI 996197. The figure of 95 differs from the total figure of 108. This discrepancy is 
due to delays in finalising the diagnosis of particular individuals. The age breakdown 
was only available for diagnosis categories and not pension categories. 
Officer and Other rank salaries differ, but in 1996/97 Officers comprised 5 
Class A (12.5%) and 3 Class B ( 4.4%) of the total invalid pensions granted. For the 
purposes of this calculation, Other Rank salary losses were used and the mid salary 
point of the age range was taken for the purposes of the calculation. 
1996/97 <20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60+ Total 
ArmyD/C 6 
Class A 
Class B 
2 
4 
18 
7 
I I 
27 
IO 
I7 
I4 
5 
9 
I6 
6 
IO 
9 
3 
6 
3 
2 
2 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
95 
36 
59 
Table 4.14 Estimation of the number of Class A and Class B pensioners in each age 
group. 
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NPVLoss Wage Loss NPV Loss Wage Loss 
Age Injury DIC Class A Class B 
Single Total Single Total 
<20 3 $492,791 $492,791 2 $683,501 $1,367,002 
20-24 14 5 $226,209 $1,131,045 9 $552,616 $4,973,544 
25-29 25 10 $219,514 $2,195,140 15 $536, 122 $8,041,830 
30-34 8 3 $210,234 $630,702 5 $513,268 $2,566,340 
35-39 9 3 $282,423 $847,269 6 $505,678 $3,034,068 
40-44 4 2 $138,032 $276,064 2 $341,002 $682,004 
45-49 2 $118,416 $118,416 $253,681 $253,681 
50-54 0 $75, 176 $0 $142,236 $142,236 
Total 66 25 $5,691,427 41 $21,060, 705 
Table 4.15 Estimated lost wages resulting from invalidity and adjusted by pension 
transfer payments. All values are in A$1996 (inflated and discounted) 
Table 4.15 shows that the 66 Army members invalided as a result of injury lost 
a total of $26. 7M in wages, even after allowing for the transfer payments of the invalid 
pension. The Class A pension resulted in significantly reduced net loss to the 
individual. 
4.9 Conclusion 
Indirect costs resulting from injury to soldiers comprise a number of different 
components, and this thesis has included invalid pensions. While strictly a direct cost, 
they are not medical costs and therefore have been included in the calculation of 
estimated indirect costs of injury. As transfer payments, they are a tangible outcome of 
the lost production resulting from injury. Other cost components include the 
productivity losses from sick leave borne by the employer and potential lost earnings 
due to invalidity, borne by the individual and society. 
Injuries can also result in soldiers being medically reclassified or downgraded 
into categories that restrict their employment and result in an intangible productivity or 
capability loss. The leading causes of medical downgrade were the usual suspects of 
lower limb and back injuries, with the proportion of soldiers downgraded due to lower 
limb causes increasing from 73 per cent in 1987, to 83 per cent in 1992 (Rudzki 1994 ). 
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The lack of a comprehensive and effective health surveillance system hampered the 
correlation between the cause of impairment and the effect of downgrading. The refusal 
of Defence to record Pulheems data makes any current causal attribution for medical 
downgrading impossible. 
The upward trend in medical downgrading due to injury was reflected in the 
invalid pension cost data with a 70% increase in DV A invalid pension recipients during 
the 5 years between 1991 and 1996. The annual increase in pension costs over this 
same period e ranged from 12.3% in 1992 to 26% in 1995. While no DVA data was 
available on the reasons for invalidity, data from the Military Superannuation Benefits 
Scheme (MSBS) showed that musculoskeletal causes were responsible for between 
72% and 78% of all invalidity, with a three year average of 75.6%. This figure was 
chosen to estimate the proportion of invalid pensions attributable to injury, while the 
Army proportion ofDVA pension costs was estimated using the proportionate figure of 
72% derived from Army's compensation liabilities, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Invalidity in the ADF is primarily a male phenomenon, but this is consistent 
with the predominance of males in the organisation. After only 4 years of operation, 
Army invalid pensions within the MSBS superannuation scheme had reached $4. 7M, or 
23% of the total invalid pension costs of the DFRDB scheme that had been running for 
over 20 years. The corresponding Navy and Air Force figures were 16% and 12% 
respectively. Army costs rose more quickly than the other two Services, being 
responsible for over 70% of the increase in invalid pension costs in both the MSBS and 
DFRDB schemes over the period 1992-1996. 
In 1995/96 the Army had 6,962 reported work related injuries and 11, 165 days 
of sick leave, representing 84.5% of the ADF total in that year. Using a conservative 
value of $86 per lost day, Army suffered an estimated $977,355 in lost production due 
to workplace absence. These losses increased to $1.36M when on-costs were included, 
and were nine times the loss in Air Force and over fourteen times the loss in Navy. 
Army had five times more days lost per injury than Navy (2.64 vs. 0.48) and nearly four 
times that of Air Force (2.64 vs. 0. 72), indicating that, in addition to a higher incidence 
of injury, there was also an increased severity. 
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Transfer payments in the form of MSBS and DFRDB invalid pensions had a 
significant impact on the net residual loss of potential earnings. For Class A 
pensioners, the net residual loss was only 25-30% of the estimated net present value 
(NPV) of lost wages, highlighting the significant moderating effect of the pension 
payments. For Class B pensioners, however there was a consistent 70% net residual 
loss in the NPV of lost wages across most age groups. Varying the discount rate from 
2% to 10% had the most marked effect on soldiers who were invalided early in their 
careers, but the discount rate became much less significant once the member reached 
the age of 45 years. The residual NPV oflost wages for the 66 soldiers with injury 
invalidity in 1996/97 was estimated to be $26. 7M. 
Veterans Affairs Pensions 
DFRDB/MSBS Pensions 1995 
Total Pensions cost 
Army Lost Production (l 1,165days) including on-costs 
Total Indirect Costs 
DV A Liability 
DFRDB/MSBS Pension Liability 
Total Pension Liabilities per annum 
Estimated NPV of lost wages of those soldiers in 
receipt of invalidity pensions for injury 
Estimated Cost $A I 996 
$7.16M 
$2.22M 
$9.38M 
$1.36M 
$10.74M 
$44.71M 
$19.llM 
$63.82M 
$26.75M 
Table 4.16 Estimated pension costs, annual pension liabilities, lost production and 
NPV oflost wages due to Army injury. 
Table 4.16 summarises the total estimated indirect costs consequent to injury in 
Army in 1996, as well as the ongoing pension liabilities. Total indirect costs attributed 
to government were $10.74M, while individuals who were invalided as a result of 
injury suffered a residual NPV of lost earnings of $26.75M. Invalid pension costs were 
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nearly seven times the estimated production losses, reflecting the long term morbidity 
associated with chronic injury and subsequent incapacity. 
A disturbing feature of the Army experience was the relative youth of those 
soldiers who were invalided as a result of injury. Fifty-four percent of Army invalid 
pensioners were aged 29 years or younger, and in this group foregone wages were much 
higher than in the older soldiers. In a civilian environment not sympathetic to those 
with physical disability, the future employment prospects of these individuals are likely 
to be problematic. Reducing the incidence and severity of injury in young soldiers is 
the only practical way to significantly reduce future costs. 
Chapter 5. Capital Investment losses due to premature separation 
from the Army due to Injury 
5.1 Separation Rates 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, traditional concepts of production do not apply to the 
Army. The notion of capability is closely linked to the availability of skilled manpower 
able to be deployed. A key factor in manning deficiencies is separation from the Army. 
These fall into two categories, voluntary and involuntary. Involuntary separations are 
due to medical, psychological or disciplinary reasons. 
Any hierarchical organization requires an ongoing staff turnover. However, the 
most efficient means for this to occur is after people have served defined periods of 
time, e.g. l 0-15 years. If they leave after shorter periods of time, the employer is 
unlikely to recoup a sufficient return on the funds invested in their education and 
training. 
5.2 Premature separation due to injury 
Figure 5.1 shows high medical separation rates in young members of the 
Australian Army, with 43% of those who left in their first year of service doing so for 
medical reasons. Medical separation reduces in the middle years, but as personnel 
become more senior and presumably accumulate wear and tear conditions, the 
percentage of those discharging with a medical problem increases. 
There are artificial spikes at the 19 and 20-year marks. Under the old DFRDB 
scheme, ADF members became entitled to a pension at 20 years and would conceal 
injuries until just prior to retirement, in order to achieve pensionable age and have 
medical conditions noted for compensation and veteran's affairs pension purposes. 
Figure 5.2 shows that between 1986 and 1996, 11,998 soldiers were discharged 
with a medical disability as reflected in their final Physical Employment Standard 
(PES) profile. Of these 4606 (38.4%) had less than 4 years of service, reflecting the 
high morbidity associated with military service for young members. 
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Figure 5.1 The average percentage of medical disability separations from Army, by 
years of service, 1986-96. 
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Figure 5.2 The number of soldiers discharged from the Army with a medical 
disability, by years of service, 1986-96. 
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5.3 Human Capital Theory 
Traditional methodologies do not account for the training cost invested in an 
individual. In most civilian enterprises, workers usually arrive with the majority of their 
formal training completed e.g. university or trade. The cost of this training has been 
borne by the individual and society (via government funding) in varying proportions. 
Most skills acquired in Tertiary institutions are transferable across a number of 
industries, although there will always be some specific to job, or "on the job" training 
involved. 
Human capital theory likens education to a capital investment that an individual 
makes in him or her self. There are two elements to this investment: 
(1) the cost of the training (e.g. Bachelor I Master's degree), and 
(2) the wages foregone whilst studying. 
An individual trades off these costs in the belief that after receiving a 
qualification he or she will command a higher salary that will ultimately compensate 
for the cost of the education. If the potential benefit in terms of increased salary is 
unlikely to recoup the cost, then an individual should consider whether the education is 
a sound investment. 
5.4 Organizational Capital Investment in Training 
Unlike most civilian employers, the Australian Army invests substantial sums 
of money into training its members in a number of specific organizational skills. For 
example, while there is a market for professional skills such as lawyers, doctors, 
engineers and dentists, there is no market for Artillery, Infantry or Tank Officers. The 
fighting Corps of the Army (Infantry, Artillery, Armour) require skills that have little or 
no civilian application. Consequently the Army provides extensive training to equip its 
members with the skills required to perform their assigned tasks competently. 
This training is almost unique in that the total cost is borne by Army, and 
members do not forego any wages or salary. For Corps such as Ordinance, Electrical 
and Mechanical Engineers, Aviation, Transport and Signals: many of the skills taught 
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have civilian application and are highly sought after in the jobs marketplace. The only 
cost to the employee or Trainee is time. For all of its training courses Army requires a 
Return of Service Obligation (ROSO), which is akin to a contract, but not formally 
structured in that way until very recently. 
These ROSOs are determined on a time rather than cost basis. The general rule 
of thumb is that for every year of training the return of service is one for one plus one 
year. Army has number of methods of entry and these and their ROSOs are summarised 
in Table 5.1. 
Years of Minimum 
Method of Entry ROSO 
Training Service (Yrs) 
ADFA 3 4 7 
ADFA+RMC 4 5 9 
RMC* 1.5 2.5 4 
IRTB/IET •• 0.5 4 
Adult Tradesman 2-3 4 6 
Direct Entry Officer (DEO)¥ 0 2-4 
DEO (Pilot) 2 4 6 
Table 5.1 Methods of entry, years of training and return of service obligations, 1996. 
§Australian Defence Force Academy 
**I st Recruit Training Battalion/ Initial Employment Training 
¥ Direct Entry Officer - professionals e.g. doctors, lawyers. 
*Royal Military College (Duntroon) 
From Table 5.1 it can be seen that there are number of entry points into Army 
service with varying degrees of contracted service obligation. These periods represent 
the minimal contracted time, with members electing to stay on if they choose; a 
situation termed "open ended engagement'', which allows for separation at any time 
following the completion of the ROSO. 
In the case of soldiers, they only have 6 months of training but are contracted 
for a minimum 4-year period, while for adult tradesmen the contracted period is 6 
years, irrespective of the training time. With most trades the learning period is 1.5 to 2 
years, and therefore the ROSO is 4 to 4.5 years. In the case of aircraft fitters and 
mechanics, the training is three years and the ROSO only 3 years. 
An officer graduating from the Royal Military College (RMC) can leave the 
Army after 4 years of service or 2.5 years after graduating. An Australian Defence 
Force Academy (ADF A) graduate must serve for 5 years after graduation. Table 5.2 
summarises the total cost of training various members of Army. These costs were 
obtained from the Directorate of Costs - Army database as at 1 July 1996. 
Course Duration Total Cost ROSO 
ADFA 3 years $330,000 4 years 
RMC 1.5 years $138,000 2.5 years 
Direct Entry Officer (DEO) Pilot 2 Years $501,000 4 years 
RMC Pilot 3 years $639,000 4 years 
ADFA Pilot 5.5 years $969,000 4 years 
Vehicle Mechanic 2 years $154,000 4 years 
Aircraft Fitter 3 years $243,000 3 years 
Electronic Technician 2 years $253,000 4 years 
Table 5.2 Sample of training costs for various Army employments, $1996. 
5.5 Previous attempts to cost personnel wastage 
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Wythes (Wythes 1991) attempted to calculate the costs of increased personnel 
wastage in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). He noted that in 1991 there was no 
universally accepted methodology for calculating costs, despite the fact that two 
previous reports had recommended a study of the cost of personnel turnover be 
undertaken. 
He noted that while there appeared to be a consensus on the importance of 
experience in the ADF, there was no method of quantifying experience in measurable 
and meaningful terms. One, albeit imperfect, gauge that was readily quantifiable was to 
measure the replacement cost and overheads incurred when a member separated from 
the Service. 
155 
Wythes argued that a replacement cost approach reinforces the view of labour as 
a factor of production, and therefore it is a 'cost' that affects the 'profit' on capital and 
therefore something to be curbed. Taking a leaf from human capital theory, Wythes 
argued that training expenditure is an investment in capital, not an overhead cost, and 
capital produces profits. In short, he felt there was a need to change attitudes to view 
manpower as capital instead of labour; an investment to be protected, not a cost to be 
curtailed. 
Wythes estimated the costs of replacing staff at given turnover rates on a 
training replacement basis. He argued that the cost of any particular pattern of 
personnel turnover was the aggregate of: 
(1) the cost of replacement of fully trained personnel, 
(2) the cost of replacing the specific skills and training of personnel who 
separate, and 
(3) the cost of postings (relocations based on changing job locations) 
The first two were classed as training replacement costs, while the last was 
classed as a cascade cost. Cascade is a refection on the reality that movement in one 
area leads to a number of related movements to fill the resulting vacancies. Vacancies 
created in a particular rank level are filled by peers or the promotion of subordinates. 
This creates the need to move people between different locations. 
Wastage of trained and experienced personnel creates a disproportionate degree 
of movement. A consultant study into this issue indicated that a single vacancy would 
lead to an average of 5 vacancies. (Peat Marwick Mitchell Services 1987) 
Wythes produced figures stating that for a Warrant Officer vacancy there were 
13 postings, for a Sergeant 5.7 and for a Leading Aircraftsman (LAC) only 1. The more 
senior the loss, the greater the disruption and movement. The average cost of a posting 
in FY 1989-90 was $6,410. 
In any decision in whether to vary an activity, it is always the marginal cost that 
is the relevant factor. (Baumol 1979). Given that most training institutions already exist 
and have fixed costs, marginal analysis applies to the rate of replacement training 
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generated by the variation in the rate of personnel wastage. Given the scale of training 
schools, the cost of training n students could be the same as training n+ 20 students. 
The primary manpower costs to the Department of Defence are salary and 
allowances, non-effective benefits (NEBs ), general service costs and some base support 
costs. The Defence Directorate of Costs, aggregated these NEBs and calculated them as 
a percentage "on cost" of military salaries. General service costs were calculated by 
averaging the aggregate cost of a basket of 18 expenditure classes. This cost was 
calculated to be $25 .08 per day in $1989. 
There are four stages in the training replacement process: 
(1) recruitment, 
(2) recruit training, 
(3) basic trade training and 
( 4) field and unit training. 
The cost of replacing a fully qualified RAAF member was the sum of the costs 
for the four stages. Recruiting does not lend itself to marginal analysis, because it is 
continuous process and unless there is a wide variation, it is relatively insensitive to 
variations in personnel turnover. Wythes estimated that the marginal cost of training a 
replacement radar technician (highly skilled) was $166,164. The cost ofreplacing a 
supply officer was estimated to be $26,938. This variation in costs was a function of 
the duration and quality of training required for each employment. 
For the two occupational groups of radar technician, and supply officer the total 
replacement and cascade costs were estimated to be $10.5M, for a 5.3% separation rate. 
If this was extrapolated to the total airman wastage for that year, then the total cost was 
estimated to be approximately $195.5M. This represents the marginal cost of 
additional training courses plus the averaged real costs associated with postings. This 
could be accepted as the unavoidable cost of doing business, but it is an expensive way 
of doing business. In 1989, the total airman wastage was 11.48% and Wythes calculated 
that a 2% reduction in wastage would lead to a saving of $34.1 lM. 
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5.6 The Capital Investment Model. 
Human resources are considered valuable by many organizations, but it is often 
difficult to put a value on these resources. The market does so by paying salaries to 
people with various skills who are in high demand. The greater the demand, the greater 
the likely salary. In public sector organizations, salaries are fixed and equal across 
various skill groups. There is essentially no market, and if the salary is uncompetitive 
the position will remain unfilled, or be taken by an individual under a contracted 
obligation. 
If one applies the same principles of capital equipment investment to human 
resources, a picture of the relative worth (or cost) of individual members to the Army 
can be developed. Capital investment in this case, is the cost of the training that Army 
expends in achieving a desired level of competence and manning levels. This capital 
cost is amortised over the various contracted periods of service or ROSOs. If is a 
ROSO is 4 years, this results in an annual depreciation rate of 25%. If a soldier or 
officer separates prematurely due to injury (before the contracted ROSO period), the 
initial capital investment is not fully amortised, and there is a resultant book loss 
equivalent to the remaining net present value (NPV) of the depreciated capital 
investment. 
Trade/Skill Pilot (DEO) Aircraft Fitter Electronic Technician 
Cost to Train $501,000 $243,451 $253,578 
Yrs of Training 2 3 2 
ROSO 4 3 4 
Rate of Depreciation 25%pa 33%pa 25%pa 
NPV at end 
Year 1 $375,764 $160,678 $190,184 
Year2 $250,510 $80,339 $126,789 
Year 3 $125,255 $0 $63,395 
Year4 $0 $0 
Table 5.3 Depreciation schedule for capital investment in three selected employments. 
This methodology involves calculating the cost of conducting the training 
courses for each of the skill groups. These costs were obtained from the Directorate of 
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Costs - Army. The components considered in calculating the cost of the courses 
included staff wages, support services (medical, dental, psychology, computing), stores 
and equipment, consumable goods (food and ammunition) and facility operating 
expenses (fuel, power, water). 
Using the values from Table 5.3, a pilot who separates in the second year of his 
ROSO represents a book loss of $375,764. An electronic technician who separates in 
the third year of his ROSO represents a loss of $63,395. 
5. 7 Capital Cost of Premature Separation 
The costs of individual Army training courses were obtained from the 
Directorate of Costs- Army database and then allocated against skill groups and their 
training progression. All training courses required before a member was considered 
suitable for initial employment were included and this training cost was then 
depreciated over the ROSO period applicable to the specific skill group. For example, 
to be an effective infantryman a soldier must have completed recruit training and initial 
employment training before being considered fully trained (usually 6-8 months). An 
airframe fitter however, would have needed to have completed his full three year 
apprenticeship to be fully trained. 
A premature separation was defined as separation from Army prior to the 
completion of a ROSO period. If a member failed to complete the ROSO period, a 
book loss of the remaining undepreciated value was deemed to have been incurred. 
This varied for different occupations and skill groups, e.g. six years for Direct Entry 
Officer (DEO) pilots and Tradesmen and four years for RMC graduates and general 
enlistment soldiers. Officers do not have trades, but soldiers are allocated an 
Employment Code Number (ECN), which reflects specific trade skills. 
Table 5.4 summarises the estimated cost of premature separations for officers 
for the three financial years 1992/93 to 1994/95. Between $11-13 million was lost 
annually as a result of premature separation of officers. The two occupational groups 
with the highest losses were pilots and officer cadets. 
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For soldiers, Table 5.5 shows similar calculations performed by skill group or 
Employment Code Number (ECN), for all separations defined as premature for the 
period 1992/93 to 1994/95. The greatest losses were sustained in trainees; with recruits, 
initial training and apprentices having the greatest cost impact. 
Corps 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 
No No 
RAINF 10 $414,976 5 $281,232 9 $414,976 
RAA 0 $0 2 $449,598 6 $899,196 
RASIGS 2 $165,703 5 $278,555 3 $218,555 
RAAC 3 $473,371 2 $453,371 2 $171,124 
RAAOC 2 $95,550 $75,550 7 $624,400 
RACT 2 $303,038 0 $0 3 $115,760 
RAE 2 $330,443 $20,000 $20,000 
RAEME 2 $172,506 10 $918,783 0 $0 
AAAVN 8 $3,105,605 27 $5,727,133 23 $4,352,897 
ADFA 22 $3,795,000 22 $3,795,000 50 $500,000 
RMC 5 $513,000 5 $513,000 22 $3,795,000 
Non Corps 41 $820,000 45 $450,000 5 $513,000 
sso 56 $952,000 35 $574,000 31 $511,000 
O/GSO 9 $457,750 3 $246,650 4 $322,200 
TOTAL 164 $11,598,942 163 $13,782,872 166 $12,458,108 
Table 5.4 Cost of premature separation - Officers 1992/93 to 1994/95. ($1996) 
RAINF = Royal Australian Infantry, RAA =Royal Australian Artillery, RASIGS =Royal Australian Signals, 
RAAC =Royal Australian Armoured Corps, RACT =Royal Australian Corps of Transport, 
RAE = Royal Australian Engineers, RAEME = Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, 
AAAvn =Australian Army Aviation, ADFA =Australian Defence Force Academy, 
RMC =Royal Military College, SSO =Special Service Officers, O/GSO =Other General Service Officers 
For trained troops the greatest losses were in riflemen, aircraft fitters and motor 
mechanics. Riflemen costs were the result of large numbers of soldiers being 
discharged, while motor mechanics and airframe fitters had high training costs and only 
required small numbers to be discharged in order to generate a large loss. 
The significant losses associated with recruits and initial employment training 
reflects the burden of injury in this population. During the period 1992-95, the recruit 
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training course was 12 weeks long and initial employment training a further 12 weeks. 
Consequently all of these separations occurred during the first year of Army Service, 
and none of these members completed their ROSO. The total cost of recruit training 
was calculated by the Directorate of Costs to be $18,500 and included acquisition costs 
(advertising, screening, and transportation) as well wages, room and board, while the 
cost of initial employment training was $18,000. Facilities and training staff costs were 
fixed and apportioned pro-rata against the throughput of trainees. Even though the 
recruits and initial trainees left at different stages of training, all premature losses were 
assigned the total training cost, as the majority of costs were already incurred as a result 
of their fixed nature. While there will have been variations in wage and food costs, it 
was not possible to account for these variations. Therefore the total training cost 
estimates are likely to be a small overestimate of the true losses. 
Code 
1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 
Employment Number No No No 
Cost Cost Cost (ECN) 
Rifleman 343 121 $4,121,344 I 12 $3,010,513 57 $1,481,108 
Clerk 74 22 $565,493 23 $393,385 10 $122,293 
Driver 109 43 $1,027,125 39 $717,750 21 $420,751 
Tank Gunner 88 25 $1,002,555 16 $524,060 3 $68,785 
Field Engineer 140 20 $579,382 21 $682,846 5 $124,153 
Gun Number 162 21 $783,291 13 $424,281 6 $277,417 
Tank Commander 90 6 $419,686 6 $464,754 6 $419,686 
Aircraft fitter 143 5 $717,935 7 $1,073,31 I 5 $1,283,581 
Airframe fitter 146 6 $738,372 6 $725,484 2 $241,016 
Motor Mechanic 229 II $848,331 20 $1,692,799 17 $848,331 
Electronic Tech 405 2 $167,130 2 $1I1,420 II $1,169,910 
Electronic Tech 415 2 $380,367 5 $316,367 3 $443,762 
Apprentice App 34 $2,700,000 46 $3,840,000 26 $1,855,000 
Recruit Rec 52 $962,000 I 18 $2,183,000 388 $7,178,000 
Initial Training IET 30 $1,095,000 22 $803,000 35 $1,277,500 
Other Other 210 $5,175,499 197 $3,810,925 77 $1,262,254 
Total 610 $21,283 ,510 653 $20,773,895 670 $18,473,547 
Table 5.5 The calculated cost of premature separation - Soldiers, 1992/93 to 1994/95. 
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The NPV losses in skilled tradesmen were rounded up to the nearest whole year, 
again resulting in an overestimation of the losses due to wages and food, but taking into 
account the apportionment of facilities and staff costs across the student population. 
Table 5.6 shows that the estimated loss of capital investment as a result of 
premature separation was approximately $30.9 million per annum (in $1996). 
Year 
1992/93 
1993/94 
1994/95 
Total no of premature separations 
774 
816 
836 
Total Estimated Cost 
$32,882,452 
$34,556,767 
$30,931,655 
Table 5.6 The total estimated loss on capital investment due to premature separation 
from the Army (Officers and Soldiers), 1992/93 to 1994/95. 
5.8 Capital Cost of medical separation due to injury 
To calculate the cost attributable to injury, data on the medical classification of 
those who separated prematurely were obtained and analysed using the same 
methodology. This data was only available for the soldier groups. 
The Army medically classified its soldiers using the PULHEEMS system in 
1996. PULHEEMS is an acronym for a number of physical attributes; Physical , Upper 
limb, Lower limb, Hearing, Eye left, Eye right, Mental capacity, and Stability. These 
physical qualities are graded with numbers; 2 being normal, 3 representing moderate 
impairment, 7 representing severe impairment and 8 representing total impairment for 
work. People whose PULHEEMS profiles were all twos were classified as Fit 
Everywhere (FE), those with a physical quality of 3 or less were graded either 
Communications Zone Everywhere (CZE), Base Everywhere (BE), Horne Only (HO), 
Below Medical Standards (BMS) or Medically Unfit (MU). 
This group of classifications can be simplified into 3 groups, those without 
physical restriction, those with a physical restriction and those not medically fit for 
continued employment. Soldiers who were made MU were medically discharged from 
162 
the Army and were entitled to an invalid pension. Soldiers who were made BMS were 
theoretically suitable for retraining, but in practice were discharged medically as no 
other Corps group would accept soldiers who had restrictions. These soldiers had no 
entitlement to an invalidity pension, but were entitled to a lump sum compensation 
payment based on the independently assessed level of impairment. 
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Figure 5.3. The 3-year average percentage of soldiers who were discharged as either 
BMS or MU, 1992/93 to 1994/95. 
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Figure 5.4. The number ofBMS and MU soldier discharges, 1992/93 to 1994/95. 
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Figure 5.3 shows that 45.2% of those who left in the first year of service did so 
as either Medically Unfit (MU) or Below Medical Standards (BMS), reflecting the 
morbidity associated with recruit and initial entry training. For those who separated 
after one to six years of service, MU and BMS discharges comprised between 11.4% 
and 21. 7% of separations. 
For the remainder, their medical grading allowed them continued employment, 
but decreased their career prospects, as promotion courses and advanced training were 
restricted to FE personnel. So while they were not medically forced from the Service, 
many elected to leave in order to restart a new career. It could be argued that these 
separations were as a consequence of injury or illness. 
To estimate the cost of injury in soldiers there are two possible methods. The 
first involves taking the percentage of total capital loss as a consequence of premature 
separation and then applying the percentage loss attributable to medical discharge 
(MU/BMS) due to injury. The second method employs the residual value of the training 
investment at the time of medical discharge. Because data on officer medical 
separations was not available, a residual loss analysis on this group could not be done. 
1992/93 
<I year 
1-3 Years 
Total 
1993/94 
<I Year 
1-3 Years 
Total 
1994/95 
<I Year 
1-3 Years 
Total 
Total Loss 
$2,057,000 
$19,226,510 
$21,283,510 
$2,986,000 
$17,787,895 
$20,773,895 
$8,455,500 
$10,018,047 
$18,473,547 
MU/BMS 
22.40% 
18.70% 
35.30% 
19.00% 
53.60% 
29.30% 
Loss MU/BMS 
$460,768 
$3,595,357 
$4,056,125 
$1,054,058 
$3,379,700 
$4,443,758 
$4,532,148 
$2,935,288 
$7,467,436 
Injury Cost (80%) 
$368,614 
$2,876,285 
$3,244,900 
$843,246 
$2,703,760 
$3,555,006 
$3,625,718 
$2,348,230 
$5,973,948 
Table 5.7 Estimated capital loss from medical separation due to injury, Soldiers. 
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Musculoskeletal and injury causes accounted for 80% of all medical discharges 
during this period, so injury was assumed to account for 80% of medical losses. Table 
5.7 shows the estimated capital losses attributable to premature medical separation due 
to injury. 
The residual method calculates the remaining residual value of the training 
investment that was not depreciated to zero at the end of the ROSO period. This value 
was calculated for individuals based on the percentage value remaining from the initial 
training investment. The residual value was rounded up to the nearest year, i.e. if a 
soldier was discharged in his second year of a 4 year ROSO, he would have been 
deemed to have lost 2 years of service and Army would have sustained a 50% residual 
training capital investment loss. Table 5.8 summarises the estimated capital loss due to 
medical causes derived from residual values. 
Code No 1992/93 No 1993/94 No 1994/95 
Employment No Residual Residual Residual 
Rifleman 343 40 $1,239,623 34 $821,049 23 $515,168 
Clerk 74 5 $147,520 6 $110,640 3 $36,879 
Driver 109 9 $222,375 11 $198,000 6 $123,750 
Tank Gunner 88 $45,571 4 $113,926 0 $0 
Field Engineer 140 4 $82,768 4 $124,154 $20,962 
Gun Number 162 7 $261,097 3 $114,230 2 $114,231 
Tank Commander 90 0 $0 0 $0 $140,835 
Aircraft fitter 143 2 $319,082 $241,729 $241,729 
Airframe fitter 146 $160,678 2 $404,129 0 $0 
Motor Mechanic 229 5 $347,045 6 $539,847 4 $308,484 
Electronic Tech 405 0 $0 0 $0 2 $278,550 
Electronic Tech 415 $126,789 0 $0 0 $0 
Apprentice App 4 $346,000 9 $730,500 9 $579,500 
Recruit Rec 18 $333,000 49 $906,500 212 $3,922,000 
Initial Training IET 8 $292,000 5 $182,500 16 $584,000 
Other Other 43 $1,020,345 50 $995,758 28 $482,625 
Total 148 $4,943,893 184 $5,482,962 308 $7,348,443 
Table 5.8 The cost of medically related discharge from Army, as estimated from 
residual training investment at time of discharge. 
1992/93 
1993/94 
1994/95 
% Method 
$3,244,900 
$3,555,006 
$5,973,949 
Residual Method 
$3,955,114 
$4,386,370 
$5,878,754 
Variation 
(+21.9%) 
(+23.4%) 
(-1.6%) 
Table 5.9 The variation in estimated loss due to injury, between the direct residual 
value estimation method and the percentage estimation method. 
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Table 5.9 compares the values obtained using the two methods and the variation 
in outcomes. For the years 1992/93 and 1993/94 the residual value method produced 
consistently higher losses. In 1994/95 there was a substantial jump in recruit discharges, 
and these had a very low residual training value as most had only received the 
minimum amount of training prior to discharge. This large number of low value 
trainees obscured the effect oflosses from soldiers engaging in longer and more 
expensive training courses. 
To calculate the cost of premature separation due to injury in the officer group it 
wais necessary to make some assumptions based on the soldier group. Due to the lack 
of medical discharge data on the officer group, the medical discharge rates observed in 
the soldier group were applied. But because of the large rise in medical discharges in 
1994/95, a three year average discharge rate was applied. It was also assumed that 80% 
of medical discharges were attributable to injury. 
Total premature Rate of medical Estimated Cost Injury Cost 
separation loss discharge - Soldiers 
1992/93 $11,598,942 20.6% $2,389,382 $1,911,506 
1993/94 $13,782,872 27.2% $3,748,941 $2,999,153 
1994/95 $12,458,108 41.4% $5,157,657 $4,126,125 
3 Year Average 
1994/95 $12,458,108 29.7% $3,700,058 $2,960,046 
Table 5.10 Estimated capital losses from to premature separation due to injury in 
Officers. 
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Table 5.10 shows that the estimated loss in officers was $4.12M if a medical 
discharge rate of 41.4% was applied. As this is significantly higher than previous years, 
a 3-year average rate of29.7% was also applied yielding a loss of $2.97M. But as 
pension and compensation data for this period indicates a significant increase in 
medical pension liabilities, the 41 % medical discharge figure may yet again be a 
reflection of changed personnel management policy which occurred at that time. 
5.9 Conclusion 
All hierarchical organizations require an ongoing staff turnover, but if there is 
high turnover in the early stages of employment, the employer is unlikely to recoup a 
sufficient return on the funds invested in education and training. The Army had high 
medical separation rates in junior staff. Between 1986 and 1996, 11,998 soldiers were 
discharged with a medical disability as reflected in their final Physical Employment 
Standard profile. Of these 4606 (38.4%) had less than 4 years of service, reflecting 
premature and the high morbidity associated with military service for young members. 
This thesis argues that investment in the training of soldiers represents a capital 
investment no different to that of a new piece of equipment. The use of a capital 
depreciation approach to personnel is unusual, but as training of staff is fully funded by 
the Army, the training investment should be considered an organisational asset, as 
opposed to an individual training investment as in the human capital model. 
These training investments are substantial and time critical. If there are staff 
losses in specialised areas such as tank drivers, there is no ready supply in the market 
able to fill the gap. The challenge for defence planners is to ensure that the flow of 
skilled labour is sufficient to allow for the efficient and effective operation of the 
capital intensive equipment used by Defence. In these terms, capability could be 
described as the right equipment operated by the right people with the right training. 
Injury interrupts the supply of skilled manpower necessary for Army to staff its 
organisation and achieve its mission. Where premature separation as a consequence of 
injury occurs, Army fails to achieve a reasonable return on the capital invested and 
reducing the incidence of injury provides an opportunity to improve the supply of 
skilled labour and reduce training costs. 
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As Wythes (Wythes 1991) argued, skilled labour should not be considered as an 
overhead cost that affects the profit on capital, but as an investment in capital that 
produces profits. The Army does not make profits but it does provide capability options 
to government. Investing in the training of its soldiers allows Army to produce 
capability; which effectively is the profit that Army should produce from the capital it 
has invested. 
The estimated annual cost of premature separations for Officers for the three 
financial years 1992/93 to 1994/95 ranged between $11-13 million, with pilots and 
officer cadets incurring the greatest losses. For soldiers, the losses ranged from $2 l .3M 
to $ l 8.5M with the greatest losses sustained in recruits, initial trainees and apprentices. 
The total cost of premature separations ranged from $32.9M in 1992/93 to $30.9M in 
1994/95. 
The proportion of those who left the Army for medical reasons varied, with 
45 .2% of those who left in the first year of service doing so as either Medically Unfit 
(MU) or Below Medical Standards (BMS), reflecting the morbidity associated with 
recruit and initial entry training. For those who separated between one and six years of 
service, MU and BMS discharges comprised between 11.4% and 21.7% of separations. 
Two methods were used to estimate the cost of premature separation due to 
injury. As musculoskeletal and injury causes accounted for 80% of all medical 
(MU/BMS) discharges, the first method applied this percentage to the total losses due 
to premature medical separation. The second method used the residual value of the 
training investment at the time of medical discharge. 
The residual value method provided a 20% increase in estimated loss compared 
to the proportional method, with the exception of 1994/95. The difference in 1994/94 
was the result of a substantial jump in recruit medical discharges (212) compared to 
earlier years (18 and 49 respectively). This large number ofrecruits had not received 
much in the way of training prior to discharge and consequently had a very low residual 
value, obscuring the effect of training losses from more highly trained soldiers. 
Officers 
Soldiers 
Total 
Table 5.11 
1994/95. 
Total 
premature loss 
$12,458,108 
$18,473,547 
$30,931,655 
Estimated medical 
discharge rate 
41.4% 
Medical discharge 
loss 
$5,157,657 
$7,467,436 
$12,625,093 
Injury loss 
$4,126,125 
$5,973,948 
$I 0, I 00,073 
Estimated total capital loss from premature separation due to injury 
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Table 5.11 estimates the total capital loss attributable to premature 
separation due to injury. The total capital loss was estimated to be $10.lM. As there 
was no data available for the 1995/96 period, data from 1994/95 has been used to 
estimate the 1996 cost. Because of the rounding up of years of service and the 
impossibility of accurately apportioning salary and food costs, the estimated losses in 
trainees will likely be a slight overestimate. 
The loss of trained staff has significant impacts on the ability of Army to staff 
its organisations and man its equipment. Army provides and fully funds the training of 
its workers necessary to achieve its capability outputs; a rarity in an employment 
environment where most skilled workers can be "purchased" in the marketplace. 
Training costs have not previously been treated as an investment and therefore 
quantified and depreciated as such. The capital investment model provides Army with a 
methodology to accurate account for its training investment and provides a financial 
incentive to reduce premature separation for all reasons, including injury. 
169 
Chapter 6. The cost of surgical procedures used for the treatment of 
low back disorders in soldiers. 
6.1 Introduction. 
The previous chapters have examined large databases to estimate the scale of 
the costs involved with injury, an approach which has been termed a top down 
approach to determining costs (Ekman 2005). However, the paucity of data and its poor 
quality prevents a more detailed examination of the injury problem. One area where 
comprehensive Army data was available was in an earlier study conducted by the 
author into the area of spinal surgery. 
Spinal surgery is usually the consequence of chronic low back pain attributable 
to injury. The preceding chapters have shown that back pain is the single leading cause 
of disability in the Army, being responsible for 40% of ADF invalid discharges, making 
back injuries the single most important subgroup of injury in Army. A systematic 
review of the cost of back pain found that only a small proportion of back pain sufferers 
were responsible for the majority of back pain costs (Dagenais 2008).This small 
proportion almost certainly includes those who undergo spinal surgery, so the 
characteristics of this group are important to analyse in order to fully understand the 
quantum of costs and outcomes of back injury. 
This chapter will examine the costs attributable to spinal surgery in a small 
Army cohort. The perspective taken is that of society as both direct medical costs and 
indirect costs are reviewed, but invalidity pension costs are not assessed. The 
perspective of government, in terms of health managers, will also be adopted, as all 
health costs were paid for by government with no private insurance input. A "bottom 
up" approach will be taken in this chapter (Ekman 2005), where detailed individual 
patient data is obtained, allowing for the analysis and comparison of subgroups 
(Soegaard 2007b ). 
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6.2 Disability due to Low Back Pain (LBP) 
Lumbar pain has reached epidemic proportions in western industrialized 
countries. The reported lifetime incidence of low back pain in the literature varies from 
48%-69% (Frymoyer 1983) (Beiring-Sorensen 1982), point prevalence rates being 
variously reported between 12.0% (Beiring-Sorensen 1982) and 30.2% (Valkenburg 
1982). In a recent systematic review of 27 studies examining the cost of back pain, 
Dagenais found the prevalence of back pain to range from 5-65%, with a mean of 
18. 7% and a standard deviation of 4.6% (Dagenais 2008). 
The natural history of low back has been reported to be relatively benign with 
only 10% of acute episodes failing to resolve by 2 months (Brooks 1998), although a 
British study (Croft 1998) found that 75% of patients in a general practice setting still 
experienced back pain 12 months after an acute episode. The authors in this study 
found that while patients ceased seeking medical care at 3 months, most still had 
substantial back pain and disability. 
In the United Kingdom (UK), 1 in 25 workers changed job annually because of 
a back condition (Harris 1971) and, on any given day, 0.05% of the workforce was 
disabled for more than 6 months by a back problem. Wood estimated that one-third of 
all musculoskeletal complaints in the UK in 1978 were back related (Wood 1987). In 
the United States, Low Back Pain (LBP) was the most frequent cause of activity 
limitation in those aged 64 or less (Andersson 1990). 
Long, in a study of chronic low back pain sufferers, found that persistent low 
back pain was most common in people aged in their mid-to-late thirties and early-to-
mid forties (Long 1996). These patients were mostly white, affluent and generally well 
educated. The average patient suffered from intermittent pain for 10 years, with the 
pain usually well localised, but varying greatly in severity. These patients reported 
significant functional impairment at work, home and play and most had consulted 
multiple health care providers and received a variety of treatments and medications, 
with none being effective. Muscle spasm, tenderness and trigger points were common, 
but neurological signs were rare despite one in three patients having a diagnosis of disc 
prolapse. Myofascial syndrome and spinal instability were the next most common 
diagnoses. Only 20% were prescribed surgery, with 60% being offered additional 
conservative therapy and 20% given no further treatment. 
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The 1989/90 Australian National Health Survey (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
1991) found that back pain was reported in 9% of the population, but more commonly 
in the middle aged (15% of people aged 45-49). The same survey in 1995 (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 1995) found that only 2.4 % of the total population reported a 
current back injury or related condition. The highest reported rates of current back 
injury were in the 35-44 yr group ( 4.2%) and the 45-54 yr group ( 4.8% ), with over 
440,000 Australians reporting a current injury-related back problem in 1995. 
However, ten years later and the situation had changed significantly, with the 
2004/05 National Health Survey finding that over three million Australians or 15.l % of 
the Australian population, reported suffering from back pain, with a prevalence in the 
15-24 year age group of9% (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006a). These figures 
indicate a significant worsening of the morbidity burden of back pain in the years since 
this thesis was commenced in 1996. 
The incidence ofreported compensable back injury in NSW was 5.8/1000 
workers in 1992 and 6.111000 workers in 1996. In 1984-85, one in four compensated 
injuries was for back injury [Qld 23%, NSW 24% and SA 28%] (National Occupational 
Health and Safety Commission 1989). 
The disability associated with low back pain has progressively increased in the 
United States, with disabling episodes rising by 26% between 1974 and 1978, while the 
total population increased by only 7% in the same period (Andersson 1990). Andersson 
also noted that there were significant problems with the validity and reliability of low 
back pain data (Andersson 1991). Most data in national statistics relied on reported 
cases and these were unlikely to be an accurate reflection of the true incidence. 
Classification systems also varied greatly, so data retrieval was difficult and correct 
diagnoses were unlikely to be recorded, with a tendency to over report severe LBP in 
comparison to milder forms. 
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6.3 Cost of Low Back Pain (LBP) 
The determination of work-related LBP costs is difficult. In the United States, 
there are many sources of payment for direct costs; worker's compensation, group and 
private health insurance, and social security benefits. Direct costs typically include 
medical care, rehabilitation expenses and death benefits. Indirect costs are associated 
with production losses, training and legal expenses. 
In the US, back injuries accounted for an average of 21 % of all compensable 
work injures (Antonakes 1981), but comprised an average of 33% of compensation and 
medical costs for occupational injuries. Spengler found that back injuries comprised 
41 % of total workers compensation costs in a sample of Boeing workers (Spengler 
1986). The US National Safety Council estimated the cost of back pain to the US 
economy to be $31.4 Billion in 1981 (National Safety Council 1981 ). Australian health 
system costs attributable to back problems in 1993/94 were estimated to be $700 
million (Mathers 1999). 
Holbrook estimated the annual total cost of back pain to be US$16 Billion 
[1984 dollars] (Holbrook 1984). In Holbrook's study, direct costs were dominant, 
accounting for 81.4 % of total costs, while the indirect costs due to lost earnings 
accounted for only 18.6%. This was a reflection of the extremely expensive US health 
care system, where inpatient services accounted for 34.9% of total costs. 
Total estimated costs of low back pain to society have been reported as being up 
to 1. 7% of the gross national product (GNP) in the Netherlands (Norlund 2000, van 
Tulder 1995) and 0.5% to 2% of GNP for the United States (Cats-Baril 1991 ). As much 
as 75% of the costs could be attributed to patients who were still on sick leave after 6 
months (Andersson 1999). 
Snook (Snook 1987) estimated that in 1986, the mean cost per compensable 
case of back pain was about US$6,000 with a median value of $750. The large 
discrepancy between the mean and the median values reflected the fact that back pain 
costs were not normally distributed, with a few high cost cases accounting for the 
majority of costs. Abenhaim found that 10% of cases were responsible for 75% of 
direct costs (Abenhaim 1987). Hashemi (Hashemi 1998) in an insurance cohort study 
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reported that 5% of claims accounted for 65% of costs, while Kim in a Korean study 
found that 6% of claims accounted for 29% of total costs (Kim 2005). Watson, in a 
workers compensation cohort from Jersey found that 35% of back pain cases returned 
to work after 1 day and the 3% of those disabled for more than 6 months accounted for 
33% of benefit costs (Watson 1998). 
Leavitt (Leavitt 1971) on the other hand found that in Californian cases, medical 
costs only accounted for 33% of costs with compensation for lost wages accounting for 
the remaining two thirds. Snook (Snook 1987) found the average cost per case of 
compensable back pain was US$5,739 in 1987, with a median cost per case ofUS$350. 
The study found significant variation in costs per state, with the average and median 
cost per case over 2.5 times more costly in Massachusetts than Wisconsin. In Snook's 
study, 10% of case accounted for 78% of costs. 
Luo found the incremental (additional) medical care costs attributable to back 
pain, compared to a control group without back pain, totalled US$26 billion and 
included higher costs for office-based visits (US$ l 1.1 billion), outpatient services 
(US$4.7 billion), inpatient care (US$4.5 billion), prescription drugs (US$3.9 billion), 
and ED visits (US$1.1 billion). Patients in the highest 10% of costs accounted for 99% 
of inpatient care costs, 90% of ED visits, 87% of outpatient services, 53% of 
prescription drugs, and 52% of office-based visits (Luo 2004). 
Antonakes (Antonakes 1981) showed that as the duration of back pain 
increased, costs rose at an accelerated rate due to increasing levels of permanent or 
partial disability. Leavitt (Leavitt 1971) reported that medical costs accounted for one 
third of total costs while disability payments accounted for the remaining two thirds of 
costs (permanent disability 66% and partial disability 33%). Costs increased 
dramatically with surgery, which was usually associated with payment for permanent 
partial disability. Laminectomies were found to result in 10-25% permanent total 
disability. These high cost cases were characterised by greater degrees of 
hospitalisation, surgery, litigation and psychological impairment (Abenhaim 1987). 
In the UK during 1978, nearly 1 % (375,000) of the population experienced an 
episode of back pain, which required certified incapacitation. It was estimated that this 
incapacity cost the UK community £220M pounds in lost productivity. The social 
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security system also paid out £40M in sickness and invalidity pensions, and NHS 
medical costs were estimated to be at least £60M (Working Group on Back Pain 1979). 
In the UK, the economic burden of back pain to the National Health Service was 
calculated to be £1632 million in 1998 (Maniadakis 2000). 
In NS W, between the years 1991 /92 to 1997 /98 the incidence of occupational 
back injuries remained stable at between 5.5 and 6.0/1000 workers, but the cost of these 
injuries almost doubled in the same 7 year period (Workcover 1999). The gross 
incurred cost of back injuries in NSW during the period 1995/96 was approximately 
$212.5 million, which accounted for 36% of the total workplace injury cost (Workcover 
Authority 1997). The gross incurred cost is the sum of payments plus an estimate of 
future liability if the claim was still open at the end of 1995/96. The estimated average 
cost was $16,195, but half of all claims cost $2,091 or less. Weekly payments (31 %) 
were the largest cost component, followed by medical payments (16%) and legal costs 
(13%). Cases undergoing surgery were not identified in the Workcover report. 
With increasing disability comes increased cost. In the NSW Workcover cohort, 
at six months post injury, 27% had not returned to work, with permanent disability 
reported in 16%, accounting for 50% of the value of gross incurred temporary disability 
costs (Workcover Authority 1997). Private Workers Compensation data (Poynter 1996) 
showed that for the years 1992-1995, low back injuries accounted for 19% of claims , 
30.2% of total claims cost and 33.8% of total weeks lost work. 
Tables 6.1 to 6.3 summarise the NSW workers compensation experience. Table 
6.1 shows that total payments for back-related injury in NSW rose by 47% in the 4 
years between 1991/92 and 1994/95. Table 6.2 compares the mean and median costs of 
back disease and back injuries. It shows that while there were fewer disease conditions 
they were on average much more costly, with a higher median value. The difference in 
cost is explained by the high permanent disability rate of 42.6% in the disease group 
compared to 16.1 % in the acute injury group, with the relative risk of permanent 
disability in the disease group being 2.6. 
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Non-compensation Compensation Total 
Payments $'000 Payments $'000 Payments $'000 
1991/92 $106,287 $259,971 $366,258 
1992/93 $130,167 $302,392 $432,559 
1993/94 $141,287 $332,556 $473,843 
1994/95 $144,615 $393,967 $538,582 
Table 6.1 Workcover NSW payments for workplace back injuries 1991/92 to 1995/96. 
Type 
Injury 
Disease 
Number 
13,121 
312 
Mean Cost$ Median Cost$ Total 
$16,195 $2,091 $212.5M 
$36,687 $13,284 $ l I .45M 
Table 6.2 The comparison between occupational injury and disease as recorded by the 
Worksafe NSW database, FY 1995/96. 
Most conditions in the disease category were disorders of the intervertebral disc. 
The distinction between disease and injury of the lumbar spine should be considered a 
misclassification. Workcover defined injury as the result of a single precipitating acute 
event, meaning that repetitive or overuse injuries were classed as diseases. For 
practitioners of musculoskeletal medicine the distinction between chronic overuse 
injury (repetitive strain) and industrial "disease" of the low back is a moot point. 
Disability Permanent Incidence of Relative 
Disability (PD) PD Risk 
Injury 13,121 2,114 16.1% 1.00 
Disease 312 133 42.6% 2.64 
Table 6.3 The number and incidence of permanent disability in those workers 
sustaining reportable workplace back injury and disease. 
Dagenais, in a review of published studies examining the cost of low back pain 
found 8 studies that provided estimates of both direct and indirect costs (Dagenais 
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2008). Mean direct costs accounted for only 22% of total costs, indicating that indirect 
costs were a much larger contributor to the cost of low back pain. Hutubessy 
(Hutubessy 1999) estimated productivity losses due to low back pain in the Netherlands 
at $4.6 billion based on daily absences and disability costs for the actual duration of 
work absences. Maniadakis (Maniadakis 2000) estimated work productivity losses in 
the UK of £9 .1 billion based on 116 million lost work days, while Walker (Walker 
2004) estimated work productivity losses in Australia at AUD$8.1 billion based on 
62,441,052 lost work days. 
6.4 Spinal Surgery 
Spinal surgery is a relatively common event with more than 200,000 patients 
undergoing a lumbar procedure in the United States every year (Wilkinson 1983). In 
Australia, there were 2518 discectomy or fusion procedures (Item numbers 40301, 
40321, 48636, 48648- 75) to the lumbar spine for which Medicare benefits were paid in 
1997, and in 2008 this figure had risen to 10,742, a 400% increase (Medicare Australia 
2009). 
Rates of spinal surgery are known to vary significantly from nation to nation. 
In Sweden, during 2000, approximately 3 to 4 per 100,000 adults had a lumbar fusion 
because of low back pain of unknown origin (Stromqvist 2001 ). Rates of lumbar 
fusion in US Medicare recipients were 30/100,000 in 1992, doubled to 60/100,000 in 
1998 and reached 110/100,000 in 2003 (Weinstein 2006c). These figures however, are 
not representative of the situation in the younger working population. Weinstein found 
an 8-fold variation in regional rates oflumbar discectomy and larninectomy, and a 
nearly a 20-fold range in lumbar fusion rates in 2002 and 2003(Weinstein 2006c). He 
noted "This represents the largest coefficient of variation seen with any surgical 
procedure". 
US Medicare expenditure for inpatient back surgery more than doubled over the 
decade from 1992 to 2003, with costs for lumbar fusion rising by more than 500%, 
from US$75 million to US$482 million. In 1992, lumbar fusion represented 14% of 
total spending for back surgery, but by 2003 lumbar fusion accounted for 47% of 
spending. For lumbar discectomy and laminectomy expenditure was estimated to be 
US$306 million in 2003 (Weinstein 2006c). 
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The most recent Medicare Australia data reported 6, 186 lumbar spine fusions in 
calendar year 2008 (item numbers 40321, 48648-75), representing an annual rate of 
29/100,000 (Medicare Australia 2009). These figures publically funded procedures 
only, with privately funded compensation procedures likely to be much higher. Given 
that most work-related spinal injuries workers compensation cases, usually in private 
hospitals, the true rate is likely to be between 1.5 to 2 times greater ( 33 58/100,000). 
The rate for the "at risk" population of working adults is likely to be higher again. 
Total Number of Percentage Medicare Percentage 
procedures Jan Incidence Rebate Medicare 
1997-Dec 2008 $Millions Rebate 
Lumbar Fusion all types 39,011 55.2% $19.810 56.25% 
MBS item no 40321, 48648-75 
Lumbar Discectomy 29,508 41.7% $15.298 43.45% 
MBS item no 40301, 48636 
Manipulation under anaesthesia 2,010 2.8% $0.101 0.29% 
MBS Item no 48600 
Manipulation under anaesthesia with 197 0.3% $0.002 0.01% 
addition of epidural medication 
MBS item no 48603 
Total Procedures 70,726 $35.211 
Table 6.4 Number of lumbar spine surgical procedures and Medicare Australia rebate 
costs for the period Jan 1997 - Dec 2008. 
Table 6.4 shows that over the last 11 years there 70,726 surgical procedures on 
the lumbar spine funded by Medicare. Lumbar fusions comprised 55% of procedures 
and 56% of costs, while lumbar discectomies comprised 42% of procedures and 43% of 
costs. Manipulation under anaesthesia comprised 3% of total procedures. 
Figure 6.1 shows that the Medicare rates of lumbar discectomy and fusion have 
steadily increased over the last decade, with the rate of fusion increasing faster than 
discectomy. These increases parallel those observed in the United States, but are not of 
the same absolute magnitude. Despite being a relatively common procedure, there is 
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considerable debate about the efficacy and the efficiency of lumbar fusion for chronic 
low back pain (Gibson 1999). 
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Figure 6.1 Medicare rates of lumbar discectomy, fusion and manipulation under 
anaesthesia, Australia 2000-2008. (Medicare Australia 2009) 
6.5 Cost of spinal surgery in a cohort of soldiers - Methods 
The data presented in the next two chapters is from a retrospective observational 
study utilizing data obtained from patient health records, and a patient questionnaire. A 
bottom up approach was adopted, as described by Ekman, where more detailed cost and 
outcome data is obtained from individual surveys and records (Ekman 2005). 
The operating theatre record book for the calendar years 1987-89 at the 1st 
Field Hospital, Inglebum, Sydney were reviewed. All patients who had undergone a 
spinal surgical procedure were included in the study. A spinal surgical procedure was 
defined as any procedure on the lumbar spine performed by a surgeon in the operating 
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theatre. 
Data was initially collected in 1991 and analysis commenced in 1996. Sixty-one 
patients were identified from this review of the operating theatre records. The medical 
records for each of these 61 individuals was obtained from Central Army Health 
Records and reviewed. Approval to review the patient records was given by the 
Director General of Army Health Services. This study pre-dated the establishment of 
the Australian Defence Force Ethics Committee. 
The surgical procedures were performed by visiting Orthopaedic surgeons at 1st 
Field Hospital of whom the numbers varied between four and five. No attempt was 
made to record data on the surgeon involved in any of the cases. The aim was to collect 
a sample that was representative and generalisable to community orthopaedic practice. 
The following data was obtained from the medical records: 
(a) Age of patient at time of first surgery, 
(b) Time in service at time of first surgery, 
( c) Time from initial presentation to first surgery, 
( d) Time from first surgery to discharge, 
( e) Diagnosis, 
(f) Number and type of investigations performed, 
(g) Number and type of Procedure/s performed, 
(h) Number of hospital bed days, 
(i) Number of days sick leave and 
G) Number of days restricted duty 
Cost calculations were based on 100% of the 1989 Medicare schedule fee for 
the procedures identified in the medical record. Investigation charges were also 
calculated at 100% of the Medicare schedule fee for that investigation. Anaesthetic 
fees were calculated using a cost of $11 per anaesthetic unit and applied to the number 
of units listed alongside each procedure in the Medicare schedule. 
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Hospital bed day costs were calculated using an all inclusive cost of $276 per 
day, this being the figure used by the Commonwealth at that time for the purposes of 
cost recovery in civil litigation. Indirect costs were calculated using the 1989 daily 
salary of a private soldier of $60 per day. For a day in hospital or on sick leave a cost of 
$60 was allocated. For a day ofrestricted (light) duties, a 50% loss of productivity was 
assumed, giving a figure of $30 per day. This was an under-estimate as many of the 
patients were of more senior rank and their daily salaries were significantly higher. 
Where members were permanently medically restricted, a maximum of 365 days of 
restricted duty was calculated. 
Where individuals had multiple procedures and investigations these were 
combined and a cost per patient rather than cost per episode of care was obtained. All 
direct and indirect costs were pooled for all the procedures and absences of the patient. 
This analysis did not attempt to estimate the net present value of wages lost due to 
permanent incapacity or any transfer payments such as compensation or invalid pension 
payments, nor did it cover ongoing medical costs. 
Additionally in March of 1991 a questionnaire was sent to the last known 
address of the 61 patients. This questionnaire requested participation in a follow-up 
study and asked questions about current levels of pain, disability, function and patient 
satisfaction. A check of the central Defence personnel database was made in 1996 to 
ascertain the number of subjects still in employment within the military. These results 
will be described in Chapter 7. 
6.6 Cost of spinal surgery in a cohort of soldiers - Results 
Number of Procedures 
(n=106) 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
No of patients 
(n=61) 
31 
20 
6 
3 
1 
Table 6.5 The number of procedures performed on the sample group. 
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Table 6.5 shows that the 61 patients underwent a total of 106 procedures, with 
30 (48%) undergoing two or more procedures. The average age of the patient sample 
was 29. 7 years with a mean time in service of 8 years. 
Table 6.6 details these 106 procedures, which were divided into 36 non-
operative and 70 operative procedures. There were four types of non-operative 
procedures and over 20 different individual operative procedures involving different 
lumbar levels. In an attempt to simplify the great variety of surgical procedures they 
were grouped into four broad categories: non-operative, decompression procedures, 
stabilization procedures, and combined decompression and stabilization procedures. 
Procedure 
Non-Operative 
Epidural Steroid 
Facet injection of Steroid 
MUA +Epidural Steroid 
Manipulation under Anaesthesia (MUA) 
Sub-total 
Operative 
Discectomy I level 
Discectomy 2 levels 
Discectomy +metal fusion (various) 
Laminectomy I level 
Laminectomy 2 levels 
Bony fusion - 1 level 
Bony fusion 2 levels 
Discectomy + Bony fusion 
Hartshill (metal) fusion I level 
Hartshill (metal) fusion 2 levels 
Metal Fusion (various) 
Metal+ bony fusion (various) 
L4-S I Removal Hartshill fusion 
Re-explore Hartshill fusion 
Subtotal 
Total 
Number 
14 
2 
I 1 
9 
36 
31 
2 
6 
5 
5 
5 
2 
2 
3 
3 
6 
2 
1 
I 
70 
106 
Table 6.6 The type and number of surgical procedures performed. 
Table 6.7 details the diagnoses recorded in the medical records. There were 17 
different diagnoses recorded and in one case, no formal specialist diagnosis was 
recorded. There was a lack of common diagnostic terminology and terms such as 
prolapse, protrusion and rupture were used interchangeably. The most common 
diagnosis was single level disc prolapse with 21 cases (34%) with disc degeneration 
being the second most common diagnosis in 11 (18%) cases. 
Diagnosis Recorded 
Chronic LBP 
Annulitis 
Disc degeneration 
Disc prolapse 1 level 
Disc prolapse 2 levels 
Disc protrusion 
Disc rupture 
Disc disease 
Disc prolapse + spondylolysis 
Facet joint strain 
Spondylolisthesis 
L5 spondylolysis 
Spondylolisthesis + disc degeneration 
L5/Sl transitional vertebra 
Neuralgia paresthetica 
Schwannoma 
Spina Bifida S 1 + scoliosis 
No diagnosis recorded 
Total 
Number 
3 
1 
11 
21 
4 
1 
1 
2 
4 
1 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
61 
182 
Table 6.7 The recorded pre-operative diagnoses found in the medical records. 
Type of Cost No Cost ($A1989) 
Direct 
Hospital Bed Days 2,897 $799,572 
Anaesthetics 1204 units $13,244 
Operations 106 $63,951 
Materiel rental/use 18 $11,096 
Investigations 320 $47,048 
Total Direct Costs $934,911 
Mean Cost/patient (n=61) $15,326 
Indirect 
Lost Work Days* 10,288 $617,280 
Restricted Duty days** 17,751 $532,530 
Total Indirect Costs $1,149,810 
Mean Cost/patient (n=61) $18,849 
Total Estimated Cost $2,084,720 
Total Mean Cost/patient $34,175 
Table 6.8 Estimated total direct and indirect costs of all spinal surgical procedures 
in this cohort (A$1989). (*Lost workdays are the sum of hospital bed days and sick leave calculated at 
$60/day) (**Permanently restricted patients were allocated 365 days, calculated at $30/day) 
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Table 6.8 details the estimated total direct and indirect costs for this patient 
cohort. The total direct cost was estimated to be $934,911 with a mean cost of $15,326 
per patient while total indirect costs were estimated to be $1, 149 ,810 with a mean cost 
of $18,849. The total estimated cost was $2,084,720 with a mean cost per patient of 
$34,175 ($A1989). There were 2,897 hospital bed days, or an average of 47.5 days per 
patient. This large number of bed days reflects the routine use of inpatient rehabilitation 
in the post-operative period. The Army had a policy that single soldiers who lived in a 
barracks environment must either convalesce with their next of kin or remain in 
hospital. They were not allowed to rehabilitate or have sick leave in the barrack lines. 
This policy therefore resulted in a very large number of inpatient days compared to 
modem civilian practice, where every effort is made to keep inpatient stay to a 
mm1mum. 
Thirty-one patients ( 51 % ) had a single procedure and thirty underwent two or 
more procedures. Table 6.9 shows the breakdown of direct and indirect costs between 
those who had a single procedure and those who underwent multiple procedures. The 
mean patient cost for multiple procedures was 57% more than those undergoing a 
single procedure. 
Total Cost Mean (SD) Median 
(A$1989) 
Single Procedures 
(n=31) Direct $346,793 $11, 187 ($8660) $8,819 
Indirect $480,450 $15,498 ($7790) $13,740 
Total $827,243 $26,685 ($13,764) $28,908 
Multi12le Procedures 
(n=30) Direct $588,117 $19,604 ($13,543) $17,182 
Indirect $669,360 $22,312 ($9,252) $18,870 
Total $1,257,477 $41,916 ($19,618) $37,077 
Table 6.9 The total, mean (SD) and median costs of spinal surgery in those with 
single and multiple procedures. 
Table 6.10 shows the cost breakdown between the four subgroups of surgical 
procedure in the single procedure group. 
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Type Direct Indirect Cost Total Mean Cost per 
Cost Cost Ratio Cost patient (SD) 
Non-Operative (n=12) $96,307 $168,840 I :l.75 $265,147 $22,095 (14,675) 
Decompression (n=14) $153,463 $220,290 I :l.43 $373,753 $26,696 (13,354) 
Stabilization (n=2) $42,475 $37,470 1 :0.88 $79,945 $39,972 (2,979) 
Stabilization + $54,548 $53,850 1:0.98 $108,398 $36, 133 (7,539) Decompression (n=3) 
Table 6.10 Single procedure total and mean costs (A$1989), by type of procedure. 
The non-operative group had the lowest mean cost, but surprisingly this was not 
greatly different from the group undergoing a decompression procedure. The majority 
of cost in the non-operative group was due to morbidity i.e. sick leave, bed days and 
restricted duty. The ratio of direct costs to indirect costs differed by the type of 
procedure; with the more simple procedures having indirect costs dominant, while the 
more complex procedures had direct costs equalling indirect costs. 
Those who had a stabilization procedure (bony and/or metal fusion) had the 
highest mean cost. Stabilization & decompression procedures were on average 35% 
more costly than decompression procedures, while stabilization procedures were 50% 
more expensive. 
Type Direct Indirect Cost Total Mean Cost (SD) 
Cost Cost Ratio Cost 
Non-Operative (n=3) $10,179 $39,900 1: 3.91 $50,079 $20,483 (11,757) 
Decompression (n=8) $91,621 $163,320 1: 1.78 $254,941 $31,867 (10,075) 
Stabilization (n=4) $88,772 $78,570 1: 0.88 $167,342 $41,835 (17,799) 
Stabilization + $353,110 $376,200 1: 1.06 $729,310 $48,620 (20,095) 
Decompression (n=l5) 
Table 6.11 Multiple procedure costs (A$1989), by type of procedure. 
Table 6.11 shows the mean cost associated with those subjects who underwent 
multiple procedures. Patients who underwent both non-operative and operative 
procedures were grouped under the operative procedure. Those undergoing multiple 
non-operative procedures had significantly lower costs than those who also underwent 
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operative procedures. Decompression procedures were 56% more expensive, while 
stabilization and decompression procedures were 137% more expensive than non-
operative procedures. Both stabilization groups were more costly than the 
decompression group, with stabilization and decompression being 53% more 
expensive, and stabilization being 31 % more expensive. Again in procedures involving 
stabilisation, direct medical costs were greater than or equal to indirect costs. 
6. 7 Cost of investigations 
Table 6.12 details the number of X-ray and Computed Tomography (CT) scans 
performed on the group. There were 189 lumbosacral spine examinations for an 
average of 3.1 series per patient. Twenty-one (34%) patients underwent four or more 
lumbar spine x-ray examinations with one patient having nine lumbar spine series. A 
lumbar series includes an AP, lateral and sacral view. In some cases oblique films were 
also included, particularly in cases of suspected spondylolisthesis or spondylolysis. 
There were 76 CT scans performed on 50 patients with an average of 1.5 CT scans per 
patient. Five patients had 3 or more CT scans. The ready availability of magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) in current times has reduced the role of the CT scan in the 
diagnostic work up of lumbar spine disorders, but has not eliminated it. Because 
general practitioners in Australia are not allowed to order MRI scans under Medicare, 
many are forced to order a CT of the lumbar spine if they wish to investigate a 
diagnosis of disc prolapse, as there is no restriction on the right of general practitioners 
to order CT scans. 
X-Ray Patients CT Scans Patients 
series (n=61) (n=61) 
0 0 0 11 
1 18 1 30 
2 11 2 15 
3 11 3 4 
4 6 4 1 
5 6 
6 4 Total 76 
7 3 
8 1 
9 1 
Total 189 
Table 6.12 The number of lumbar spine series and CT scans performed. 
Table 6.13 
Additional Investigation 
None 
Disco gram 
Myelogram 
Bone scan 
MRI 
Discogram + Myelogram 
MRI + Discogram 
MRI + Bone Scan x2 
Disco gram x2 
MRI + Myelogram x2 
Total 
No of Patients 
24 
15 
7 
1 
5 
2 
2 
I 
1 
1 
59 
Other investigations ordered on the patient group. 
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Table 6.13 shows additional investigations performed on the cohort. In the late 
1980s MRI scanning had just become available through private clinics, which explains 
the small number of MRI investigations. Thirty-seven patients had an additional 40 
investigations, with a discogram being the most common single investigation. In this 
cohort there were 7.6 lumbar spine CT scans performed for every MRI scan. 
Investigation No Cost ($Al989) 
X-Ray 189 $15,120 
CT 76 $17,860 
MRI 10 $3,300 
Other Ix 52 $10,768 
Total 320 $47,048 
Table 6.14 Total number and Cost of investigations ($Al 989). 
Table 6.14 outlines the number and cost of investigations. These costs were 
calculated using 100% of the Medicare schedule fee applicable for the specific 
investigation in 1989. The 27 patients had an additional $47,048 worth of 
investigations, with a mean cost of $1742 per patient. 
6.8. Limitations and comparison with other studies 
This study was a retrospective observational study, and therefore suffers from 
the usual concerns regarding confounding, selection and recall bias. Retrospective 
cohort designs are common in the injury literature, and they commonly produce 
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descriptive data (Caine 1996). This study was limited by its small sample size, but was 
restricted to the feasibility of following up patients from the three year window chosen. 
The use of a cohort comprising all patients undergoing a spinal surgical 
procedure within a three year period provides data that was an accurate reflection of 
clinical orthopaedic practice in the late 1980s in South Western Sydney. It is 
reasonable to argue that these findings were generalisable to community practice at that 
time, as all five orthopaedic surgeons were visiting medical officers and held 
appointments at university teaching hospitals. Surgical practice has changed in the 
intervening period, but there is evidence that demonstrates an increase in operative 
procedures at the expensive of non-operative procedures over the intervening period 
(Weinstein 2006c, Medicare Australia 2009). 
This study provides the first comparison of cost between non-operative 
procedures such as manipulation under anaesthesia and epidural injection of 
corticosteroid with the more common operative procedures of lumbar fusion and 
discectomy. In a systematic review of published studies of epidural steroid injections 
Abdi (Abdi 2007) found only one study comparing epidural steroid injections to 
another surgical procedure ( discectomy ). 
One of the strengths of this study was the quality of the medical data and the 
compliance with post-operative management with regards to sick leave and 
rehabilitation. Soldiers are, in effect, a 'captive' population who receive free medical 
care and once in a treatment regime are highly likely to follow it through. It is unlikely 
that there were any confounding compensation factors, as all soldiers received income 
support as a matter ofroutine and had no medical costs to pay. If medically discharged, 
they were entitled to an invalidity pension. 
A societal perspective requires the calculation of both direct and indirect costs, 
as the costs of production loss from sick leave and disability can greatly exceed 
diagnostic, therapeutic and treatment costs (Maniadakis 2000, Maetzel 2002). Indirect 
productivity losses attributable to the surgical procedure in this study were calculated, 
using the human capital approach, and applying a societal perspective as advocated by 
Soegaard (Soegaard 2006). All work absences from the Army required a medical 
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certificate and these certificates were placed in the medical record and were available 
for review. Thus the productivity losses captured in this study are considered accurate. 
The Spine Patient Outcomes Research Trial [SPORT] (Weinstein 2008) 
calculated productivity losses using lost work days and missed homemaking days. This 
study did not calculate lost homemaking days as all the subjects were employed. Other 
studies calculated drug utilisation and costs, but this study did not because there was no 
prescription database and copies of prescriptions were not placed into the medical 
records. 
The SPORT study used selfreported work days lost from a patient recall diary, 
while this study calculated lost work days directly from medical sick leave certificates 
in the medical records (Tosteson 2008). Fritzell (Fritzell 2001) estimated production 
losses due to sick leave from low back pain using data from the Swedish Social 
Insurance Board. Tosteson used a human capital approach, in which the extent of 
production losses was valued by current earnings and calculated for the entire length of 
impairment. 
This study also provided a detailed breakdown of the number, type and 
distribution of investigations. Only a few recent studies examining the cost of spinal 
surgery (Tosteson 2008, Soegaard 2007a) provided total and mean investigational costs 
but no description of the distribution of investigations between individuals. The 
description of individual utilisation of investigational resources provides useful insights 
into individual variations in surgical management that could be useful to hospital 
managers who must manage tight budgets. Payors would also be interested in the 
clinical rational for repeated investigations in subjects with known pathology. 
In this analysis, the estimated ratio of indirect to direct costs for stabilisation 
procedures was approximately 1: 1. Heinrich (Heinrich 1931) estimated that the ratio of 
indirect to direct costs for most injury conditions was approximately to 7: 1. Seferlis in 
a study of treatments costs for chronic low back pain found a ratio of indirect to direct 
costs of 9: 1 (Seferlis 2000). 
Fritzell (Fritzell 2004) in a cohort of spinal fusion patients reported the ratio of 
mean indirect costs to direct costs as being 3.62: 1, with a ratio in a non-operative 
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group of2.87 :1, consistent with the view that indirect costs are dominant. However, 
the SPORT study (Weinstein 2008) found the opposite, with the ratio of indirect to 
direct costs to being 1: 2.85. This relationship was reversed in the non-operative group 
with the ratio of indirect to direct costs being 1.27: 1. This inversion of the cost ratios is 
most likely a reflection of the high costs of surgical inpatient care in the US, compared 
to Sweden (Tosteson 2008). 
The MRC spine stabilisation study (Wilson MacDonald 2008) found that costs 
increased with increasing complexity of the fusion procedure. Fritzell found 
instrumented fusion to be 66% more expensive than simple fusion, and interbody 
fusion was 103% more expensive (Fritzell 2004). Kuntz (Kuntz 2000) also reported 
that instrumentation in patients who had a lumbar fusion for degenerative 
spondylolisthesis increased hospital costs by 50% without producing a significantly 
better outcome. 
This study confirmed the principle of increasing cost with increasing 
complexity, with decompression and stabilisation procedures demonstrating the highest 
cost, but as Chapter 7 will show, no significant improvement in clinical outcome 
compared to more simple procedures. Stabilisation and decompression procedures were 
nearly 25% of the cases described in this study , but based on the current literature this 
combined procedure is no longer in vogue. Complex instrumented fusion or simple 
discectomy are the more commonly applied procedures (Fairbanks 2005). 
In the five patients in this study who underwent a single stabilisation procedure 
in this study, the 1989 dollar total direct medical cost of fusion was A$97,023, with a 
mean direct cost of A$19,404. This figure is inflated because of the large number of 
inpatient rehabilitation bed days included in the calculation of direct costs. Total costs 
[direct+ indirect] for this single procedure fusion group was A$188,343 with a mean 
total cost of A$37,668. Between 1989 and 2003 the CPI increase in Australia was 
37.5% (Rate Inflation 2009), resulting in 2003 dollar figure for direct medical costs of 
$26,680. 
The MRC Spine Stabilisation Trial (Wilson-MacDonald 2008) found that total 
medical costs were £ 6927 for a Graf fusion, £6164 for a posterolateral fusion and 
£9264 for a 360 degree fusion. Using a 2003 mean exchange rate A$2.51 = £1 (FX 
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History 2009), the mean direct costs (2003 A$) of fusion surgery in the MRC study 
were A$17,386 for Graf fusion, A$15,471 for posterolateral fusion and A$23,252 for 
360 degree fusion. 
Soegaard calculated the direct medical costs of different fusion types in a 
Danish population (Soegaard 2007a). Using a 2003 exchange rate of A$1 = 4.27 
Danish Kroner (FX History 2009), the mean cost of a non-instrumented fusion was 
DKK 88,285 (A$20,675), an instrumented fusion DKK 94,396 (A$22,106) and a 
circumferential fusion DKK 120,759 (A$28,280). These calculations included 
diagnostic, inpatient, surgery and follow-up costs. The standardised direct medical costs 
in both these studies are comparable to the inflated cost estimates in this study. 
In an observational cohort study of 695 subjects who underwent a spinal fusion 
procedure between 1996 and 2002 Soegaard found that the 2 year societal costs (direct 
and indirect costs) for spinal fusion in a heterogeneous surgical population was 38,937 
euro (Soegaard 2007b ). Using a 2002 mean exchange rate of 1 euro = A$ l. 7 4 (FX 
History 2009), the mean societal cost of spinal fusion in Denmark was estimated to be 
A$67,750. Inflating the A$1989 costs by the CPI increase over that period [33.8%] 
(Rate Inflation 2009), gives a 2002 dollar figure of $A50,340 for stabilisation 
procedures, approximately 15% less than the total cost calculated by Soegaard. 
In a Swedish study of lumbar fusion costs, Fritzell calculated the mean total cost 
to be SEK 704,000 (1999 Kroner) in the surgical group compared with SEK 636,000 in 
the non-operative group (Fritzell 2004). Direct medical costs were 123,000 SEK for the 
surgical group and 65,200SEK for the non-surgical group. Using a 1999 conversion rate 
of A$1=5.34SEK (FX History 2009), the total 1999 Australian dollar costs were 
A$ l 3 l ,835 for the fusion cohort and A$ l l 9, 101 for the non-operative group, while the 
direct medical costs were A$23,033 and A$12,209 respectively. Between 1989 and 
1999 the CPI increased by 19.1 % (Rate Inflation 2009), giving a total mean cost of 
stabilisation procedures of A$44,862 (1999 dollars) with mean direct costs being 
A$23,l 10. The direct medical costs of fusion were almost identical, but the total cost 
figure was influenced by the method of calculating indirect costs, with Fritzell 
calculating productivity losses for a 2 year period following surgery, while this study 
limited productivity losses to a maximum of 365 days for those soldiers on restricted 
duty. 
191 
Tosteson (Tosteson 2008) used Diagnostic Related Group costs (DRG) for 
lumbar discectomy to estimate direct surgical costs in the SPORT study. Total mean 
cost for the surgery cohort was US$27,273 and US$13,135 for the non-operative group 
(2004 US Dollars). Using a 2004 conversion rate ofUS$1 =A$1.36 (FX History 2009), 
the SPORT cost was A$37,091 (2004 dollars) for the surgery cohort. In the period from 
1999 to 2004, the CPI rose 40.7% (Rate Inflation 2009), giving a mean cost A$37,561 
(2004 dollars). The mean cost for those with repeat surgeries in SPORT was A$38,105, 
compared to A$44,836 in the multiple procedure decompression group in this study. 
Despite the 15 year gap between these studies the mean costs are extremely similar 
when described in comparable terms. 
Soegaard (Soegaard 2007a) reported diagnostic costs, but provided no 
indication of the number of investigations per patient. Mean cost per patient was 
approximately 5,000 Danish Kroner (DKK), and using a 2003 currency conversion of 
A$ I = 4.27 DKK (FX History 2009), the mean investigational cost for fusion patients 
was A$ I, 170 (2003 dollars). The mean cost for all investigations in this cohort was 
A$1742 (1989 dollars). Inflating this figure by the CPI increase between 1989 and 2003 
(37.5%, Rate Inflation 2009), provides a value of A$2395 (2003 dollars). 
Neither the SPORT study (Tosteson 2008) or the Swedish Lumbar Spine Study 
(Fritzell 2004) provided any detail on the total number of investigations performed on 
individuals. The SPORT study reported a mean diagnostic test cost in 2004 US dollars 
ofUS$859 per surgery patient and US$882 per non-operative patient. Using a 2004 
currency conversion rate ofUS$1 =A$1.36 (FX History 2009), the mean diagnostic 
cost in the surgery group was $Al 168 (2004 dollars). Inflating the A$1742 mean cost 
to 2004 Australian dollars (40.7%, Rate Inflation 2009) provides a mean diagnostic cost 
of A$2451. 
The cost of investigations is disproportionally higher in this study compared to 
other reported studies and this may reflect the number of multiple procedures 
performed, with the concomitant increase in multiple investigations observed. 
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6.9. Discussion 
This study is the first to compare the cost of all spinal procedures performed 
within a community orthopaedic setting. Because all the visiting orthopaedic surgeons 
held public teaching hospital appointments, the findings should be generalisable to the 
orthopaedic community of that time. From an economic standpoint this is important, as 
existing practice is what therapists, administrators, and politicians responsible for fund 
allocation most easily relate to (Baltussen 1996). 
The one key area of difference in clinical practice was the extensive use of 
inpatient rehabilitation in the post-operative period, resulting in a significantly 
increased number of bed day costs attributable to surgery. Previous studies have either 
confined themselves to single types of procedure, usually discectomy and fusion 
exclusively or compared conservative management to either fusion or discectomy. 
An uncontrolled study using observational data may produce evidence relevant 
to real practice but will introduce bias for making causal inferences. Drummond noted 
that this tension between internal and external validity is a theme that recurs in the 
health economic literature (Drummond 1997). Drummond terms this as a "trade-off 
between bias and relevance". Drummond puts forward the proposition that "an 
economic evaluation is only as good as the data it is based on, but economic analysts 
must do the best they can with the available data". 
Costs of illness studies serve a different purpose to health economic evaluations 
(Dagenais 2008). Cost-benefit, cost-utility and cost-effectiveness analyses focus on 
evaluating the costs of various interventions rather than the overall cost of the problem 
itself. As the ever increasing efforts to reduce health cost continue, increasing focus 
will be placed on absolute improvements in outcomes and the quantum of cost 
necessary to achieve these. With rates of spinal surgery increasing these efforts will 
increase. 
The Fritzell study of 2004 (Fritzell 2004) was the first published full economic 
evaluation comparing lumbar fusion with nonsurgical treatment for therapy-resistant 
chronic low back pain. This seems remarkable given that spinal fusion has been a 
procedure in common use for over 30 years. It also highlights the paucity of relevant 
literature available when this thesis commenced in 1996. 
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The Medicare Australia figures (Table 6.1) reveal that fusion procedures 
accounted for 55% of total procedures involving surgery of the lumbar spine and 56 % 
of total Medicare expenditures. Stabilisation and decompression procedures have fallen 
out of favour and there were no item numbers for this combination of procedures in the 
Medical Benefits Schedule of Feb 2009, but there were combined procedures for the 
cervical spine. 
This study captured detailed cost data on a range of surgical procedures applied 
to the lumbar spine. It demonstrated high levels of imaging and other invasive 
investigations, and a high incidence of multiple procedures. While nothing can be said 
about causation, useful observations regarding the cost of achieving outcomes can be 
made in Chapter 7. Of particular concern was the wide variation in both diagnosis and 
subsequent surgical procedure observed in this study. 
Epidemiological research into back pain and its surgical treatment has been 
hampered by methodological problems in definition, classification and diagnosis. 
Wood found no consensus on classification and diagnosis, making it difficult to rely on 
insurance and hospital data (Wood 1987). Comparison of different studies was 
hindered by the lack of standardized outcome measures, and the difficulties in adjusting 
for compensation and psychological status. (Fraser 1997) 
Schonstein found significant variation in the diagnostic labels used for back 
pain in general practice, suggesting a lack of precision in diagnosis with a consequent 
variety of treatment methods (Schonstein 2000). Bogduk (Bogduk 2000) has addressed 
this problem and noted that the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) 
"recognized that many diagnostic labels were illegitimate, inappropriate, or fanciful". 
The IASP stipulated strict criteria for the use of particular diagnostic labels, with the 
aim of ensuring "consistent, disciplined and accountable use of terms". The use of 
stringent criteria "was to highlight the deficiencies of contemporary practice and to 
indicate the need for research into the reliability and validity of traditional diagnostic 
practices ..... the exercise established that it was essentially impossible to render any 
conventional or traditional diagnosis for low back pain. The means to do so were 
simply not available, not reliable, or not valid". 
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Bodguk railed against diagnostic imprecision and argued that "labels, such as 
'segmental dysfunction' are simply metaphors, with no established biological 
correlates ..... 'degenerative disc disease' conveys to patients that they are 
disintegrating, which they are not. Moreover, disc degeneration, spondylosis and spinal 
osteoarthrosis correlate poorly with pain and may be totally asymptomatic. They are age 
changes and do not constitute diagnoses." 
There is a clear need for more definitive diagnostic criteria for spinal surgery 
and the plethora of surgical procedures is reflective of the lack of such criteria. The 
wide range of diagnostic labels for what is theoretically the same condition suggests 
that the lack of diagnostic precision may represent a lack understanding of the 
underlying pathology. Long found that in a cohort of chronic low back pain sufferers, 
muscle spasm, tenderness and trigger points were commonly reported, but neurological 
signs were rare despite one in three patients having a diagnosis of disc prolapse (Long 
1996). 
Has anything changed in the twenty years since this study was done? The recent 
comments of Glassman (Glassman 2009) suggest not: "This study clearly emphasises 
the need for greater specificity in our diagnostic characterization of patients undergoing 
lumbar fusion surgery. Chronic low back pain is a symptom, not a diagnostic entity for 
which treatment outcomes can be readily extrapolated. Asking whether fusion is a good 
treatment for low back pain is like asking whether antibiotics are a good treatment for 
shortness of breath. Antibiotics would be the obvious choice if the etiology is 
pneumonia, but not if the cause is congestive heart failure". 
The number and range of investigations was of concern, in particular the 
number of plain lumbar films. Thirty-four percent of the patients in this study had four 
or more lumbar films. Plain x-ray of the lumbar spine comprises 5% of all radiological 
investigations in UK NHS hospitals (Royal College of General Practitioners 1995), but 
the findings rarely alter clinical management (Kaplan 1986, Rockey 1978). In a study 
by Kendrick (Kendrick 2001), 30% ofx-rays taken in a cohort of 420 patients with 
back pain had no abnormality detected, while 69% had disco-vertebral degeneration 
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noted. Lumbar disc herniation is often seen on imaging studies in the absence of 
symptoms (Boden 1990, Jensen 1994) and can regress over time without surgery (Saal 
1989). 
Kendrick argued that clinical guidelines should be consistent and recommended 
against radiography, particularly in the absence of serious disease, for cases of low back 
pain of less than 6 weeks duration in primary care. The role of multiple plain film and 
CT examinations of the lumbar spine is questionable and there is considerable debate 
about the risks of low level radiation exposure. The UK National Radiation Protection 
Board (Cox 1995) has concluded that the available data is broadly consistent with the 
thesis that, at low doses and low dosage rates, the risk of induced neoplasia increases as 
a simple function of dose and there is no threshold-like component related to DNA 
damage or DNA repair. 
A typical abdominal CT has a dose of 10 Millisieverts (mSv), compared with 
2.3mSv for a cranial examination. This equates to the same radiation risk as 500 chest 
x-rays and a background equivalent radiation time (BERT) of 4.5 years (Dixon 1998). 
The better resolution available with Spiral CT has seen an upsurge in its general 
medical use. 
The patients in this study group had a high incidence of CT use, which may not 
reflect current practice. However Medicare data shows that in 2008 there were 268,353 
CT scans of the lumbar spine (12.53/1000) and 329,648 plain x-rays of the lumbar 
spine (15.4/1000) performed in Australia. By contrast there were only 59,239 lumbar 
spine MRI conducted under Medicare (0.42/1000), demonstrating that CT was 4.5 
times more commonly used in the diagnosis of lumbar spine disorders than MRI 
(Medicare 2009). This proportion is similar to that observed in this study where there 
7.6 CT scans performed for every MRI scan, and at a time when access to MRI was 
severely restricted. 
MRI scanning offers the prospect of no radiation exposure, but the relative ease 
and reduced cost of obtaining a CT, and the difficulty in accessing public MRI services, 
means that plain films and CT are often the preferred investigation of the lumbar spine 
in the general community, and this remains as true in 2009 as it was in 1989. 
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Deyo (Deyo 1986) has detailed the indications for spinal x-rays in cases of acute 
back pain. Ifx-rays have been performed within the past 2 years and there are no clear 
indications other than exertional pain, then there is little likelihood of a subsequent x-
ray changing the diagnosis or influencing treatment. The use of oblique films is not 
warranted except in cases where spondylolysis is suspected (Scavone 1981 ). There is a 
strong case to be made that one set of plain films is all that is required to exclude bony 
pathology of the lumbar spine, and that repeated plain films offer no additional clinical 
information and merely serve to increase cost and risk for no clinical benefit. 
Imaging is only as valid as it's correlation with clinical signs and symptoms. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated similar pathological findings in asymptomatic 
subjects compared to symptomatic subjects (Hitselberger 1968, Weisal 1984, Holt 
1968, Boden 1989). These and other findings call into question the sensitivity, 
specificity and predictive value of imaging studies of the lumbar spine. At present, no 
carefully controlled studies have determined the specificity or sensitivity of these 
imaging studies in the diagnosis of other disorders of the lumbar spine such as spinal 
stenosis or spinal instability. Many findings seen on imaging such as disc bulging, 
abnormal MRI T2 weighted images diagnosed as "disc degeneration", and facet 
arthropathy have questionable clinical significance (Frymoyer 1991). 
The role of the disco gram in diagnosing disc disease has recently been called 
into question. Carragee (Carragee 2000a) studied 42 patients with chronic back pain 
and 54 asymptomatic controls. All subjects underwent physical examination, 
psychometric testing, plain x-rays, MRI and provocative discography. A total of 109 
discs were evaluated in the symptomatic group and 143 discs in the asymptomatic 
group. 
Fifty nine percent of the symptomatic group had a high intensity zone in the 
annulus suggestive of an annular tear, as did 25% of the asymptomatic group. Seventy 
percent of the high intensity zones tested positive on discography in both groups, with 
pain intensity being similar in both groups. The authors noted that while disc prolapse 
has a distinct and recognizable pattern, the annular tear did not. The high prevalence of 
25% in asymptomatic individuals was considered too high for reliable clinical use. 
Carragee (Carragee 2000a) found the best predictor of a positive provocation on 
discography was psychometric testing and argued that discography may be of little 
diagnostic value in patients with abnormal psychological findings or marked illness 
behaviour. 
In a follow-up study, Carragee (Carragee 2000b) found that previously 
asymptomatic patients had persisting low back pain 1 year after having undergone 
discography. Again, persistent morbidity was noted in 40% of those who had an 
abnormal pre-investigation psychometric screen. Those with normal psychometric 
screening results had no residual pain. 
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The literature of economic evaluations in chronic low back pain continues to 
grow, but in a review of published economic evaluations, Soegaard found the quality of 
most published papers to be poor (Soegaard 2006). The broad methodological 
differences seen in the literature make it difficult for decision-makers to adopt a 
consistent approach in seeking value for money. 
Soegaard noted that published studies reported very different patient 
populations: Fritzell (Fritzell 2001) and Hacker (Hacker 1997) defined the patient 
population by chronic, non-specific low back pain, Klara (Klara 2003) and Ray (Ray 
1997) defined their populations by degenerative disc diseases, Katz (Katz 1997) and 
Kuntz (Kuntz 2000) targeted degenerative stenosis and Schofferman (Schofferman 
2001) reported a mixed population of spondylolisthesis, disc degeneration, stenosis and 
scoliosis. It is therefore very difficult to draw comparisons or conclusion across such 
diverse populations. Soegaard noted that "There is a great potential for improvement of 
methodological quality in economic evaluations oflurnbar spinal fusion and further 
research is imperative." 
6.10 Conclusion 
This study is the first to compare the cost of all spinal procedures performed 
within a community setting. Previous studies have confined themselves to either 
discectomy or fusion procedures exclusively or compared conservative management to 
either fusion or discectomy. 
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In this cohort of soldiers, considerable costs were incurred. As a general 
principle, the more invasive or complex the procedure, the greater the cost. The non-
operative group had the lowest mean total cost, but surprisingly this was not greatly 
different from the group undergoing a decompression procedure. The majority of costs 
in the non-operative group were due to sick leave, bed days and restricted duty. The 
ratio of direct costs to indirect costs differed with the type of procedure, with indirect 
costs dominating in more simple procedures, while more complex procedures had 
direct costs equalling indirect costs. 
Decompression procedures were 56% more expensive, while stabilization and 
decompression procedures were 137% more expensive than non-operative procedures. 
Both stabilization groups were more costly than the decompression group, with 
stabilization and decompression being 53% more expensive, and stabilization being 
31 % more expensive. These findings were consistent with UK Medical Research 
Council (MRC) Spine Stabilisation Study (Wilson-MacDonald 2008) and the Danish 
study by Soegaard (Soegaard 2007). 
This patient cohort also underwent a large number of expensive investigations, 
which, based on the great variety of diagnoses, did not improve diagnostic precision. 
Twenty-one (34%) patients underwent four or more lumbar spine x-ray examinations 
with one patient having nine lumbar spine series. Five patients had 3 or more CT 
scans. The ready availability of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in current times 
should have reduced the role of the CT scan in the diagnostic work up of lumbar spine 
disease, but has not. In this cohort there were 7.6 lumbar spine CT scans performed for 
every MRI scan, but recent Medicare data shows that there were 4.5 CT scans of the 
lumbar spine for every MRI in 2008. 
The diagnostic costs in this study were significantly higher in comparable terms 
than those reported in SPORT (Tosteson 2008) or by Soegaard (Soegaard 2007a). This 
was surprising and may be the consequence of the significant number of multiple 
procedure cases observed. 
As well as the monetary cost, a number of these soldiers were exposed to 
relatively high doses of ionising radiation. The risks associated with this exposure 
should be balanced against the benefit of outcome, but this relationship was not clear. 
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Legitimate concerns can be raised about the radiation exposure being sustained in the 
effort for diagnostic accuracy. It would seem appropriate that guidelines on the relative 
frequency and type of imaging should be developed by the College of Surgeons and the 
College of Radiologists in order to minimize the radiation exposure of patients. 
The direct medical cost figures in this study are comparable to the figures for 
lumbar fusion reported by Soegaard and MacDonald-Wilson (Soegaard 2007b, 
MacDonald-Wilson 2008), and comparable to the direct medical costs reported for 
discectomy in the SPORT study (Tosteson 2008). This is a surprising given the 
methodological differences regarding inpatient days in the military cohort. 
The wide variation in both diagnosis and subsequent surgical procedure in this 
study was surprising, but consistent with the findings of others (Schonstein 2000, 
Glassman 2009) suggesting a lack of precision in diagnosis with a consequent variety 
of treatment methods. There is a clear need for more definitive diagnostic criteria for 
spinal surgery. 
A cost of illness study is by its very nature a descriptive study that seeks to 
quantify costs and not to identify risk factors or identify causation. This study does not 
provide a formal economic evaluation in the way that cost-utility and cost-effectiveness 
evaluations do. By providing data about the quantum and distribution of costs, decision 
makers can make more informed decisions about the relative value provided by certain 
procedures. 
200 
Chapter 7. Outcomes of Spinal Surgical Procedures in Army Soldiers. 
7.1 Introduction 
The linkage of cost data to outcomes seems a logical clinical process, but one 
that is rare. Soegaard noted in 2007 that "To the best of our knowledge, no stochastic 
analysis has investigated co-variation between costs and effects." When this thesis was 
first commenced in 1996, there were no published studies in this area and the delay has 
provided the opportunity for other authors to examine this relationship. The first 
randomised evaluation of cost effectiveness in lumbar spine fusion was only published 
in 2004 (Fritzell 2004). 
Patients undergo surgery with the expectation of a positive outcome, but as 
Zucherman noted, this is not always the case. "The patient and surgeon expect a 
successful outcome, defined as elimination or significant reduction of pain and 
disability, and markedly improved function. It is hoped that the patient will return to 
work, discontinue medications and resume a normal place in family and society. 
Unfortunately, 20-40% of patients will fail to gain the desired outcome. In fact, 1-10% 
of patients will be worse after initial surgery."(Zucherman 1986). 
The success rates of spinal fusion reported in the literature vary greatly, ranging 
from 16-95% (Barr 1987, Thorvaldsen 1989, Turner 1992). This relatively high 
incidence of poor outcome has given rise to the term 'Failed Back Surgery Syndrome' 
(Zucherman 1986). This refers to a situation where the patient has continued disability 
due to either surgical complications, failure to remove the symptomatic pathology or 
occurrence of another pathology subsequent to surgery. 
Since the 1930s, lumbar fusion has been a controversial intervention for the 
treatment of chronic low back pain (Christensen 2004). The level of supporting 
evidence has increased during the last decade but similarly, so has the rate of surgery, at 
a pace not seen in other major orthopaedic procedures. Deyo investigated the potential 
reasons for this increase and found no association with improved indications or 
efficacy, but did find an association with the approval of new surgical instrumented 
implants for lumbar fusion (Deyo 2005). 
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The first two published randomised controlled trials (RCT) examining the 
effectiveness of lumbar fusion found evidence of improved clinical outcome from 
surgery compared to non-operative care (Fritzell 2001, Moller 2000a), but three 
subsequent trials did not find any such benefit (Brox 2003, Ekman 2005, Fairbank 
2005). In the RCT with the best reported results, the mean improvement in pain 
intensity score was only 2 points on a 10-point scale, and the disability improvement 
using the Oswestry Disability Index was only 10 to 12 points on a 100-point scale 
(Carragee 2006a). Malter found a post spinal fusion complication rate of 18%, with 
20% of those patients going on to reoperation over the subsequent 5 years (Malter 
1998). 
The use of complex instrumentation in lumbar fusion increases costs, but there 
is no evidence of enhanced benefit compared to less complex procedures (Fischgrund 
1997, Moller 2000b, Fritzell 2002, Hacker 1 997, Christensen 2002). 
Disc degeneration, annular fissures, small protrusions, and facet arthritis are 
commonly found in individuals with little or no back pain (Boden 1990, Jensen 1994, 
Jarvik 2005). Many studies have shown that serious disability in this group is associated 
with abnormal psychological profiles, multiple chronic pain processes, and 
compensation issues (Pincus 2002, VonKorff 2005). The severity of chronic pain in this 
group does correlate well with the presence or extent of degenerative findings, rather 
with associated psychosocial conditions (Carragee 2006b) It should not therefore be 
surprising that surgical treatment of poorly defined discogenic pain has been 
somewhat disappointing (Gibson 2005, Carragee 2006c). 
This Chapter will examine the subjective and functional outcomes of the cohort 
of patients described in Chapter 6 and relate these outcomes to the direct and indirect 
costs of the procedures involved. 
7.2 Procedure differences between Responders and Non-responders 
In March of 1991 a questionnaire was sent to the last known address of the 61 
patients identified in the cost study. This questionnaire requested participation in the 
follow-up study and asked questions about current levels of pain, disability, function 
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and patient satisfaction. Forty-seven patients responded to the questionnaire, giving a 
response rate of 77%. Subjects were asked to rate their current levels of symptoms on 
different Likert scales examining frequency of pain post-operatively and lifestyle 
impact. Levels of perceived success were ascertained by the question "Do you regard 
your operation as a success? Yes/No". 
In 1996, a review was conducted of the study population using the central 
Army Personnel Database. From the database it was determined that as at 30 June 1996, 
46 subjects had been discharged and 15 were still serving. 
Mean (95% CI) Range (years) 
Age (yrs) 29.7 (27.7-31.6) 18-56 
Time in Service (yrs) 8.0 (6.2-9.7) 0.2-35.5 
2.6 (1.9-3.3) 0.2 -8.7 Time from presentation to first procedure: 
discharged (years) (n=46) 
3.3 (2.0-4.6) 0.6-8.3 
Time from presentation to first procedure: 
serving (years) (n=l 5) 
(years) (n=46) 
3.2 (2.3-4.1) 0.1-11.0 Time from first operation to Discharge 
Table 7 .1 Age, time from initial presentation to first procedure and discharge as at 30 
June 1996. 
Table 7 .1 shows some of the characteristics of the study population, with a 
mean age of 30 years and a mean time in Service of 8 years at the time of their first 
procedure. 
Those who continued to serve had a slightly longer mean time from initial presentation 
to time of initial surgical procedure of3.3 years versus 2.6 years, but this difference was 
not statistically significant. The mean time from initial surgical procedure to discharge 
was 3 .2 years. 
Table 7.2 shows the profile ofresponders and non-responders. There were 6 
non- responders in the single procedure group for a total response rate of 80.5% (25/31) 
and a 73.4% (22/30) response rate in the multiple procedure group. Only in the multiple 
procedure, decompression and stabilization sub-group was there a response rate less 
than 67%. 
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Non-Op Decompression Stabilization D+S Total 
N on-res12onders 
Single procedure 4 2 0 0 6 
Multiple Procedures 0 3 0 5 9 
Res12onders 
Single Procedure 8 12 2 3 25 
Multiple Procedures 3 5 4 10* 22 
Total 15 22 6 18 61 
Table 7.2 Summary by procedure type of those who did and did not respond to the 
follow-up questionnaire. (*response rate< 67%) 
These findings indicate little difference between responders and non-responders 
in each of the procedural groups with the exception of those with multiple procedures 
involving decompression and stabilization. This would suggest that the responder 
group represents a reasonable sample of the procedural groups. 
7.3 Subjective success ratings and cost outcomes. 
Non-Op Decompression Stabilization D+S Total 
Single 12rocedure 
Successful 1(12%) 7(58%) 2(100%) 1(33%) 11 (44%) 
Unsuccessful 7(88%) 5(42%) 0 2(67%) 14(56%) 
MultiQle Procedures 
Successful 0 3(60%) 2(50%) 4(40%) 9(41%) 
Unsuccessful 3(100%) 2(40%) 2(50%) 6(60%) 13(59%) 
Total 
Successful 1(9%) 10(59%) 4(66%) 5(38%) 20(43%) 
Unsuccessful 10(91%) 7(41%) 2(34%) 8(62%) 27(57%) 
Table 7.3 Success of procedure type as rated subjectively by the patient. 
Table 7 .3 shows the various procedural sub-groups and compares them to the 
subjective rating of success by the responder group. It shows that the non-operative 
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group had the worst subjective success rate. This group underwent injection of epidural 
steroid, manipulation under anaesthesia or a combination of both. These results do not 
lend any support for the routine use of these procedures. 
Both decompression and stabilization procedures had subjective success ratings 
of 59-66%, while the combination of a decompression and stabilization procedure had a 
subjective success rating of only 38%. The rationale for combining these 2 procedures 
is not clear and these results also do not lend any support for their routine use. 
When considering the cost of spinal procedures, outcome is an important but 
until recently overlooked variable. One procedure may be more expensive than another, 
but can be justified on either better subjective outcome or better functional outcome. 
Table 7.4 compares the mean direct and indirect costs of the different procedural sub-
groups by subjective rating of success. 
Single procedure 
Successful (n= I I) 
Unsuccessful (n=14) 
T-test of means 
Multiple Procedures 
Successful (n=9) 
Unsuccessful (n=13) 
T-test of means 
Total 
Successful (n=20) 
Unsuccessful (n=27) 
T-test of means 
Direct 
$15,348 ($9 I 39) 
$9,128 ($7499) 
p=0.08 
$19,176 ($10809) 
$14,355 ($12573) 
p=0.25 
$I 7 ,262 ($I 0808) 
$11,741 ($10400) 
p=0.077 
Indirect 
$15,164 ($3952) 
$I 6,663 ($9625) 
p=0.5 I 
$23,203 ($5943) 
$20, 739 ($7158) 
p=0.32 
$19,183 ($8851) 
$I 8,686 ($8622) 
p=0.94 
Total 
$30,5 I I ($I 2326) 
$25,760 ($14209) 
p=0.38 
$42,380 ($13560) 
$35,094 ($17804) 
p=0.19 
$36,446 ($15967) 
$30,427 ($I 6427) 
p=0.22 
Table 7.4 Means costs and standard deviations (SD), by subjectively reported success. 
There were no statistically significant differences in mean cost between those 
procedures rated a success or those rated as unsuccessful. There was near statistical 
significance in the single procedure group, where the more successful procedures had a 
higher mean cost. This however can be explained by the very poor reported success 
rates for non-operative procedures, which had significantly lower direct costs. 
Interestingly, there was little difference in the mean indirect costs, suggesting that the 
degree of post-procedural morbidity (hospital stay, sick leave, restricted duty) was 
similar in the two groups. 
Operative Procedures 
Unsuccessful (n=I 7) 
Successful (n= 19) 
T -test of means 
Direct 
$15,993 ($10630) 
$I 6,634 ($9917) 
p=0.85 
Indirect 
$21,118 ($8239) 
$18,625 ($6452) 
p=0.31 
Total 
$37,112 ($14333) 
$35,259 ($14051) 
p=0.71 
Table 7.5 Comparison of mean costs and (SD) by subjective outcome for operative 
patients (both single and multiple procedures). 
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Table 7.5 addresses this issue by excluding non-operative procedures and shows 
that there was no significant difference in mean direct cost between those operations 
rated as successful and those rated as unsuccessful. Therefore cost of the operative 
procedure had no impact on the subjective rating of success. 
7.4 Function and cost outcomes 
In 1996, the Army had a categorical grading system to determine physical 
capability and employability. These categories were Fit Everywhere (FE), 
Communications Zone Everywhere (CZE- mild limitations), Base Everywhere (BE-
moderate limitations), Home Only (HO- severe limitations), Below Medical Standards 
(BMS) and Medically Unfit (MU). The latter two classifications usually resulted in 
medical discharge from the Army. 
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• SERVING AT 30 JUN 96 
25 D DISCHARGED 21 
20 
13 
15 
7 
IO 4 
0 
FE CZE BE/HO BMS/MU 
Figure 7.1 The medical employment standard and discharge status of the 61 
subjects as at 30 June 1996. 
The medical classification status at discharge for each member was ascertained 
to provide an objective measure of functional employment outcome. Review of the 
central Army personnel database at 30 Jun 1996 showed that only 15 (25%) of the 
cohort of 61 patients were still serving between 6 and 8 years following their surgical 
procedure. 
Figure 7.1 shows that 75% of the original cohort had been discharged at a 
minimum of 7-year follow-up. Thirteen (21 % ) had been discharged as either below 
medical standards or medically unfit with a further three likely to be discharged. Only 
eight (13%) of the original sixty-one subjects had retained a medical category of fit 
everywhere (FE), and only four of those were still serving in 1996. These could be 
classed as very successful outcomes or even "cured". 
Table 7.6 shows that there were no statistically significant differences in mean 
cost between the different objective functional outcomes (CZE vs. BE/HO or BE/HO 
vs. BMS/MU). Therefore a good functional outcome cost exactly the same as a bad 
functional outcome. 
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FE CZE BE/HO BMS/MU 
Total Cost $256,153 $383,028 $792,171 $544,291 
Mean (SD) $32,019 ($10430) $29,464 ($15650) $34,442 ($14901) $32,017 ($20434) 
Median $34,887 $33,590 $35,664 $31, 180 
P=0.35 p=0.69 
Table 7.6 Functional outcome by mean (SD) and median cost. 
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Figure 7.2 Number of cohort discharges from the Army by Year. 
Figure 7.2 shows that 21(34%) subjects were discharged from the Army by the 
end of 1989, the majority of whom had been made MU/BMS and would likely have 
been discharged within 12 months of their last procedure. Subsequent discharges 
occurred progressively, with a peak of7 discharges in 1991. 
Table 7.7 shows the functional outcome by the different categories of procedure. 
Interestingly, while the non-operative procedures had the poorest rating of subjective 
success they had the best objective work outcomes, with 53% being FE or CZE. 
Stabilisation procedures had the worst objective outcome with only 17% being either 
FE orCZE. 
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FE CZE BE/HO BMS/MU TOTAL 
NON-OP 2(13%) 6 (40%) 4 (27%) 3 (20%) 15 (100%) 
DECOMPRESSION 2 (9%) 4 (18%) 9(41%) 7 (32%) 22 (100%) 
STABILISATION 1 (17%) 0 4 (66%) 1 (17%) 6 (100%) 
D&S 3 (17%) 3 (17%) 6 (33%) 6 (33%) 18 (100%) 
Total 8 13 23 17 61 
Table 7.7 Functional employment category by surgical procedure group 
Both decompression procedures and decompression and stabilisation procedures 
had the worst objective outcome with 32 and 33% percent respectively of MU/BMS 
grading. For decompression procedures this poor outcome suggests that the indications 
for surgery may not have been appropriate. 
7.5 Pain and subjective disability outcomes 
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Figure 7.3 The perceived level of symptoms post-operatively. 
Pain scores were elicited using the 11 point pain Numerical Rating Scale (NRS). 
This scale has been shown to be valid, reliable and appropriate for use in clinical 
practice. It is comparable to the Visual Analogue Scale and the Verbal Rating Scale, 
has good sensitivity and generates data that can be statistically analysed for audit 
purposes (Wilkinson 2005). Multi-level Likert items were used to elicit subjective 
patient views on their current functional status. 
209 
Figure 7.3 shows that only 5 (11 %) of the 47 respondents reported themselves 
as symptom free at follow-up. Twenty (42%) reported their symptoms as better, while 
12 (25%) had the same symptoms and 10 (22%) said they were worse. 
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Frequency of Post-Operative Pain 
Figure 7.4 The perceived frequency of pain post-operatively. 
Figure 7.4 shows that only 3 respondents reported no pain while 2 had 
infrequent pain. This presumably represents the 5 respondents who reported no 
symptoms. Interestingly 25 (53%) reported reasonably frequent episodes of pain 
following their procedure and 13 (28%) reported constant pain. 
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Figure 7.5 Perceived lifestyle restrictions in the post-operative period. 
Figure 7.5 shows the self-reported restrictions in lifestyle. Only 4 subjects 
reported no restrictions, while 25 claimed mild to moderate restriction and 18 reported 
more severe restriction. Figure 7.6 shows the Numerical Rating Scale (NRS) pain score 
response for those who rated their procedures successful and unsuccessful. Of the forty-
seven respondents, nine did not mark the rating scale in their response, leaving only 
thirty-eight with NRS pain scores. Of those that did respond, 22 (58%) reported pain 
scores in the 7-10 range. This indicates that these subjects had high levels of ongoing 
pain many years after their original procedures. Also of note was the clear relationship 
between pain score and subjective rating of success. All those subjects with a pain score 
of 0-3 rated their procedure a success. 
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Figure 7.6 The recorded post-operative NRS pain scores at time of follow up. 
As the pain score increased the subjective rating of success fell away. 
Interestingly 4/38 (11 %) still rated their procedure a success despite having residual 
pain scores of between 7 and 10. This finding is surprising, but is reflective of the 
importance of psycho-social factors in determining outcomes. 
0 1-3 4-6 7-10 Not Recorded TOTAL 
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NON-OP 0 0 5 (46%) 4 (36%) 2 (18%) 11 (100%) 
DECOMPRESSION (6%) 3 (18%) 3 (18%) 7 (40%) 3 (18%) 17 (100%) 
ST ABILJSA TION 1 (17%) 1 (17%) 1 (17%) 2 (32%) 1 (17%) 6 (100%) 
D&S 0 2 (15%) 3 (23%) 5 (39%) 3 (23%) 13 (100%) 
TOTAL 2 (4%) 6 (11 %) 12 (26%) 18 (39%) 9 (20%) 47 
Table 7.8 Numerical Rating Scale Pain Score (NRS) by procedure type - responders 
(n=47) 
Table 7.8 shows that no patient in the non-operative group reported a pain score 
of less than 4, and this was consistent with the poor subjective success rating but at 
odds with the objective functional grading. This would suggest that these members 
continued to work despite their back pain being reported as moderate. Perhaps more 
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importantly they were able to continue working, whereas others with similar pain scores 
could not. All procedure types produced a similar percentage of patients with high 
residual pain scores greater than 7. 
If pain relief is used as an outcome measure, no procedure performed well. If a 
pain score of 4 or more is considered as significant residual pain, then 82% of the non-
operative group, 58% of the decompression group, 49% of the stabilisation group and 
62% of the decompression and stabilisation group were left with significant residual 
pain, 2 or more years after their procedure. Only 4% of respondents reported no pain 
with none of the operative groups appearing to be better than another. 
Successful 
Not Successful 
0 
2 (10%) 
0 
1-3 4-6 
6 (30%) 4 (20%) 
0 8 (30%) 
7-10 
4 (20%) 
14 (52%) 
Not Recorded 
4 (20%) 
5 (18%) 
Table 7.9 NRS pain score compared with subjective rating of outcome. 
Total 
21 
27 
Table 7.9 confirms the link between residual pain score and rating of subjective 
success. Those who rated their procedure as unsuccessful had high residual pain scores, 
with none of this group reporting pain scores of 3 or below. For the successful group 
however, only two (10%) subjects were pain free and four (19%) reported pain scores 
of 7 or greater. This disparity is probably the result of different individual pain 
threshold and tolerance levels. This result is consistent with research findings that 
indicate psychological variables are highly significant in determining the return to work 
outcome. It should be no surprise that a procedure that fails to abolish pain will have its 
functional outcome determined by the residual intensity of pain and the individual's 
response to that pain. 
7 .6 Limitations and comparison with other studies 
This study was limited by its retrospective observational design. The subjective 
rating questionnaire did not use validated indices with the exception of the Numerical 
Rating Scale (NRS). While a weakness, the simple rating scales employed did provide a 
clear understanding of specific aspects of the patient's discomfort, whereas the 
aggregate scores of validated composite instruments are more difficult to relate to 
specific symptoms or types of disability. 
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At least 2 years of follow-up is required for surgical studies evaluating low back 
pain treatment (van Tulder 1997). Because of the retrospective design this study only 
measured subjective patient outcomes at 2 years follow up with no baseline values 
against which to measure improvement. If the proposition is that spinal surgery is 
effective in abolishing chronic low back pain, then this approach provides some useful 
data, but if the hypothesis is that spinal surgery will reduce pain then baseline data is 
essential. 
Missing data is an important limitation in interpreting study results. Although 
An analysis of those who did respond to the questionnaire did not appear to indicate 
that they differed from those who responded, it is possible that the responses were 
biased. The preponderance of missing data from the decompression and stabilisation 
group could reflect either greater satisfaction or dissatisfaction and could have biased 
the results. 
The only validated instrument in the study questionnaire was the Numerical 
Rating Scale for pain. The other Likert items in the questionnaire are not comparable to 
other outcome measures published in the literature. When measuring subjective 
outcomes, differences in motivation for recovery, expectation of treatment success, and 
perception of changes in health status may affect the results. The use of a military 
cohort in this study is noteworthy as there was unlikely to be any confounding due to 
compensation status. All soldiers wished to remain employed in the Army and saw 
surgery as a means to achieve this and were strongly motivated to remain in the Army. 
The mean age of this cohort of 29.7 years was younger than that reported in 
three recent surgical studies; 41.4 years (Weinstein 2006b ), 52 years (Soegaard 2007) 
and 58 years (Glassman 2009). The MRC spine stabilisation study did not report mean 
age of subjects, but did report that only 12.6% of patients were under the age of 30 
(Fairbanks 2005). It is reasonable to say that the subjects in this study were younger 
than the general population normally undergoing spinal surgery. 
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There are a number of reasons for this. The demanding nature of Army service 
leads to a high incidence of back injury as demonstrated in previous chapters. There is 
considerable pressure to recover quickly and achieve a suitable medical classification in 
order to maintain employment. Free medical care is a condition of military service, so 
there is an environment where young soldiers wishing to prolong their military careers 
could seek the option of spinal surgery as a quick fix for their problems; one free of 
cost concerns as they were effectively unconstrained by sick leave and rehabilitation 
concerns. 
There are a myriad of rating scales for pain and disability described in the 
literature. Soegaard noted that determining the magnitude of a clinically relevant 
improvement in clinical studies was not straightforward, and therefore the reported 
percentage of patients benefiting from surgery was often arbitrary (Soegaard 2007b ). 
Despite several studies comparing surgical and non-operative treatment of the 
lumbar spine, baseline differences between treatment groups, small sample sizes, or the 
lack of validated outcome measures limit the comparisons or conclusions that can be 
drawn regarding optimal treatment. (Hoffinan 1993, Gibson 1999, Jordan 2003, 
Weinstein 2008) 
A Cochrane review of studies involving the surgical treatment of lumbar 
spondylosis or degenerative disc disease (Gibson 2005) found that most of the earlier 
published papers reported technical surgical outcomes with only crude ratings of 
clinical outcome. More recent trials reported patient-centred outcomes of pain or 
disability, but Gibson noted there was very little information on occupational outcomes, 
and in particular a lack of reported long term outcomes beyond two to three years 
(Gibson 2005). 
Many studies of surgical outcome did not report VAS or NRS pain scores as 
primary outcome measures , but used composite instruments such as the Medical 
Outcomes Study 36-Item Short- Form Health Survey (SF-36) bodily pain and physical 
function scales (McHorney 1994) and/or the Oswestry Disability Index (ODI) (Daltroy 
1996) as their primary outcome measures. 
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The SF36 bodily pain scale comprises two indices; Pain-magnitude and Pain-
interfere, with the resulting score being a composite of the two indices (Ware 2009). 
The Bodily Pain scale is scored from 0-100, but inversely to the VAS and the NRS, 
with a higher score representing less pain and a lower score representing more pain. 
The Bodily Pain scale is one of four scales that comprise the Physical Health summary 
measure of the SF 36, with the other scales being Physical Functioning, Role-Physical 
and General Health. Weinstein (Weinstein 2006a) considered a 10-point difference in 
the SF-36 bodily pain and physical functioning scales or a similar effect size in the ODI 
to be clinically significant. Interpretation of the clinical significance of changes seen in 
quality-of-life scales is difficult, for despite considerable interest in knowing the 
minimal clinically important difference for various scales, no consensus exists with 
regards to methods for providing such benchmarks (Beaton 2000, Beaton 2001 ). 
This study found large numbers of subjects (18/47, 38.3%) who completed the 
follow up questionnaire had residual pain scores in range of 7-10. This level ofresidual 
pain was only partially related to self rated perceptions of success, with a significant 
number of subjects with high residual pain scores rating their surgery a success. Being 
a retrospective study there was no opportunity to examine the change in pain score from 
baseline at the follow-up period. None of the studies reviewed provided a distribution 
of raw pain or disability scores, with only mean pain scores being reported. Thus it was 
not possible to determine how many patients were rendered pain free from any of the 
interventions studied. In this study only 4% (2/47) of those who responded to the follow 
up questionnaire reported themselves as pain free, while a further 12 % (6/47) reported 
NRS pain scores in the range of 1-3. 
Frymoyer (Frymoyer 1983) found that of those who rated their pain as 
moderate, only 2% proceeded on to surgery, while of those who described their pain as 
severe, 10% preceded to surgery. Junge (Junge 1996), in a cohort of subjects 
undergoing discectomy, reported a mean pre-operative NRS pain score was 6.7 and 
noted that two years post operatively 23.4% still had a pain score greater than 6. 
Leufven (Leufven 1999) reported a reduction in mean NRS pain score from 8.6 pre-
operatively to 4.0 at 1 year and 4.2 at 5 years following circumferential lumbar fusion. 
Comefjord in a study of patients with spinal stenosis found no statistically 
significant difference in pain score between those who underwent decompression and 
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fusion and those who had decompression alone (Comefjord 2000). There was a 50% 
reduction in the number of patients reporting constant or daily leg or back pain, but at 
follow up 43% reported constant leg pain and 45% constant back pain. Saal (Saal 2000) 
in a study of intradiscal electrothermal therapy (IDET), reported mean VAS pain scores 
falling from 7.64 (SD 1.33) to 4.44 (SD 2.18) at two months post-operatively. 
Fritzell (2001) reported a reduction in VAS pain score from 64 to 43 (33%) in a 
surgical fusion group, compared to a reduction from 63 to 58 (7%) in a control 
nonsurgical group (p=0.0002). Pain scores improved most during the first 6 months and 
then gradually worsened. Disability as measured by the Oswestry Disability Index 
(ODI) was reduced by 25% (47 to 36) in the surgical group compared with a 6% 
reduction (48 to 46) in the nonsurgical group (p=0.015). Brox, in a study comparing 
lumbar fusion to physiotherapy and cognitive behavioural therapy found no significant 
difference in pain scores between the two groups at 1 year follow-up (Brox 2003). 
Fairbank (Fairbank 2005) in a study comparing spinal fusion to rehabilitation 
reported the SF36 bodily pain index in the fusion group improved from 28.6 (17.3) at 
baseline to 48.1 (26.4) at 24 month follow-up. For the rehabilitation group bodily pain 
improved from 30.0 (16.0) to 44.9 (25.1) at follow-up. There was no significant 
difference in pain improvement between the two groups. 
Assigned to Assigned to 
Surgery Nonoperative 
Treatment 
Baseline Surgery No Surgery p Surgery No Surgery p 
(n = 140) (n = 92) Value (n = 107) (n = 133) Value 
Bodily pain- mean (SE) 
Randomised Cohort -
Intention to Treat 24.1 (16.7) 31.7 (20.2) .002 24. I (16.8) 28.9 (17.7) .03 
Observational cohort ~ 
As treated 21.2 (15.8) 36.2 (20.3) <.001 
Table 7.10 Baseline SF36 Bodily Pain scores for both randomised (Weinstein 2006a) 
and observational (Weinstein 2006b) cohorts. 
The Spine Patients Outcomes Research Trial (SPORT) trail was a major multi-
centre trial comparing discectomy to conservative treatment in a randomised and 
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observational cohort with proven intervertebral disc prolapse. (Weinstein 2006a, 
Weinstein 2006b ). Table 7 .10 shows the baseline SF36 bodily pain scores in the 
randomised cohort. The group that chose non-operative care had significantly higher 
bodily pain scores (i.e. less pain) at baseline. 
The SPORT study recently reported 4 year follow-up data (Weinstein 2008). 
Table 7 .11 shows the mean change in SF36 body pain index at two, three and four year 
follow up. On an intention to treat basis, there were no significant differences in SF 36 
bodily pain score at any of the follow-up periods for the surgical and non-surgical 
groups. Using an 'as treated' analysis, the mean difference in SF36 bodily pain scores 
ranged from 11.4 at 2 year follow-up to 15 at 4 year follow-up. Based on a threshold of 
clinical significance set at a 10 point difference on the 100 point scale, the authors 
argued that this reduction in pain was clinically significant. 
Baseline mean 26.9(0.82) Intention to Baseline mean 26.6 (0.5) As treated 
SF36 Bodily treat- RCT SF36 Bodily - combined 
Pain cohort Pain cohorts. 
SF36 Bodily 
Pain Score 
(0-100) (SE) at 
follow-up 
Surgery Non-operative Treatment Surgery Non-operative Treatment 
effect(95%CI) effect (95%CI) 
2 year n=187 N=l91 N=662 N=344 
Mean 40.5(1.9) 37.5(1.9) 3.1(-2.2,8.4) 43 (0.87) 31.6 ( 1.2) 11.4 (8.5, 14.2) 
change( SE) 
3year N=180 N=170 N=581 N=318 
Mean 39.2(2) 36.2(2) 3.4 (-2.1,8.9) 43.8(0.9) 31.8( 1.2) 12 (9,15) 
change( SE) 
4 year N=l49 N=150 N=511 N=283 
Mean 41.3(2.1) 36.8(2.1) 4.5(-1.2,10.3) 45.6(0.95) 30.7(1.3) 15 (11.8, 18.1) 
change( SE) 
Table 7.11 Mean changes in SF 36 Body Pain scores at 2, 3 and 4 year follow up in 
the SPORT study. (Weinstein 2008) 
The authors of SPORT attributed the large effects seen in the as-treated analysis 
to the very high cross-over of randomised subjects observed in the study, with only 
60% of those assigned to surgery eventually having surgery, and 43% of those assigned 
to non-operative care having surgery at 1 year post-enrolment. Those more likely to 
cross over to surgery had worse baseline pain, disability and fear that their symptoms 
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were getting worse, compared to those receiving non-operative treatment. The 
converse was found in those who crossed over to non-operative treatment (Weinstein 
2006a). 
The authors acknowledged they could not exclude the possibility that the 
baseline differences between the 'as treated' groups may have affected the results, even 
after controlling for important covariates (Weinstein 2008). These findings would 
support a hypothesis that pain intensity and fear of worsening pain are significant 
motivators for patients to choose surgery. 
The SF36 Bodily pain score is not directly comparable to the numerical rating 
scale pain score used in this study, but the SPORT data showed that surgical patients 
still experienced residual pain at follow-up with a mean SF 36 bodily pain score 
(baseline plus mean change) of 68.2 in the surgical group and 63.7 in the non-operative 
based on intention to treat [ 1 OO=no pain]. In the 'as treated' cohort mean residual 
bodily pain scores were 72.2 in the surgical group and 57.3 in the non-operative group. 
The SPORT study did not provide any data on the subset of patients who were pain 
free. 
Soegaard in a study of outcomes of lumbar spinal fusion reported a highly 
significant improvement (p < 0.0001) in all dimensions of functional disability using 
the Dallas pain questionnaire, but did not use VAS or NRS pain score (Soegaard 
2007b ). He found that patients with a more severe disability at baseline reported a 
greater net benefit from surgery. 
Glassman reported the outcomes of lumbar fusion patients stratified by 
diagnosis (Glassman 2009). The study reported mean improvement in NRS pain score 
within different diagnostic subgroups, but did not report baseline pain scores. The best 
mean improvement in NRS pain score was seen in the spondylolisthesis group with a 
mean reduction of pain score of 3.8 points (SD 3.3) at 1 year and 3.3 points (SD3.2) at 
2-year follow-up. Glassman used a Minimum Clinically Important Difference (MCID) 
for NRS of 1.6 points. At 2 year follow up, 60% of the spondylolisthesis and 70% of 
the scoliosis subgroup achieved a MCID in NRS pain score. The other diagnostic 
subgroups ranged from 50-57% of subjects reaching a MCID in NRS pain score. 
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This study reported the distribution of pain scores in the subject population, 
which included those who were pain free at time of follow-up. All other published 
studies have only reported mean patient pain scores or improvement in symptoms using 
a wide array of instruments. Success usually being defined as the mean improvement in 
various outcome measure scores, with no sense of the population distribution of 
outcome or those who were pain free and therefore "cured". The clear conclusion to be 
drawn from the literature is that spinal surgery is a palliative procedure and not a 
curative one, and the findings of this study are consistent with the literature. 
This study found self -reported success rates of 10% for the non-operative 
group, 59% in the decompression group, 66% in the stabilisation group and 38% in the 
decompression and stabilisation group. The total selfrated success was 43%, but this 
was skewed by the low rate in the non-operative group. While the self-reported rating 
of symptoms revealed that 5 (10.6%) reported no symptoms, 20 (42.5%) reported 
symptoms as better, 12 (25.5%) reported no change and IO (21.3 %) reported that their 
symptoms were worse. There was an inconsistency in that only two subjects reported no 
pain and 5 reported no symptoms. The most likely explanation for this is that three 
subjects had infrequent episodes of mild pain that they did not consider troublesome. 
There is considerable variation in the types of primary outcome measure utilised 
in the literature. Stewart used three primary outcome measures; return to work, narcotic 
use and patient satisfaction, and claimed a 72% success based on improvements in 
those three outcomes, noting that pain scores correlated significantly with each of the 
outcome measures (Stewart 1996). Santavirta reviewed 80 spinal fusion patients 5 years 
post surgery (Santavirta 1996) and found the mean ODI decreased from 3.8 to 2.7. The 
mean Oswestry total index for the whole group was 41 % reflecting severe disability 
before surgery and 25% at follow-up reflecting moderate disability. Half the patients 
returned to work and patients with previous surgery had the worst outcomes. 
Fraser (Fraser 1997) in a 10 year follow-up study of discectomy patients noted 
that 78% of patients rated themselves as having complete relief or a good deal of relief, 
but when assessed on a functional basis this number fell to 34%. Clinical outcome was 
not associated with radiologic fusion or compensation status. 
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Fritzell reported that 63% of a lumbar fusion group rated themselves as "much 
better" or "better" compared with 29% in a comparative nonsurgical group (p<0.0001). 
In the surgical group, 23.6% rated themselves as unchanged and 13.8% rated 
themselves worse, while in the non surgical group the figures were 45.2% unchanged 
and 25.8% worse (Fritzell 2001). Brox reported an assessed success rate of 70% at 1 
year following lumbar fusion surgery and 76% after cognitive behaviour therapy and 
physiotherapy (Brox 2003). 
At 4 year follow-up in SPORT, there was no significant difference in those who 
rated themselves as having "major improvement" in the intention to treat group (72.5% 
surgical vs. 65% non-operative), but in the 'as treated' group there was a significant 
self-reported improvement in the surgical group [79.2% vs. 51.7%] (Weinstein 2008). 
Weber reported "good" results in 70% of a surgical group and 51 % in a conservative 
treatment group at 4 year follow-up (Weberl 983).Weinstein noted that there were no 
long-term studies reporting the same primary outcome measures as SPORT (Weinstein 
2008). 
Soegaard found greater improvement in subjective ratings of success in subjects 
with high levels of baseline disability (Soegaard 2007b), and suggested that subjects 
with higher disability were offered greater potential for improvement whereas those 
with moderate disability had less potential for improvement. This phenomenon would 
explain the somewhat paradoxical outcomes of this study and others, where despite 
high residual pain scores; a reduction in pain from extremely high levels to moderate 
levels would appear to have constituted success in the eyes of many patients. 
This study also reviewed the military employment status of the patient cohort 
six years post-surgery and found that only 15 (25%) of the original cohort remained in 
military service. Many of those who were discharged would have taken up less 
physically demanding jobs, and only those discharged as medically unfit (MU) were 
likely to remain on invalid pensions. There were 6 MU discharges, indicating that up to 
90% of the other soldiers may have returned to employment. If those who were 
discharged as below medical standards (BMS) are included, the number rises to 16/61 
giving a worst case return to work status of 74%. 
Fritzell (Fritzell 2001) calculated a 'net return to work rate', which involved 
subtracting the number of patients who ceased work from those returned to work. The 
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net return to work rate was significantly in favour of surgical treatment, with 36% of 
the surgical group and 13% of the non surgical group returning to work (p=0.002). 
This patient population had been on sick leave for over two years, and this was 
reflected in the low return to work rates. There was no significant difference in the 
mean number of days of sick leave per patient in either group during the 2-year period 
of follow-up (fusion group 521days (SD 204) versus non operative 534 days (SD 227). 
In the SPORT study, employment status was the only outcome measure which 
showed a small treatment effect in favour of non-operative care, but this was not 
statistically significant (Weinstein 2008). At 4 year follow-up, there were no significant 
differences in the percentage of subjects who were in employment between the two 
treatment arms on either an intention to treat (71.4% surgical vs. 75.1 % non-
operative) or on an 'as treated' basis ( 84.4% surgical vs. 78.4% non-operative). 
Weinstein commented that "return to work appears to be independent of treatment 
received and does not follow improvement in pain, function or satisfaction with 
treatment". This finding was consistent with the Maine Lumbar Spine Study which also 
that although spine surgery was associated with pain reduction, it was not associated 
with increased labour force participation (Atlas 1996). 
SPORT also found that those treated surgically reported more diagnostic test 
use (53% surgery vs. 34% non-operative patients, p<0.001) and medication use (96% 
surgery vs. 89% non-operative patients, p<0.001) than non-operative patients, with use 
in both groups declining over time. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that patients with greater morbidity incline towards surgery. 
Hazard (Hazard 1994) examined the correlation between pain, impairment and 
disability in a cohort of 90 chronic LBP subjects. Correlation co-efficients between 
initial scores were all less than 0.50. At 5-year follow-up, pain and disability correlated 
closely but not impairment. Patient satisfaction scores correlated with current pain and 
disability, but not with improvements in pain, disability or impairment scores. 
Carragee noted that surgical practice in treating disc herniation had changed 
smce the 1980's , where a comparatively large surgical exposure was used compared 
with current surgical interventions, which are characterized by small incisions, minimal 
blood loss, and early hospital discharge (Carragee 2006a). The postoperative 
convalescence after a modern uncomplicated limited discectomy may be only a few 
weeks compared with a few months in the study by Weber (Weber 1983). 
7.7 Discussion 
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The evaluation of outcomes in spinal surgery is difficult and there is no 
agreement in the literature as to what should constitute standardised outcome measures. 
A number of studies have reported patient satisfaction, return to work and one of a 
number of different pain and disability assessment ratings. The myriad of reporting 
instruments reflects the failure to abolish pain, and therefore most are seeking to 
measure change or improvement in either pain or its associated disability. 
While instruments such as the SF36 bodily pain scale and the Dallas pain 
questionnaire are validated, what do their scores mean in practical terms? Because they 
are composite items, the same aggregate score could represent different scores in 
different scales. They provide a reproducible score that can be statistically analysed, but 
is that a practical and socially desirable outcome? 
This study reports the distribution of outcomes and it can be seen that there was 
significant variation in outcome on the key outcome measures of pain and return to 
work. The plethora of instruments used to measure pain and its impact are a reflection 
of the well reported disconnection between reported intensity of pain and its consequent 
effect on function. Hence there is a strong focus on measuring disability in many of the 
instruments that record outcome. The lack of a clear and reproducible relationship 
between pain and function has been the great conundrum of back pain research. 
There is a strange dichotomy between pain and function, with no strong 
correlations between pain, self-reported satisfaction, treatment type and return to work. 
Nearly all studies have reported significant residual levels of pain but relatively high 
levels of patient satisfaction with the outcome of the procedure. These findings are 
most probably due to psychological factors, as reported by many authors. 
Fraser (Fraser 1997) found that psychological status influenced the reporting of 
outcome and was strongly correlated with the functional low-back outcome score. Van 
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Susante, in a prospective study, confirmed the importance of psychological factors in 
determining the outcome of spinal procedures (Van Susante 1998). Patients were 
assessed preoperatively and at 12 months following spinal fusion, with those labelled as 
"psychogenic" preoperatively having worse outcomes in terms of pain and analgesic use 
than a group termed "organic". The authors commented that psychological stress 
worsened the outcome of lumbosacral fusion and all intending patients should be 
psychologically screened before surgery. 
Andersen (Andersen 2006) found that pre-operative disability and emotional 
distress were potent predictors of a poor outcome. Trief (Trief 2006) in a prospective 
cohort study of 160 patients found that pre-operative emotional distress predicted a 
poor outcome, with similar findings reported in the Swedish Lumbar Spine Study 
(Hagg 2003). Grahn (Grahn 2000) reported that motivation was a predictive factor for a 
cost-effective outcome in patients with chronic musculoskeletal pain conditions, and it 
was important to specifically focus on patient motivation when discussing surgery 
versus nonsurgical treatment. 
This study found a number of subjects who despite moderate to severe levels of 
residual pain rated their procedure a success, and managed to remain in employment. 
This observation could be explained by individual variation in pain tolerance or 
psychological robustness. For a given level of pain, individuals with higher pain 
thresholds will be able to function better and perceive more success, especially if they 
started from a high baseline of pain. Under this hypothesis it is not the effectiveness of 
the procedure, but individual patient characteristics that will determine the subjective 
outcome. This hypothesis will need to be tested in a randomised controlled study. 
From a societal and individual perspective, return to work is perhaps the most 
important outcome in any intervention involving the spine. The Army subjects were 
young and, in normal circumstances could look forward to a long and productive 
working life. An outcome from spinal surgery that precludes return to work has 
significant economic impact not only on the individual (as shown in Chapter 3) but also 
for Government and Society. Soldiers with specialist military skills cannot quickly be 
replaced as there is no "market" for many of these skills. 
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Fritzell stated that "The main purpose when treating therapy-resistant chronic 
low back pain with surgery is to reduce pain and disability to a level at which it makes 
an important difference to the patient. ... .If these patients do return to work, then it may 
be considered as a bonus." 
The role and effectiveness of spinal surgery has generated considerable debate 
in the literature. The significant regional variation (up to 15-fold) in rates of spinal 
surgery in the United States and lower rates internationally raise questions regarding the 
appropriateness of some of these surgeries (Deyo 2005). The increasing popularity of 
spinal fusion surgery also warrants a more rigorous scrutiny of the benefit achieved for 
the cost incurred (Medicare Australia 2009). 
The Cochran review of lumbar surgery (Gibson 1999) noted that after a search 
of the literature over a 32 year period from 1966 to 1998 there were only 26 randomised 
controlled trials (RCT) examining lumbar disc prolapse and 14 RCT studying 
degenerative lumbar spondylosis. In both groups, the reviewers commented that there 
were many weaknesses of trial design and that conclusions must be drawn with caution. 
The reviewer's thoughts are worthy of quotation; "Currently, there is no 
adequate scientific knowledge about the efficacy or long-term effects of either surgical 
decompression or fusion. This is of particular concern given the magnitude of the 
clinical problem and costs of surgical procedures being performed. There is no 
acceptable evidence (Strength D) of the efficacy of any form of fusion for degenerative 
lumbar spondylosis, back pain or "instability" .... There are major gaps in knowledge 
concerning the costs, cost effectiveness, and work outcomes of all forms of surgical 
management for lumbar disc prolapse and degenerative lumbar spondylosis." (Gibson 
1999). 
In a later review, Gibson noted that recently published RCT used appropriate 
methods of randomization, blinding and independent assessment of outcome (Gibson 
2005). He noted that "More of the recent trials also reported patient-centred outcomes 
of pain or disability, but there is still very little information on occupational outcomes." 
Spinal instability is a major indication for lumbar fusion. The surgical literature 
abounds with the view that true fusion is responsible for pain relief, and much effort is 
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directed at achieving radiological fusion. However a number of studies have reported 
patients who continue to have persistent pain and satisfaction rates at least 10% lower 
than radiological fusion rates. (McCulloch 1998, Kim 1999, Liljenqvist 1998). 
The quest for improved radiological fusion has resulted in an expansion of 
techniques to achieve it, but with little or no evidence to justify the newer techniques. 
Fritzell found that instrumented fusion increased hospital costs by 66% (posterolateral) 
and 103% (circumferential) respectively, compared to non-instrumented fusion, with no 
statistically significant difference in clinical effects. He concluded that "There is a 
widespread belief among spine surgeons that an instrumented fusion carries potential 
advantages of both earlier rehabilitation and return to work, and it should therefore be 
an urgent and important mission to compare non-instrumented posterolateral fusion 
with an instrumented procedure." 
MacDonald-Wilson found that instrumented fusion surgery was more costly and 
had higher complication rates (Macdonald Wilson 2008). He noted that "We were able 
to demonstrate no benefit in outcome for patients undergoing more complex and 
expensive surgery with the three surgical groups experiencing very similar 
outcomes ..... It seems sensible to use the least technically demanding procedure, which 
is most cost-effective, with the least complications." 
The natural history of "discogenic" back pain is controversial. Smith followed a 
cohort of 25 patients who had a positive discogram but declined surgical treatment 
(Smith 1996). At 3-year follow-up, 68% had improved, 8% were unchanged and 24% 
worse. Of the 6 who were worse, 4 had a psychiatric disease. He noted that these results 
were comparable or better than reported surgical results. The SPORT study found 
similar levels of improvement in those subjects who opted for non-surgical treatment 
(Weinstein 2008). 
The New Zealand Accident, Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance 
Corporation guidelines for the management of acute low back pain note that "surgery 
seems to be a luxury for speeding recovery of patients with obvious surgical 
indications, but benefits fewer than 40% of patients with questionable physiologic 
findings. Moreover surgery increases the chance of future procedures with higher 
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complication rates." (Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Corporation 
1995) 
Effective surgical treatment requires the precise diagnosis of a surgically 
correctable lesion. Szpalski states that "surgery should not be performed to treat a 
symptom (pain) but only to treat an objective condition or disease" (Szpalski 1998). 
Surgical management is the subject of many controversies, and even in agreed 
diagnostic conditions such as disc herniation, spinal stenosis and spondylolisthesis there 
is a wide choice of techniques and procedures for each indication and there are 
conflicting results in the literature. As stated by Gibson, "There is no scientific 
evidence on the effectiveness of any form of surgical decompression or fusion for 
degenerative lumbar spondylosis compared with natural history, placebo, or 
conservative management." (Gibson 1999). 
Failure to abolish pain calls into question the theoretical paradigms 
underpinning current surgical procedures. If the current hypotheses driving procedures 
for spinal stabilization were correct, then correction of spinal instability should abolish 
pain, not merely palliate it. Would society accept palliation in the management of 
appendicitis or fracture? The difference in the latter cases is that the causative 
pathology is clearly known. 
When considering the issue of diagnostic discipline it is useful to review Koch's 
postulates which have historically formed the basis for disease causation. Koch's 
postulates state that; 
(a) the disease is present if the organism/factor is present, 
(b) the disease is absent if the organism/factor is absent, 
( c) the disease is abolished if the organism/factor is removed, and 
( d) the disease is created when the organism/factor is introduced. 
While originally invoked to define causation in bacterial disease they are readily 
applied to any medical condition, including procedures used to treat a hypothesized 
cause. The application of Koch's postulates to the putative diagnostic and treatment 
criteria governing spinal surgery, should give the surgical fraternity pause for reflection. 
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Little has changed in the intervening decade since this thesis commenced, as 
Glassman noted in a recently published paper; "added diagnostic specificity is a critical 
component in building an improved evidence base for lumbar fusion surgery. In 
particular, broad categories such as degenerative disc disease, chronic low back pain 
and discogenic disease need to be divided into clinically relevant entities such that the 
reported outcomes can be interpreted more effectively"( Glassman 2009). 
The editors of the Spine Journal commenting in reference to Glassman's paper 
noted that, "Patients and payors have questioned the broad application of spinal fusion 
for "back pain syndromes". The administrative argument often lacks any specificity, 
treating all diagnoses (e.g. spondylolisthesis) and syndromes (back pain with common 
degenerative changes) as a monolithic group. Proponents of fusion, nonetheless, often 
quote"80%" , as a somehow reasonable estimate of spinal fusion success- independent 
of our frequent failure to accurately diagnose the structural cause of pain beyond broad 
diagnostic categories such as 'Low Back Pain' or 'Degenerative Disc Disease'." 
Hagg found that back pain subjects selected for surgery only differed from the 
general population of patients with back pain in the severity of their pain and disability 
symptoms (Hagg 2002). Weinstein observed high levels of patient cross-over the 
SPORT study and the significant difference in baseline bodily pain scores suggest that 
patients with higher levels of pain and a fear that the condition would worsen opted for 
surgery, while those with less pain and less fear opted to wait and see (Weinstein 2008). 
This suggests that patient concerns regarding pain and disability, rather than clear 
therapeutic criteria guided the decision for surgery. 
Given the lack of evidence in favour of these procedures and the variable 
outcomes, why are these procedures continuing to be performed? Fairbank (Fairbank 
1993) summed it up well "The patient usually takes the final decision to proceed. 
Nevertheless, this individual, however carefully advised, is far from "homo numericus 
economicus". How can a young middle-aged adult who has tried and failed all the 
available treatments avoid grasping at any straw, even if the odds are clearly stacked 
against them? (Homo desperatus?)". 
Fairbanks comments are supported by the findings of later studies, that is, 
patients in greater pain seek surgery as the last option, and therefore in a number of 
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cases it is patient preference rather than surgical indication, which governs the decision 
to have surgery. If there were effective alternatives to reduce pain then the number of 
spinal surgical procedures should decrease. 
Carragee formed the same conclusion in his analysis of the outcomes of the 
SPORT study" ... whether to choose a surgical approach to sciatica due to disk 
herniation depends strongly on the individual patient's situation beyond the commonly 
considered medical and surgical comorbid conditions ...... the apparently slower 
recovery without surgery may represent a hardship beyond physical pain. While 
curtailing activity can lessen sciatica if the patient can afford to do so, these individuals 
may be unable to meet important daily necessities over an extended illness; they may 
lose their ability to care for family, to earn a living, or to keep a competitive job." 
(Carragee 2006) 
Resnick in a defence of lumbar fusion stated that , "The challenge is to 
determine the right procedure for a given patient population, define a clinically relevant 
difference in outcome using reliable and valid outcome measures, design a study with 
adequate power, and perform the study in an era of burdensome HIPAA regulations and 
public scrutiny." (Resnick 2007). 
Whilst there are a number of clearly identified conditions associated with back 
pain (disc prolapse, spondylolisthesis, annular tear, facet joint dysfunction) there is no 
clear evidence for the specific pathological process of pain generation. The underlying 
pain generating process is not known and could include inflammation, trauma, and 
tension of nerve fibres or neuromas formed in scar. Nociceptive stimulation of nerve 
endings is a requirement, but the basic underlying process is not clearly understood. 
There are a number of other possible aetiologies that could cause pain and be amenable 
to alternative therapies. 
Cholewicki (Cholewicki 1992) studied a group of power lifters lifting heavy 
weights (up to 200kg); while their lumbar vertebrae motion patterns were quantified 
using fluoroscopy. During lifting the subjects spinal segments remained 2-3° short of 
full lumbar flexion. During one lift a subject reported pain and discomfort, and the lift 
was aborted. The fluoroscopy records revealed that at the L2/L3 joint, full flexion had 
been achieved causing the spine to buckle. The authors attributed this to failure to 
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activate one of the segmental muscles, allowing excessive movement at a single point, 
which could lead to damage of the passive restraining tissues. This raised the issue of 
whether spinal stability was a dynamic or static process, and whether instability could 
be corrected with a dynamic strengthening approach rather than a static fusion 
approach. 
Nelson (Nelson 1999) studied a group of patients who had been recommended 
for cervical or lumbar surgery and then participated in a 10 week outpatient program of 
aggressive resistance exercise. Of the 46 (75%) patients who completed the program, 
38 were available for follow-up at 16 months. Only 3 subjects in the follow-up group 
required surgery. The authors noted that a large number of patients who had been told 
that they needed surgery were able to avoid surgery in the short term by aggressive 
strengthening exercise. The authors commented that it was important to define what 
constitutes "adequate conservative care." This study supports the hypothesis that 
dynamic muscle strengthening can effectively reduce pain and reduce surgical 
preference. 
Takemasa (Takemasa 1995) compared 2 groups of low back pain sufferers; one 
group with identifiable back pathology and the other with no detectable organic 
pathology. Trunk flexor and extensor strength was significantly lower in both groups 
compared to matched controls. An exercise program increased muscle strength in both 
groups with excellent relief of pain in the group with no identified pathology and a 
lesser reduction in the group with organic pathology. The authors argued that decreased 
trunk strength is a major factor in chronic back pain. 
Rask (Rask 1993) used pantaloon body casts to assess patients for lumbar 
fusion. Forty-five patients underwent casting for a 2-4 week period with 69% of 
patients reporting significant pain relief. Twenty-three patients subsequently underwent 
lateral bony fusion, and of these 17(74%) reported significant pain relief. This study 
was interesting in that it demonstrated significant pain relief with a resting cast, and 
implied that to truly compare the efficacy of spinal fusion would require a control group 
of casted individuals to determine if in fact prolonged rest was not a confounding factor 
in outcomes. In the absence of controlled studies of conservative management, it is not 
clear if the surgery is the cause of pain reduction or the prolonged immobilization and 
rest that characterises the immediate post- operative period. Rather than physiotherapy 
as a control, bracing or strict bed rest followed by physiotherapy may be a better 
method for eliminating the potential confounding effect of prolonged rest. 
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In lumbar disc protrusions, other pathological processes have been shown to co-
exist. Saal found mean levels of Phospholipase A2 in human lumbar intervertebral 
discs 10,000 greater than in the plasma of normal human controls (Saal 1990). 
Phospholipase A2 plays a central role in the inflammatory process through its 
regulation of the arachidonic acid cascade, and its activity levels are the rate-limiting 
step in the production of prostaglandins and leukotrienes. Synovial Phospholipase A2 
has been shown to be inflammatory in its own right (Vishwanath 1988). The presence 
of large concentrations of inflammatory mediators suggests that anti-inflammatory 
approaches have the potential to reduce pain. 
All health resources are to some extent rationed, and scarce resources should be 
allocated to interventions or procedures that produce the greatest good. Despite the 
availability of a plethora of surgical treatments for chronic pain in the lumbar spine, a 
satisfactory outcome remains elusive for many. A procedure that is performed for pain 
relief should be judged by its ability to eliminate or reduce pain. This study has 
demonstrated that pain elimination is rare (2/4 7), with 79% of respondents reporting 
baseline NRS pain scores of 4 or greater two years after surgery. Other published 
studies did not record the number of pain free patients, only reporting mean changes in 
pain or disability scores. 
Understanding the cost and outcomes of a range of surgical procedures will 
become increasingly important as cost pressures mount on health budgets. Decision 
makers will be increasingly be in accordance with the views ofTosteson "Changing 
trends in spine surgery in the United States, combined with continued escalation in 
health care expenditures, highlights the importance of understanding the economic 
value of common surgical intervention." (Tosteson 2008). 
Given the reported effectiveness of non-surgical therapies, there is an 
opportunity to identify those patients whose pain can be palliated in a non-operative 
manner, and prevent the choice of surgery with its attendant risks and costs. 
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7.8 Conclusion 
The consistent theme from the literature is that the expected outcome of spinal 
surgery is palliation not cure. This immediately raises the possibility of diagnostic error 
and/or a faulty paradigm that governs the decision. Clinicians in the future must look to 
offer more effective palliative therapies that do not involve surgery. The literature 
indicates that reducing pain and its associated fear and disability, is likely to reduce the 
patient preference for surgery. Efforts should be directed at reducing pain through non-
operative means, allowing the decision for surgery to be resolved on strictly defined 
clinical criteria. 
Reducing the incidence of spinal surgery will dramatically reduce the costs 
associated with injury to the lower back. The literature is very clear that only a small 
percentage of low back pain sufferers contribute disproportionately to costs, and this 
group are those who undergo spinal surgery. Given that back injury is the leading cause 
of disability in the Army, improved efforts to better palliate low back pain should be a 
priority. 
Low back pain is a symptom, not a diagnosis. Much is made of the self-limiting 
nature of most acute episodes of low back pain, and the poor prognosis associated with 
chronic low back pain. But this approach defines the condition by its chronicity, not its 
aetiology. 
The scientific method, which is the hallmark of modem medicine, requires that 
treatment of a condition should be based on its aetiology and pathology. A specific 
pathology will respond to a therapy designed to address it and ifthe diagnosis is wrong, 
logical treatment will not follow. Therefore a decompression procedure will only be 
successful if there is a compressive pathology, and a stabilisation procedure will only 
be successful if there is an underlying instability to be corrected. The literature 
consistently reports reductions in pain, but no or very small numbers of patients whose 
pain is abolished. How much of this improvement is attributable to the surgery and how 
much is due to enforced lifestyle change, forced rest or psychological adjustment 
cannot be determined. 
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Until we have a much better understanding of the aetiology of the various 
causes of low back pain, surgeons will continue to pursue a plethora of surgical 
techniques that may palliate but not cure. The human and societal cost of this is 
enormous. The literature contains contradictory evidence in favour of current spinal 
surgical procedures and some evidence suggesting that the outcomes of doing nothing 
are as effective as surgical intervention. An ineffective procedure becomes a candidate 
for elimination and potentially significant cost saving. 
The non-operative group in this study (injection of epidural steroid, 
manipulation under anaesthesia) reported a self-rated success of only 10%, and these 
results do not lend any support for the routine use of these procedures. The 
decompression and stabilization procedure had a subjective success rating of only 38%, 
and the rationale for combining these 2 procedures is not clear. These results also do 
not lend any support for the continued use of this combination of procedures and recent 
published studies confirm that this procedure is now little utilised. 
The findings of this study are consistent with other paper in finding that pain 
score was decoupled from return to work or disability, suggesting that individual 
psychological makeup and by inference pain threshold, determines functional outcome. 
The role of psychological factors has traditionally been linked to secondary 
compensation gain, but this study supports the view that pain threshold or tolerance 
may impact on functional outcome in the presence of severe levels of residual pain. 
This could explain the repeated finding that outcome in subjects with abnormal 
psychometric testing was consistently poor (Fraser 1997). It should be no surprise that a 
procedure that fails to abolish pain will have its functional outcome determined by the 
residual intensity of pain and the individual's response to that pain. 
For many patients, low back pain is a self-limiting symptom. But for 
approximately 10% of patients the symptoms become chronic and the costs escalate 
rapidly. Data collection and research effort should focus on identifying why this select 
population have poor prognoses. Given that this group incur great direct costs and 
usually have residual permanent or partial incapacity, the risk factors and effective 
treatments for this group should be a national priority. 
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Research into unintentional injury received only 1.9% of total National Health 
and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) funding during 2002-3 (Aoun 2004). 
Funding for research into back injury is just a fraction of that overall expenditure. For a 
condition that causes so much pain and suffering to individuals and tremendous cost to 
government, employers and the community, it is poorly funded. As Mitchell noted "The 
gap between the size of the public health problem of injury and national efforts to 
reduce it needs to be addressed." (Mitchell 2008) 
The main purpose of economic evaluations is to help setting funding priorities. 
A new treatment should be compared with the best available alternative, (Drummond 
1997) which may be difficult because the best alternative for treating chronic low back 
pain is debatable, as evidenced by the plethora of surgical procedures available. Also, 
assessing the costs related to treatment of subjective entities, such as pain, quality of 
life, and function, is a complex undertaking (Ferrell 1996). 
Patients in this population were younger than those who participated in other 
studies, but the residual pain scores and return to work rates were similar to other 
reported studies. Reporting the distribution of pain scores provides information useful 
to decision makers, and allows for the identification of sub-groups worthy of further 
investigation. 
The cost of intervention did not govern success and a number of studies have 
found that increasing complexity of procedure increased costs but did not produce 
improved clinical outcomes. The benefit and role of more complex fusion procedures 
should clearly be reviewed. 
Governments and society cannot continue to fund expensive procedures which 
have little or no impact on functional outcome. Patient preference (or desperation) is 
the driving force in this context, for if patients are in severe pain and perceive that pain 
to be worsening it is only human nature to want something done. Grasping at straws is 
perhaps an apt description for this scenario. 
The cost of providing a service can be justified ifthe outcome is beneficial to 
the individual or society. The primary outcome for the patient is relief of pain, whilst 
the primary outcome for society is return to gainful employment (or a lack of 
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invalidity). In this study there were no statistically significant differences between the 
cost of successful and unsuccessful procedures, consistent with other recent studies 
which found no link between clinical outcome measures and return to work status. 
Working status is perhaps the best outcome indicator from an employer, insurer, 
government and societal perspective, if not also from an individual perspective. 
The detailed review of the costs and outcomes of spinal surgery provide useful 
information for health system decision makers. It is one thing to be injured, it is another 
to receive the appropriate treatment required to facilitate a full. The cost of injury is 
significantly increased if expensive treatments that do not result in a rapid and sustained 
return to work are achieved. 
In a constrained financial environment where governments are seeking to 
maintain or reduce the growth in health expenditures, a fairly ruthless approach to 
effectiveness is required. Traditional cost effectiveness evaluations have examined the 
incremental cost in comparison to a standard treatment, but do not question whether the 
standard treatment or any of its competitors are effective from a primary standpoint. To 
justify the continued commitment of scare funds to a procedure or group of procedures, 
decision makers must be convinced that there is a worthwhile absolute, rather than just 
relative, benefit to justify the cost. 
The final word will rest with Gibson; "Surgical investigations and interventions 
account for large health care utilisation and costs, but the scientific evidence for most 
procedures is still limited." (Gibson 2005). 
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Chapter 8. Summary and Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This is the first study to have determined a comprehensive estimate of the cost 
of injury to the Australian Army. Ironically, the data sources used in this analysis, while 
dated, are more comprehensive and reliable than those currently available through 
existing information systems within the Department of Defence. The included review of 
spinal surgery is also the first study to compare the cost and outcomes of a range of 
spinal surgical procedures reflective of general orthopaedic community practice. 
This study adopted a government perspective as well including societal and 
individual perspectives in assessing the cost of injury to the Australian Army. Because 
the government pays salaries, medical costs, pensions, and bears the burden of 
productivity losses; its perspective is very similar to that of society. Capability loss is a 
uniquely Army intangible cost that cannot be currently quantified. 
8.2 Cost of Illness Studies 
Cost of illness studies summarize the economic burden of a particular disease 
and provide information for stakeholders, allowing them to make informed decisions on 
the allocation of scarce healthcare resources. Cost of illness studies serve a different 
purpose to that of health economic evaluations (i.e. cost-benefit analysis, cost-
effectiveness analysis, cost-utility analysis) which are focused on evaluating the cost of 
an intervention rather than estimating the cost of a particular disease (Druss 2002). 
The economic burden of injury is the sum of all costs associated with injury that 
would not otherwise have been incurred, had the injury not occurred. Estimating the 
economic burden of all injuries in a defined population can be difficult because the 
necessary data are often unavailable. 
The cost of injury has three components; direct costs; indirect costs; and 
intangible costs. Direct costs considered in this analysis included external medical and 
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compensation costs, as well as compensation liabilities calculated by the Australian 
Government Actuary. Indirect costs included productivity losses, with invalid pensions 
also included because they constitute a significant cost to Government not usually 
included in (COI) studies. An additional analysis of the net present value oflost wages 
was conducted on a cohort of soldiers who were invalided from the Army. A novel 
approach, termed the Capital Investment Model, was used to estimate the loss of 
training investment as a result of premature separation from the Army due to injury. 
Intangible costs were not included in this study because of the difficulty in placing a 
monetary value on these aspects of injury. 
Dagenais, in a systematic review of cost of illness studies, found that the 
greatest cost savings from a societal perspective may be obtained from interventions 
that promote early return to work and minimize lost productivity (Dagenais 2008). 
8.3 Strengths and Limitations of this thesis 
This thesis has categorised and captured costs associated with injury in the 
Australian Army in a comprehensive manner. Correctly categorising all costs represents 
the first step in improving the quality and comparability of cost information (Balas 
1998). The cost data in the review of spinal surgery conformed to the requirements of 
Barber by presenting the data more precisely with arithmetic means and standard 
deviations, as well as the use of simple statistical analysis to determine any significance 
between two different mean costs of treatment. (Barber 1998). 
Most of the datasets used in this thesis are proprietary and not publically 
available. It is a weakness of this study that a detailed breakdown of injury costs could 
not be obtained from the Defence Financial Management Information System 
(DEFMIS) database. Other cost of illness studies have been able to identify the 
individual components contributing to the direct cost calculation, but this thesis was 
forced to rely on a number of proportional estimates, due to the previous and continuing 
limitations of the existing datasets. 
The DEFMIS database only accounted for externally generated medical 
expenses and did not take into account the services and costs incurred from salaried 
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members of the Defence Department who delivered health services. It was not possible 
to apportion a contribution of sunken health costs to injury. 
The estimate of direct medical costs relied on assumptions based on data 
derived from a Canberra Area Medical Unit database, because it was able to capture 
individual episodes of injury using a unique referral number. Defence computer systems 
did not allow for the identification of discrete care episodes, thus not allowing for the 
distinction to be made between injury and illness. 
This thesis used a cross-sectional prevalence approach to estimate the cost of 
injury across the Army. The use of a Canberra-based population containing a mixture 
of very young and relatively older subjects is likely to have skewed the estimation of 
injury prevalence, with the prevalence of illness likely to be higher in the older 
population compared to the younger populations located in other main troop 
concentration areas. 
Clerical staff determined if the referral was for injury or illness, thereby 
introducing a potential source of bias, although this decision was informed by the 
content of the original doctor's referral and feedback from the patient. This process did 
allow for all costs associated with the episode of care such as radiology, pathology, 
anaesthetic, hospitalisation and ancillary costs to be recorded against the one referral 
number. This system was not utilised at any other military health facility, so the data is 
unique within Defence. 
The only data available on the causes of medical downgrading came from an old 
Army database utilised by the Soldier Career Management Agency (Rudzki 1994). Data 
ceased being entered onto this database with the advent of the Defence Personnel 
Management system called PMKeys. This system adopted a "lowest common 
denominator approach" to the recording of data, and any data not collected or required 
by other groups and Services within the Department of Defence was not captured. 
Data on compensation costs and invalid pensions was drawn from large 
organisational databases, and while cost data was accurate it was not possible to 
identify subgroups for detailed analysis. In most cases, Army costs were explicitly 
identified, but occasional pro-rata estimates was made. There was no data available 
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from the Department of Veterans Affairs on the type of conditions leading to the 
awarding of invalidity pensions, but medical invalidity data was available from the 
Military Superannuation (MSBS) scheme. Unfortunately the statistical reporting of 
causes of invalidity data ceased in the 1998/99 year. The estimation of compensation 
liabilities was required for the Department of Defence to satisfy its accrual reporting 
obligations, and the actuaries noted that data collection within the compensation 
organization was poor, with no regular matching of claims data with payments data. 
One of the strengths of this study was the inclusion of transfer payments when 
calculating net productivity losses. The sensitivity analysis revealed that the level of 
disability pension impacted on the net residual loss to an individual's productive 
working life earning capacity. For Class A pensioners, the net residual loss was only 
25-30% of the estimated net present value (NPV) oflost wages, while for Class B 
pensioners; there was a consistent 70% net residual loss across most age groups. 
Varying the discount rate from 2% to 10% had the most marked effect on soldiers who 
were invalided early in their careers, but the discount rate became much less significant 
once the member reached the age of 45 years. 
Another strength of this thesis was the use of a novel capital investment model 
to estimate the lost investment in training. The human capital model relies in 
investment by the individual in their own education or training, but Army funds all job 
related training while providing a salary. The investment in training is therefore 
significant, and this approach allows the value of the training investment to be 
quantified and an estimate made of the loss attributable to premature separation due to 
lllJUry. 
The review of spinal surgery in this thesis is the first to compare the cost of all 
spinal procedures performed within a community setting. It provides the first 
comparison of cost between non-operative procedures such as manipulation under 
anaesthesia and epidural injection of corticosteroid with the more common operative 
procedures oflumbar fusion and discectomy. Previous published studies have confined 
themselves to either discectomy or fusion procedures exclusively or compared 
conservative management to either fusion or discectomy. There is only one published 
study comparing epidural steroid injection to discectomy (Abdi 2007). 
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This spinal surgery study was a retrospective observational study, and suffered 
from the usual concerns regarding confounding, selection and recall bias. Retrospective 
cohort designs are common in the injury literature, and they commonly produce 
descriptive data (Caine 1996). This study was limited by its small sample size, but was 
restricted to the feasibility of following up patients from the three year window chosen. 
The bottom up review of the spinal surgery cohort provided detailed data on the 
cost and outcome of spinal surgery procedures, and a number of important findings 
emerged. This study presented the distribution of investigations in the cohort and 
uncovered significant radiation exposures in 30% of the subjects. Other studies have 
only presented the total or mean number of investigations and the total and mean cost. 
There is a high incidence of multiple radiologic investigation in those with chronic low 
back pain, and the use of CT scans with their associated high radiation exposure 
remains prevalent today. The description of individual utilisation of investigational 
resources provides useful insights into individual variations in surgical management 
that could be useful to hospital managers who must manage tight budgets. 
Direct medical costs outweighed indirect costs in cases of complex surgery and 
this was supported by other studies. There was no relationship between the cost of 
surgery and the clinical outcome, with many authors advocating the use of simple and 
less costly procedures to achieve the same clinical outcome. There was a dissociation 
between perceived surgical success and return to work status and this has been a 
consistent finding in the literature. 
The detailed review of the costs and outcomes of spinal surgery provide useful 
information for health system decision makers. It is one thing to be injured it is another 
to receive appropriate treatment required to facilitate a full recovery (as determined by 
return to work). The cost of injury is significantly increased if expensive treatments do 
not result in a rapid and sustained return to work. 
8.4 Assumptions 
A number of assumptions were made to ascertain the proportion of total costs 
attributable to injury. The contribution of injury to direct medical costs was estimated 
from the 2-year sample obtained from the Canberra Area Medical Unit database. The 
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total Army cost was calculated by extrapolation of the injury contribution from the 
Canberra dataset to total Army health expenditure. Injury accounted for a mean of27% 
of total cost in this sample, but the Canberra sample was not representative of the total 
Army population, with 50% of the Army in Canberra being over 35 years old, 
compared to 20% of the total Army. 
Reported injury attendances in the British and United States Armies were 39% 
and 46% respectively, while data drawn from a small sample of Australian Defence 
Academy cadets showed a 38% incidence of injury attendance. An upper bound 
estimate of 40% was therefore adopted as the injury cost contribution and a sensitivity 
analysis performed. 
The relative contribution of injury to overall compensation costs was based on 
data produced by the Australian Government Actuary. A figure of 72% was chosen and 
represents a rounding up of the 71.2% liability contribution from the combination of 
back, knee, lower limb and upper limb compensation categories, which were assumed 
to have arisen as the consequence of injuries. The rounding up acknowledged that many 
of the cases within the head category would also be classed as injuries, but were not 
included in this figure. Thus the estimate of 72% was considered to represent a reliable 
lower bound estimate. 
DVA invalidity pension data did not provide detail sufficient to determine the 
contribution of Army injury. Given that Army's compensation costs were 
disproportionate to its numerical strength, it was assumed that its disability pension 
contribution would be similar to its compensation contribution. Therefore a figure of 
72% of DV A pension costs was attributed to Army, a similar proportion to its 
compensation liabilities. It was also assumed that 75.6% of these pension costs will be 
the result of an injury, similar to the proportion of invalidity due to musculoskeletal 
causes. 
Disorders of the spine accounted for between 3 7% and 4 7% of total invalidity in 
Army. The contribution of musculoskeletal conditions to invalidity was a 3 year 
average of 75.6% and this was used to calculate the proportion ofDFRDB and MSBS 
pension costs attributable to injury. 
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8.5 The importance of injury 
Injury is a leading cause of death and premature mortality, especially in young 
adults. Injury is predominately a male event, especially in the workplace, motor vehicle 
and sporting field. Work injuries have been estimated to cost Australia $20 billion 
dollars annually, while sports injuries have been estimated to cost over $1 billion per 
year. Back pain is the leading type of occupational injury, accounting for 25% of all 
work-related injuries. 
Injury is a major problem for western armies. In Australia, the reported rate of 
injury in soldiers is four times higher than the mining injury, although the reporting 
criteria are different. In contrast to industry, lower limb injuries predominate in the 
Army, mainly due to the heavy emphasis placed on physical training. The US Army 
has demonstrated that injury rates in female soldiers are twice that of males, with days 
of restriction five times greater. The British Army has shown that while the incidence of 
illness was greater than of injury, injury resulted in two and a half times greater 
morbidity (days lost). 
Systematic data on injury outcome is surprisingly scarce and it is of note that 
severity of initial injury is not automatically related to residual disability. The best way 
of reducing injury incidence and improving outcome is through a comprehensive 
system of injury surveillance 
Injury can be prevented, it neither inevitable nor an act of god. An 
understanding of where, when and how injuries occur is critical for the development of 
interventions to prevent and control injuries. The establishment of effective injury 
surveillance systems is the only way in which the problem can be tackled in a rational 
and effective way. Unfortunately there is a paucity of accurate health surveillance and 
cost data within the Australian Army at an organisational level. This is primarily due to 
the lack of an effective electronic health record within the Defence Health Services. 
Prevention of injury is the most effective way to reduce the cost of injury, and 
the power of effective prevention was demonstrated by the significant reduction of 
injuries in the 3rd Brigade achieved by the Defence Injury Prevention Program (DIPP). 
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Accurate data that is analysed and presented to decision makers with accompanying 
advice regarding injury countermeasures is a proven and effective strategy. Attempts to 
include the injury prevention data set into a revised occupational health and safety 
incident form will hopefully provide the dataset required to restore the DIPP as an 
effective injury prevention system. 
8.6 The total cost of Injury to the Australian Army 
Table 8.1 summarises the total cost of injury to the Australian Army in 1996. 
Direct costs were estimated from an examination of external medical costs and 
compensation costs. The estimated direct cost of injury for the Army in 1996 comprised 
estimated medical costs of between $3.35M and $4.96 Mand a compensation cost of 
$37.40M. The total direct cost of injury to Army was estimated to be between $40.75M 
and $42.36M, while the outstanding compensation liability for injury was estimated to 
be $270.0M. 
Indirect costs for 1996 were estimated from productivity losses and invalid 
pension costs. Total invalid pension costs attributable to injury were estimated to be 
$9 .38M, comprising $7. l 6M from DV A pensions and $ 2.22M from military 
superannuation disability pensions. Productivity losses, including on-costs, were 
estimated to be $1.36M. The total indirect cost of injury was estimated to $10.74M with 
estimated invalid pension liabilities of $63.82M. The total capital loss due to 
premature separation due to injury was estimated to be $10.lM. 
Direct Costs AG39 Medical Costs 
Compensation Costs 
Total Direct Costs 
Outstanding Compensation Liabilities 
1989 Dollars $A 
$3.35M - $4.96M 
$37.40M 
$40. 75 -$42.36M 
$270.0M 
Indirect Costs 
Capital Losses due to 
premature Separation 
Veterans Affairs Pensions 
DFRDB/MSBS Pensions 1995 
Total Pensions cost 
Army Lost Production (I I ,165days) 
including on-costs 
Total Indirect Costs 
DV A Liability 
DFRDB/MSBS Pension Liability 
Total Pension Liabilities per annum 
Estimated NPV of lost wages of those 
soldiers in receipt of invalidity pensions for 
injury 
$7.16M 
$2.22M 
$9.38M 
$1.36M 
$10.74M 
$44.71M 
$19.IIM 
$63.82M 
$26.75M 
$10. IOM 
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Total Cost $6l.59M - $63.20 
Total Liabilities $333.82M 
Table 8.1 Summary of estimated Total Cost of injury for Army in 1996. 
8. 7 Conclusion 
The Australian Defence Force often uses the slogan "People are our greatest 
asset". The Capital Investment Model used in this thesis, applies that slogan in a literal 
way by valuing the of training investment in Army members in the same way as capital 
assets are valued and depreciated. This differs significantly from the traditional human 
capital approach where an individuals invests in his or her own training to improve 
their own "human capital". This thesis has shown the significant impact that injury has 
on the Army, in terms of direct and indirect costs, as well as attendant compensation 
and invalid pension liabilities. The loss of trained staff also has significant impacts on 
the ability of Army to staff its organisations and man its equipment. 
A disturbing feature of the Army experience was the relative youth of those 
soldiers who were invalided as a result of injury, with 54% percent of Army invalid 
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pensioners being aged 29 years or younger. Effective prevention strategies are the only 
practical way of reducing the incidence and severity of injury in young soldiers and 
significantly reduce future costs. 
The large sums involved, offer the prospect that investment in injury prevention 
strategies can be offset by reductions in the high recurrent costs of injury. The impetus 
for investment in injury prevention is two fold; reduce the burden of direct and indirect 
costs and reduce the burden on individuals who are prematurely invalided and lost to 
the workforce. Injury is a lose-lose situation for both government and society, with the 
productive capacity of soldiers to engage in employment and with their families being 
severely disrupted by injury. 
To a large extent, Army (and the ADF) is shielded from the true cost of the 
injuries suffered by its members, as it does not have its workplace injury record judged 
by its compensation costs and resulting insurance premiums. Most private sector 
employers strive to have their worker's compensation premium at or below 1.5% of 
salaries, but Army's actuarially derived notional premium of 3.8% is 2.5 times greater 
than the industry benchmark. This places Army in the worst category of employer from 
a compensation perspective, but it bears no consequence as government carries all 
compensation costs. 
Because these costs are largely hidden, the impetus to reduce them is not great. 
Tackling the problem will require a number of structural reforms, including the 
introduction of a workers compensation premium. Such a move would introduce direct 
accountability for performance and provide a feedback loop of reduced premiums for 
improved performance. 
To obtain accurate and reliable data, a comprehensive injury surveillance system 
must be introduced into the ADF, and be linked to cost data. For any meaningful 
change in policy approach or allocation of resources, the true extent and nature of costs 
must be visible. Current attempts to improve injury surveillance in the ADF by 
incorporating injury surveillance data into the Defence Occupational Health and Safety 
(OHS) reporting system offers some hope that this can be achieved. The introduction of 
an electronic health record is also critical to enable the linkage between clinical and 
cost data. 
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The detailed review of the costs and outcomes of spinal surgery provide useful 
information for health system decision makers. In a constrained financial environment, 
where governments are seeking to maintain or reduce the growth in health 
expenditures, a fairly ruthless approach to effectiveness is required. To justify the 
continued commitment of scare funds to a procedure or group of procedures, decision 
makers must be convinced that there is a worthwhile absolute, not merely relative, 
benefit sufficient to justify the cost. 
With disorders of the spine accounting for 40% of all Army invalidity, 
improved methods of diagnosing and treating back pain are clearly required. Until we 
have a better understanding of the aetiology of the various causes of low back pain, 
surgeons will continue to pursue a plethora of surgical techniques that may palliate but 
not cure. The human and societal cost of this is enormous. Reducing the intensity of 
back pain and its associated fear and disability, will likely reduce patient preference for 
surgery. Research efforts should be directed at reducing pain through non-operative 
means, allowing the decision for surgery to be made solely on the basis of strictly 
defined clinical criteria. 
The literature would suggest that the findings of this study remain relevant 
today because of the paucity of data in this area. Published studies examining the cost-
effectiveness of spinal fusion and discectomy have only been published since 2004, 
long after this thesis was commenced. That the problem remains real and unsolved, is 
the observation by some authors that, despite a plethora of new procedures, there is no 
evidence these complex and expensive procedures provide any advantage over older, 
simpler and less expensive procedures. 
This thesis identified and aggregated costs that were not visible to policy 
makers. By identifying the large sums involved, it is hoped that policy makers will 
become engaged. It is hoped that by identifying and highlighting these costs, decision 
makers will be spurred to take action, not just in Army but in all the government 
agencies involved. 
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